and the electors in each state have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. (Art. 1. sec. 2.) Under the confederation, delegates were appointed for one year, and were at any time subject to recall by the state legislature. Elections so frequent, especially elections by the people, would bring together a great number of men without the requisite experience in national business. Measures originated at one session would often be determined by new members unaided in their decisions by the light of previous investigation. Wise legislation is best secured by a term of office which will enable the same set of men to mature and finish the business they have begun. Hence two years was considered a proper term for a national representative. 3. The convention readily acceded to the proposition to transfer the choice of representatives from the state legislatures to the people. It is proper that a representative should derive his power from those whose wants he is to make known, and whose rights he is to guard. § 4. In determining the qualifications of the electors of representatives, regard was had to the supposed preferences of the states. In some of them, property, or the payment of taxes, was made a qualification. In others, none but freeholoers were voters. In others, the senate and governor were elected by freeholders, while in the election of the other house freemen generally were allowed to vote. In others, again, the right of suffrage was almost universal. It was presumed that no state would object to a rule which it had established, or might thereafter establish, for electing the popular branch of its own legislature. § 5. A representative, to be eligible, must have attained the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States; and he must be, when elected, an inhabitant of the state in which he is chosen. (Art. 1, sec. . 2.) Few men at an earlier age than twenty-five years, have that knowledge of public affairs, or that degree of caution and prudence, which is requisite in the exercise of so important a trust. Aliens can hardly be supposed to feel that attachment to our institutions, and that regard for the public interest, which are felt by our own citizens. A residence for a less period than seven years after they shall have become citizens, could hardly enable them to acquire sufficient knowledge of our government and of the various interests of the country, to fit them for the duties of legislators. For equally wise reasons is a representative required to be an inhabitant of the state he is chosen to represent. The business of a state is more safely intrusted to a representative whose residence in the state has made him more familiar with its interests, and who must himself be affected by the measures he may support. § 6. The next clause of the constitution prescribes the rule of apportionment. No part of the labors of the convention was more difficult than the settling of the principle of representation. It was proposed in the plan under consideration, that the vote of each state should be in proportion to its quota of contribution to the general revenue, or to the number of its free inhabitants, as the one or the other might seem best in different cases. To this the smaller states objected. One of the states, (Delaware,) had expressly instructed her delegates not to surrender the right of an equal vote in congress. A proportional representation, or unequal suffrage, it was said, would give the large states undue influence. A combination of three or four such states would enable them to enact whatever laws they pleased, however oppressive to the others. Not only so; they could even control the appointment of the president, the judges, and other officers of the government. 7. It was urged, on the other hand, that there was no similarity of interests which would be likely to unite the larger states against the small ones; that there was quite as much danger of combinations of the smaller states, or of some of them with one or more of the larger states; and that the number of small states (small in population) would soon be increased by the admission of new states formed from the western territory. Union was indispensable to the welfare and safety of all. Especially did the small states need the protection of the federal government. But no other than a radical change, similar to the one proposed, could preserve the union; and it was evident that the convention would agree to no plan which should retain the right of the small states to an equal vote in the legislature. 8. The difficulty of an arrangement was increased by the proposition to exclude slaves from the representative population. Although slavery existed in most of the northern as well as in the southern states, the number of slaves in the former was comparatively inconsiderable. These states, therefore, very naturally favored the proposed exclusion of slaves. The slaveholding states strenuously insisted on their being included in the basis of representation. The debate was warm and protracted. Indeed, so inflamed did the controversy become, and so unyielding were the parties, as to cause fears of a sudden dissolution of the convention. § 9. Against the computation of slaves in fixing the rule of apportionment, it was urged, that slaves, having neither personal liberty, nor property, nor being permitted to acquire property, but being themselves property, and, like other property, at the will of the master, they ought not to be counted. They were not represented in the states; why should they be represented in the general government? If they were men, let them be made citizens and voters. If they were property, why should the property of the free states be excluded? Besides, the admission of slaves into the representation would indirectly encourage the slave trade, which was a violation of the most sacred laws of humanity. § 10. There being no hope of settling this exciting question but by compromise, it was at length agreed that, in ascertaining the number of the representative population, three-fifths of the number of slaves should be added to the number of free persons; that is to say, every five slaves should be counted as three free persons. The advantage to the slaveholding states of this arrangement is clearly shown by the following example: Suppose a state to contain 600, 000 free persons and 500,000 slaves. Adding three-fifths of the number of slaves (300,000) to the number of free persons, gives 900,000 as the number of the representative population and the state would be entitled to three representatives for every two that a state would have which contained 600,000 free inhabitants and no slaves. : § 11. In return for this advantage, the slaveholding states consented that, in the apportionment of direct taxes among the states, the same rule should be observed so that a state gaining every third representative by the computation of its slaves, as in the case supposed, (§ 10,) would, in cases of direct taxation, contribute to the national treasury three dollars for every two which it would pay if its slaves were not counted. But this expected advantage has not been realized by the non-slaveholding states, as the treasury of the United States is supplied by the revenues derived from other sources, chiefly by duties on imports. Congress has found it necessary to exercise its power of direct taxation only two or three times since the adoption of the constitution. § 12. The constitution does not limit the house to any definite number of representatives; it only declares that the number shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants. It requires an enumeration of the inhabitants every ten years; and the next congress thereafter determines the ratio of representation and the number of representatives, and apportions them among the states. But as a representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, after the population has become very numerous, would make the house too large to transact business with equal dispatch, the ratio of representation has been increased with the increase of popula- . tion. After the census taken in 1790, the ratio was fixed at 33,000, which gave the house 106 members. After the census of 1800, the same ratio made the number of members 142. After 1810, the ratio was 35,000; the number of members, 182. After 1820, the ratio was 40,000; the number of members, 213. After 1830, the ratio was 47,700; the number of members, 240. After 1840, the ratio was 70,680; the number of members, 223. After 1850, the ratio was 93,000 and a fraction, making the number of members, 233; of which number California had one; but by special enactment an additional member was given to that state, making in all, 234. Minnesota has since been admitted as a state with two representatives, (1858,) and the admission of other new states will take place before the next appor tionment. Each § 13. Representatives are chosen by districts. state is divided by the legislature into as many districts, called congressional districts, as there are representatives to be elected in the state; and one representative is chosen in each district. In most of the states, representatives are chosen at the general state election. In some of them, there are special elections for choosing representatives. § 14. The constitution secures to the smallest states a representation in the house of representatives. It declares that each state shall have at least one representative. Without such a provision, and with a ratio large enough to keep the house within a proper size, the smallest states might be deprived of a representation in this branch. By an act of congress, every territory also, belonging to the United States, in which a government is established, is entitled to a delegate, who has the right of debating, but not of voting. : CHAPTER XXXII. THE SENATE. § 1. THE senate of the United States is composed of two sena tors from each state, chosen by the legislature for six years; and each senator has one vote. (Art. 1, sec. 3.) The division of the legislature into two branches was decided at an early period of the session, and apparently without serious opposition but as to the structure of the senate, there was a great diversity of opinion. For the election of senators, several modes were proposed. One proposition was, that the members of the second branch should be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual legislatures; another, that they should be chosen by the state legislatures; another, by the people of each state, in districts; another, by a body of electors chosen for that purpose by the people; and another still, that they should be appointed by the executive magistrate out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual legislatures. The last two modes, however, seem to have found no favor beyond their respective movers. § 2. The election of senators by the state legislatures appears to have been agreed to without much difficulty. It was proposed by those who thought it expedient to assimilate our national legislature, as nearly as might be, to that of England, by placing the election of one branch one remove from the direct choice of the people. It was ac |