the nature of the relations between different States, and between particular States and the individuals composing them.

It will thus happen that in the consideration of the various theories that have been held by political philosophers in the past, there will not be mentioned many of those whose names would properly appear in a general history of Political Science. Only those will be here referred to who have contributed by their writings to the development of the idea of the State as distinct from its organization or good administration. Thus, for example, the writings of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Sidgwick, which are devoted to the science of politics, will need comparatively scant mention. Nor shall we find it necessary to consider the works of that large body of writers who have devoted their attention either to the description of governmental forms or to the analysis of particular political types. During the Middle Ages, and indeed reaching well up into modern times, the relation between Church and State was the pivotal point around which political controversies raged. In all the writings which these struggles engendered theological dogma played an important part, and we shall find this literature of interest to us only in so far as doctrines of a general nature were evolved.

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

"State" and "Government."-The first fundamental distinction that must be made, is that between "State" and "Government." By the term "Government" is designated the organization of the State, -the machinery through which its purposes are formulated and executed. Thus, as we shall see, while the term "State" is, when strictly considered, an abstract term, Government is emphatically concrete. More than that, Government is purely mechanical and governed by no general laws. Its varying forms are in all cases determined by political expediency, and the examination of its essential character involves no such philosophical considerations as will interest us in our present inquiry. The subject of Government thus lies almost wholly without the field of Political Theory, and is comprehended within the domains of descriptive and historical politics.

Simple and definite as is this distinction between the State and its governmental machinery (corresponding as it does very much to the distinction between a given person and the material bodily frame in which such person is organized), we shall find it to be one that has been but seldom made. In fact,

it has been the confusion between these two terms that has led directly or indirectly to a great majority of the erroneous results reached by political philosophers in the past.

"Nation" and "People.". "From the terms "Nation" and "People" the State is likewise to be dissociated.

In the use of the two former terms the greatest confusion exists. In Germany the word "People' (Volk) has primarily and predominantly a political signification, as denoting a body of individuals organized under a single government; while the term "Nation" (Nation) is reserved for a collection of individuals united by ethnic or other bonds, irrespective of political combination. According to this use "a Nation is an aggregate of men speaking the same language, having the same customs, and endowed with certain moral qualities which distinguish them from all other groups of like nature. . . . All people living under the same Government compose the People' of the State. In relation to the State, the Citizens constitute the People; in relation to the human race, they constitute the Nation."1

923.

1 Helie, in Lalor's Encyclopædia of Political Science, Vol. II. p. Attention may also be called to the fact that the English word "government" is of wider meaning than the German term Regierung, which excludes the function of legislation, and frequently has no wider signification than that conveyed by our word "administration." The Germans have, however, a narrower term Verwaltung, which has especial reference to the details of executive action. Cf. Sarwey, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 93, 94 (Marquardsen's Handbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart). See post, for the special use of the term "government" by Burgess.

As opposed to this usage, American and English publicists are wont to give to "Nation" the political meaning, and to signify by the word "People" an aggregate of men united by other than political bonds. Thus, as Bluntschli says in his Theory of the State: "In English the word 'People' and the French Peuple' implies the notion of a civilization which the Germans (like the old Romans in the word 'Natio') expressed by 'Nation.' The political idea is expressed in English by Nation' and in German by Volk.' Etymology is in favor of German usage; for the word 'Natio' (from Nasci) points to birth and race, Volk and populus rather to the public life of a State (móλis).” 1

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At the same time, however, the English are not always consistent in making the use of these words the converse of that of the Germans. Commenting upon this paragraph of Bluntschli which we have cited, his translators say: "It will be found that he goes too far in supposing our use to be the exact converse of the German. The fact is, our word 'People,' though often less political in its signification than Volk, is more political than the German word Nation. Thus we must translate Volksvertretung' by 'representation of the people,' and we can only render Populus Romanus by 'the Roman people.' They might also have added that the same indefiniteness surrounds the use of the word "Nation." For example, in the phrase rights of nationality," there is the obvious postu2 Idem, p. vii.

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1 Trans. 2d ed. p. 86.

late that nationality is nowise coterminous with political boundaries.

Notwithstanding, however, the confusion that thus exists in the English use of these terms, the translators of Bluntschli have seen fit to translate wherever possible the German word Volk by "Nation," and Nation by the English word "People." In this it would seem to the writer they have been unwise. The mere fact that they could not follow this rule in all cases condemns it. It would have been far better to have followed the German usage, and thus to have obtained, if not a perfect, at least a more definite and precise nomenclature. We shall therefore in the following pages denote by "People" an aggregate of men living under a single political control. The term "Nation" will be reserved for the more general and abstract use. That which welds a body of individuals into a national unity is no rigid political control, but ethnic and other factors largely sentimental or psychological in character.

Now when we say that it is these influences of race, religion, custom, language, and history that create a Nation, we mean that from these sources spring the feeling or sentiment that binds together a community of people, and constitutes from them a Nation. Each of these factors invites the formation of a Nation, but no one of them compels it. The essential principle is the feeling that is the result of one or more of these factors. Thus, as says Renan: "A Nation is a spiritual principle, resulting from the profound complications of history; a spirit