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Over

15 years (F).

Generally

(G).

One-third to be deducted off all repairs and renewals. Anchors to be allowed in full. Onesixth to be deducted off chain cables.

The deductions (except as to provisions and stores, machinery, and boilers) to be regulated by the age of the ship, and not the age of the particular part of her to which they apply. No painting bottom to be allowed if the bottom has not been painted within six months previous to the date of accident. No deduction to be made in respect of old material which is repaired without being replaced by new, and provisions and stores which have not been in use.

In the case of wooden or composite ships:

When a ship is under one year old from date of original register, at the time of accident, no deduction new for old shall be made. After that period a deduction of one-third shall be made, with the following exceptions: Anchors shall be allowed in full. Chain cables shall be subject to a deduction of one-sixth only.

No deduction shall be made in respect of provisions and stores which had not been in use.

Metal sheathing shall be dealt with, by allowing in full the cost of a weight equal to the gross weight of metal sheathing stripped off, minus the proceeds of the old metal. Nails, felt, and labor metaling are subject to a deduction of one-third.

In the case of ships generally:

In the case of all ships, the expense of straightening bent iron-work, including labor of taking out and replacing it, shall be allowed in full.

Graving dock dues, including expenses of removals, cartages, use of shears, stages, and graving dock materials, shall be allowed in full.

Rule XIV. TEMPORARY REPAIRS.-No deductions "6 new for old" shall be made from the cost of temporary repairs of damage allowable as general average.

Rule XV. LosS OF FREIGHT.-Loss of freight arising from damage to or loss of cargo shall be made good as general

average, either when caused by a general average act, or when the damage to or loss of cargo is so made good.

Rule XVI. AMOUNT TO BE MADE GOOD FOR CARGO LOST OR DAMAGED BY SACRIFICE.-The amount to be made good as general average for damage or loss of goods sacrificed shall be the loss which the owner of the goods has sustained thereby, based on the market values at the date of the arrival of the vessel or at the termination of the adventure.

Rule XVII. CONTRIBUTORY VALUES.-The contribution to a general average shall be made upon the actual values of the property at the termination of the adventure, to which shall be added the amount made good as general average for property sacrificed; deduction being made from the shipowner's freight and passage-money at risk, of such port charges and crew's wages as would not have been incurred had the ship and cargo been totally lost at the date of the general average act or sacrifice, and have not been allowed as general average; deduction being also made from the value of the property of all charges incurred in respect thereof subsequently to the general average act, except such charges as are allowed in general average.

Passengers' luggage and personal effects, not shipped under bill of lading, shall not contribute to general average.

Rule XVIII. ADJUSTMENT.-Except as provided in the foregoing rules, the adjustment shall be drawn up in accordance with the law and practice that would have governed the adjustment had the contract of affreightment not contained a clause to pay general average according to these rules.

§ 126. Contributory Value of Freight.-As has been observed, the law prevailing in the United States does not conform in all respects to these rules.

In respect to the contributory value of the freight interest, which cannot always be easily ascertained, an arbitrary rule has been adopted in New York. While the full amount of freight is contributed for in general average, only fifty per cent. of that amount is called upon for contribution.1 That is supposed to be a rough estimate of its net value at the end of the voyage, after expenses have been deducted from the gross freight.

1 Rathbone v. Fowler, 6 Blatch. 296.

CHAPTER XI.

THE NEW YORK STANDARD FIRE POLICY.

THE dissimilarities existing in numerous forms of fire policies resulted in inconveniences and uncertainties, especially in cases where the same property was insured by policies in different companies, which often thus furnished inconsistent provisions for the adjustment of the same loss. This and other considerations influenced the legislatures of certain States to pass statutes for the adoption of standard forms of fire policies. A list of references to these statutes will be found in the appendix. The actual framing and adoption of the standard policy by the several States was sometimes separated by a considerable interval of time from the enactment making provision for its adoption.

In framing a standard form of fire policy Massachusetts was the pioneer State. Under the act of 1886, Chapter 488, passed prior to the Massachusetts act, New York followed with the preparation of a standard form differing in many particulars from that previously drafted by the Massachusetts authorities. The other States mentioned in the list already referred to have accepted either substantially or precisely the New York standard form. This was drafted under the provisions of the New York statute ostensibly by a committee of the New York Board of Fire Underwriters, but actually by that committee in conference with a committee of the National Board of Fire Underwriters, and all that legal knowledge and business experience could furnish was brought to bear upon the careful construction of this important instrument. The aim, among other things, was to avoid giving occasion for novel questions of controversy by making it accord in its phraseology with the decisions of the court of last resort in this State.

The work was superintended by William Allen Butler, Esq., of the New York bar. Except New Hampshire.

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The use of the standard form is made by the statute obligatory in New York upon all fire companies doing business within the State, and a penalty is imposed for violating the act, but it is provided that any policy in form inconsistent with the provisions of the act shall nevertheless be binding upon the company issuing the same.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the policy is not an absolute agreement to grant indemnity to the insured at all events for the loss occasioned by the casualty insured against, but is made dependent upon the fulfilment on his part of certain provisions of the contract which are called conditions. If any one of these is violated or unperformed, the policy is avoided, and there can be no recovery unless the policy is subsequently confirmed by the insurer. The conditions for the most part are expressed in the contract itself, and to solve their proper meaning, force, and effect must be the chief concern in the study of fire-insurance law. An inspection of the New York standard policy, given in the appendix, will show that some of its conditions are precedent to the effectual making of the contract; others pre-suppose the contract made, but are precedent to a right of action thereon. Others declare events in which all right under the contract is forfeited, or otherwise define the obligations of the parties, or restrict the liability of the insurers. Others deal with the mode of settling disputes, and others limit the period for bringing suit. The conditions may also be divided into three classes; those precedent to a valid inception of the contract, those relating to the contract during the pendency of the risk, and those which appertain to the presentation of the claim of the assured and the proofs of his loss. Before the standard policy was adopted, much complaint was made regarding the fine-print conditions ordinarily inserted in a fire policy. The chief justice of the New Hampshire court made the character of these conditions the subject of a forcible but unjudicial tirade against insurance companies generally. We shall examine the clauses of the New York standard policy in the order in which they occur in the policy.

§ 127. In Consideration of the Stipulations and Premium. The insurer is entitled to payment of premium 1 De Laney v. Ins. Co., 52 N. H. 581.

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upon the inception of the risk or closing of the contract unless otherwise agreed, but ordinarily the payment of the premium is not made a condition of the policy, nor is its non-payment made a ground of forfeiture. It is generally paid in cash or check, but may be paid by notes or credit. Premium notes in mutual companies are generally made a lien upon the property insured. If the risk attaches, the premium is not returnable except as provided by the terms of the agreement or by statute. If the contract is rescinded, the premium is returnable;2 but if void for fraud it is not returnable.3

§ 128. Insures against all Direct Loss by Fire.Loss by fire means the result of the ignition of the property insured or some substance near to it. For example, where sugar was spoiled by great heat from a fire in ordinary use because of the closing of a register, the company was held not liable, and so also where the heat of the sun contracted timber without any actual fire; and similarly where the interior of a boiler was damaged by overheating from regular furnace fires owing to absence of water in the boiler; but the proximate results of fire within the rule of law establishing the liability of the insurer may include other things than combustion; as, for example, injuries to the insured property by water from the fire-engines, or exposure of goods during the fire, or during their reasonable removal, and the loss of goods by theft during the fire, or during a reasonable removal to a place of safety.

If a policy were silent upon the subject, loss by fire would include loss by a gunpowder explosion, but not loss by a steam explosion or by the wind. It would not include loss by

1 Woodfin v. Asheville Mut. Ins. Atkinson v. Newcastle & G. W. W. Co., 6 Jones (N. C.) 558.

"Ins. Co. v. Pyle, 44 Ohio St. 13; s. c., 58 Am. Rep. 781.

'Blaeser v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 31; s. c., 19 Am. Rep. 747.

'Babcock v. Montgomery Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Barb. 637. Austin v. Drewe, 6 Taunt. 436. Scripture v. Lowell Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 356; s. c., 67 Am. Dec. 111.

6

Co., L. R. 6 Ex. 404. 132 N. Y. 298.
5 American Towing Co. v. Ger. Fire
Ins. Co.. 20 Ins. L. J. 402 (Md. 1891).
Stanley v. Western Ins. Co., L. R.,
3 Exch. 74; s. c., 37 L. J. Q. B. 73.
Babcock v. Montgomery Co. Mut. Ins.
Co., 6 Barb. 637. White v. Republic
Fire Ins. Co., 57 Maine 91; s. c., 2
Am. Rep. 22.

7 Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co., 11 Peters 218. Scripture v.

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