order that the visiting officer may go aboard, the right of visit and of search would become a nullity.

The present conflict is not the first in which this necessity has arisen. As long ago as the Civil War the United States found it necessary to take vessels to United States ports in order to determine whether the circumstances justified their detention.

The same need arose during the Russo-Japanese War and also during the second Balkan War, when it sometimes happened that British vessels were made to deviate from their course and follow the cruisers to some spot where the right of visit and of search could be more conveniently carried out. In both cases this exercise of belligerent rights, although questioned at first by His Majesty's Government, was ultimately acquiesced in.

No Power in these days can afford during a great war to forego the exercise of the right of visit and search. Vessels which are apparently harmless merchantmen can be used for carrying and laying mines and even fitted to discharge torpedoes. Supplies for submarines can without difficulty be concealed under other cargo. The only protection against these risks is to visit and search thoroughly every vessel appearing in the zone of operations, and if the circumstances are such as to render it impossible to carry it out at the spot where the vessel was met with the only practicable course is to take the ship to some more convenient locality for the purpose. To do so is not to be looked upon as a new belligerent right, but as an adaptation of the existing right to the modern conditions of commerce. Like all belligerent rights, it must be exercised with due regard for neutral interests, and it would be unreasonable to expect a neutral vessel to make long deviations from her course for this purpose. It is for this reason that we have done all we can to encourage neutral merchantmen on their way to ports contiguous to the enemy country to visit some British port lying on their line of route in order that the necessary examination of the ship's papers, and, if required, of the cargo, can be made under conditions of convenience to the ship herself. The alternative would be to keep a vessel which the naval officers desired to board waiting, it might be for days together, until the weather conditions enabled the visit to be carried out at sea.

No war has yet been waged in which neutral individuals have not occasionally suffered from unjustified belligerent action; no neutral nation has experienced this fact more frequently in the past than Great Britain. The only method by which it is possible to harmonise belligerent action with the rights of neutrals is for the belligerent nation to provide some adequate machinery by which in any such case the facts can be investigated and appropriate redress can be obtained by the neutral individual. In this country such machinery is provided by the powers which are given to the prize court to deal not only with captures, but also with claims for compensation. Order V, rule 2, of the British prize court rules, provides that where a ship has been captured as prize, but has been subsequently released by the captors, or has by loss, destruction, or otherwise ceased to be detained by them, without proceedings for condemnation having been taken, any person interested in the ship (which by Order I, rule 2, includes goods) wishing to make a claim for costs and damages in respect thereof, shall issue a writ as provided by Order II. A writ so issued will initiate a proceeding, which will follow its ordinary course in the prize court.

This rule gives the prize court ample jurisdiction to deal with any claim for compensation by a neutral arising from the interference with a ship or goods by our naval forces. The best evidence that can be given of the discrimination and the moderation with which our naval officers have carried out their duties is to be found in the fact that up to this time no proceedings for the recovery of compensation have been initiated under the rule which I have quoted.

It is the common experience of every war that neutrals whose attempts to engage in suspicious trading are frustrated by a belligerent are wont to have recourse to their Government to urge that diplomatic remonstrances should be made on their behalf, and that redress should be obtained for them in this way. When an effective mode of redress is open to them in the courts of a civilized country by which they can obtain adequate satisfaction for any invasion of their rights which is contrary to the law of nations, the only course which is consistent with sound principle is that they should be referred to that mode of redress, and that no diplomatic action should be taken until their legal remedies have been exhausted, and they are in a position to show prima facie denial of justice.

The course adopted by His Majesty's Government during the American Civil War was in strict accordance with this principle. In spite of remonstrances from many quarters, they placed full reliance on the American prize courts to grant redress to the parties interested in cases of alleged wrongful capture by American ships of war, and put forward no claims until the opportunities for redress in those courts had been exhausted. The same course was adopted in the Spanish-American War, when all British subjects who complained of captures or detentions of their ships were referred to the prize courts for relief.

Before leaving the subject may I remind Your Excellency of the fact that at your request you are now supplied immediately by this department with particulars of every ship under American colors which is detained, and of every shipment of cargo in which an American citizen appears to be the party interested. Not only is the fact of detention notified to Your Excellency, but so far as is practicable the grounds upon which the vessel or cargo has been detained are also communicated to you; a concession which enables any United States citizen to take steps at once to protect his interests.

His Majesty's Government have also done all that lies in their power to insure rapid action when ships are reported in British ports. They realize that the ship and cargo owners may reasonably expect an immediate decision to be taken as to whether the ship may be allowed to proceed, and whether her cargo or any part of it must be discharged and put into the prize court. Realizing that the ordinary methods of interdepartmental correspondence might cause delays which could be obviated by another method of procedure, they established several months ago a special committee, on which all the departments concerned are represented. This committee sits daily, and is provided with a special clerical staff. As soon as a ship reaches port full particulars are telegraphed to London, and the case is dealt with at the next meeting of the committee, immediate steps being taken to carry out the action decided upon. By the adoption of this procedure it has been found possible to reduce to a minimum the delays to which neutral shipping is exposed by the exercise of

belligerent rights, and by the necessity, imposed by modern conditions, of examining with care the destination of contraband articles.

Particular attention is directed in Your Excellency's note to the policy we are pursuing with regard to conditional contraband, especially foodstuffs, and it is there stated that a number of American cargoes have been seized without, so far as Your Excellency's Government are informed, our being in possession of facts which warranted a reasonable belief that the shipments had in reality a belligerent destination, and in spite of the presumption of innocent use due to their being destined to neutral territory. The note does not specify any particular seizures as those which formed the basis of this complaint, and I am therefore not aware whether the passage refers to cargoes which were detained before or since the order in council of the 29th October was issued.

Your Excellency will no doubt remember that soon after the outbreak of war an order of His Majesty in council was issued under which no distinction was drawn in the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage between absolute contraband and conditional contraband, and which also imposed upon the neutral owner of contraband somewhat drastic conditions as to the burden of proof of the guilt or innocence of the shipment.

The principle that the burden of proof should always be imposed upon the captor has usually been admitted as a theory. In practice, however, it has almost always been otherwise, and any student of the prize courts decisions of the past or even of modern wars will find that goods seldom escape condemnation unless their owner was in a position to prove that their destination was innocent. An attempt was made some few years ago, in the unratified Declaration of London, to formulate some definite rules upon this subject, but time alone can show whether the rules there laid down will stand the test of modern warfare.

The rules which His Majesty's Government published in the order in council of the 20th August, 1914, were criticised by the United States Government as contrary to the generally recognised principles of international law, and as inflicting unnecessary hardship upon neutral commerce, and Your Excellency will remember the prolonged discussion which took place between us through the month of October with a view to finding some new formulæ which should enable us to restrict supplies to the enemy forces, and to prevent the supply to the enemy of materials essential for the making of munitions of war, while inflicting the minimum of injury and interference with neutral commerce. It was with this object that the order in council of the 29th October was issued, under the provisions of which a far greater measure of immunity is conferred upon neutral commerce. In that order the principle of noninterference with conditional contraband on its way to a neutral port is in large measure admitted; only in three cases is the right to seize maintained, and in all those cases the opportunity is given to the claimant of the goods to establish their innocence.

Two of those cases are where the ship's papers afford no information as to the person for whom the goods are intended. It is only reasonable that a belligerent should be entitled to regard as suspicious cases where the shippers of the goods do not choose to disclose the name of the individual who is to receive them. The third case is that of goods addressed to a person in the enemy territory. In the

peculiar circumstances of the present struggle, where the forces of the enemy comprise so large a proportion of the population, and where there is so little evidence of shipments on private as distinguished from Government account, it is most reasonable that the burden of proof should rest upon the claimant.

The most difficult questions in connection with conditional contraband arise with reference to the shipment of foodstuffs. No country has maintained more stoutly than Great Britain in modern times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from interference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. The circumstances of the present struggle are causing His Majesty's Government some anxiety as to whether the existing rules with regard to conditional contraband, framed as they were with the object of protecting so far as possible the supplies which were intended for the civil population, are effective for the purpose, or suitable to the conditions present. The principle which I have indicated above is one which His Majesty's Government have constantly had to uphold against the opposition of continental powers. In the absence of some certainty that the rule would be respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great doubt whether it should be regarded as an established principle of international law.

Your Excellency will, no doubt, remember that in 1885, at the time when His Majesty's Government were discussing with the French Government this question of the right to declare foodstuffs not intended for the military forces to be contraband, and when public attention had been drawn to the matter, the Kiel Chamber of Commerce applied to the German Government for a statement of the latter's views on the subject. Prince Bismarck's answer was as follows:

"In answer to their representation of the 1st instant, I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity, which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants, but also on neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral power with the way in which a third carries on the war, to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering power, and by this means German commerce might be weighed with far heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships."

His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the same view is still maintained by the German Government.

Another circumstance which is now coming to light is that an elaborate machinery has been organized by the enemy for the supply of foodstuffs for the use of the German army from overseas. Under these circumstances it would be absurd to give any definite pledge that in cases where the supplies can be proved to be for the use of the enemy forces they should be given complete immunity by the simple expedient of despatching them to an agent in a neutral port.

The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended

for the civil population and those for the armed forces or enemy Government disappears when the distinction between the civil population and the armed forces itself disappears.

In any country in which there exists such a tremendous organisation for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear division between those whom the Government is responsible for feeding and those whom it is not. Experience shows that the power to requisition will be used to the fullest extent in order to make sure that the wants of the military are supplied, and however much goods may be imported for civil use it is by the military that they will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now that the German Government have taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country.

I do not wish to overburden this note with statistics, but in proof of my statement as to the unprecedented extent to which supplies are reaching neutral ports I should like to instance the figures of the exports of certain meat products to Denmark during the months of September and October. Denmark is a country which in normal times imports a certain quantity of such products, but exports still more. In 1913, during the above two months, the United States exports of lard to Denmark were nil, as compared with 22,652,598 pounds in the same two months of 1914. The corresponding figures with regard to bacon were: 1913, nil; 1914, 1,022,195 pounds; canned beef, 1913, nil; 1914, 151,200 pounds; pickled and cured beef, 1913, 42,901 pounds; 1914, 156,143 pounds; pickled pork, 1913, nil; 1914, 812,872 pounds.

In the same two months the United States exported to Denmark 280,176 gallons of mineral lubricating oil in 1914 as compared with 179,252 in 1913; to Norway, 335,468 gallons in 1914, as against 151,179 gallons in 1913; to Sweden, 896,193 gallons in 1914, as against 385,476 gallons in 1913.

I have already mentioned the framing of the order in council of the 20th October, and the transmission to Your Excellency of particulars of ships and cargoes seized as instances of the efforts which we have made throughout the course of this war to meet all reasonable complaints made on behalf of American citizens, and in my note of the 7th January I alluded to the decision of our prize court in the case of the Miramichi, as evidencing the liberal principles adopted toward neutral commerce.

I should also like to refer to the steps which we took at the beginning of the war to insure the speedy release of cargo claimed by neutrals on board enemy ships which were captured or detained at the outbreak of war. Under our prize court rules release of such goods can be obtained without the necessity of entering a claim in the prize court if the documents of title are produced to the officer representing His Majesty's Government, and the title to the goods is established to his satisfaction. It was shortly found, however, that this procedure did not provide for the case where the available evidence was so scanty that the officer representing the Crown was not justified in consenting to a release. In order, therefore, to ameliorate the situation we established a special committee, with full powers to authorise the release of goods without insisting on full evidence of title being produced. This committee dealt with the utmost expedition with a large number of claims. In the great majority of cases the goods claimed were released at once. In addition to the cases dealt with by this committee a very large amount of cargo