to have been adopted and practiced with a view to diminish risk.1 Erection of new buildings upon the property insured or adjacent thereto, or any change in the structure of the buildings which makes them more inflammable, or the introduction of new and more hazardous employments or machinery, are likely to avoid the policy unless a disclosure is made to the company, and its consent obtained by written permit.2 The introduction of electric lighting should be disclosed to the company, but the making of ordinary and necessary repairs does not fall within the prohibition of this clause.3 Whether the change amounts to a material alteration in the risk must generally be a question for the jury.1 In Iowa it has been held that giving a chattel mortgage amounted to an increase of risk as matter of law; but this decision is very questionable, and in general the creation of encumbrances, whether voluntary as in the case of mortgages, or involuntary as in the case of tax liens, is not to be considered as increasing the risk within the meaning of this clause, although they might result in increasing the inducement to the insured to destroy his property. It must be noticed that the requirements of this clause impose upon the insured an obligation which in terms might seem to cover all material changes in the surrounding or adjoining premises; but inasmuch as nothing is specifically said about the adjoining premises, and the word "knowledge" is connected with the word "control," it is doubtful how far the courts would hold the insured responsible for not disclosing changes made by others upon adjacent premises. The only 'Houghton v. Manufrs. Mut. F. Ins. Co., 8 Met. 114; s.c., 41 Am. Dec. 489. Diehl v. Adams Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 58 Penn. St. 443; s.c., 98 Am. Dec. 302. Murdock v. Chenango Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Comst. 210. Long v. Beeber, 106 Penn. St. 466; s.c., 51 Am. Rep. 532. Williams v. People's F. Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 274. Cole v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 36. Stokes v. Cox, 1 H. & N. 320. Co., 18 N. Y. 168. Lyman v. State 4 Shepherd v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 38 N. H. 232. Ritter v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 40. Insurance Co. v. McDowell, 50 Ill. 120; s.c., 99 Am. Dec. 503. Schmidt v. Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 295. Lee v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 79 Iowa, 379. Judge v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 521. Hosford v. Germania Fire • Townsend v. Northwestern Ins. Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 399. safe plan, however, is to bring to the attention of the insurers any alterations in the situation which might affect their estimate of the risk. Sometimes policies contain an express provision in regard to an increase of risk by adjacent buildings or in the use of surrounding premises. It has been held that in such a case no obligation is imposed upon the insured to disclose changes of risk unless they are known by him to increase the risk.1 Of course, after receiving notice of the change of circum stances, it is optional with the company, under the cancellation clause, to terminate the insurance or not, and after exercising an election the insurer will be bound thereby. Where the warranty against increase of risk without permission is absolute, the insured is responsible for alterations made by his tenant on the insured property, though without his knowledge or consent.2 If the change of risk is such as to fall within the ban of this provision of the contract, the question is quite immaterial whether or not it was the cause of the loss; for the risk has become other than that which was contracted for, and the contract is void at the option of the insurers.3 According to the weight of authority and reason, then, a temporary increase of risk vitiates the policy and does not simply suspend its operation; but a contrary rule has been adopted in Illinois.5 The clause in the Massachusetts policy is substantially the same. § 142. Mechanics.-Or mechanics more than fifteen days at any one time. The limit of time which has wisely been inserted in this clause tends to make it much more free from ambiguity, and if the insured allows any building or repairing operations to go on 'Rife v. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Pa. St. 531. 2 Long v. Beeber, 106 Penn. St. 466. Liverpool & L. Ins. Co. v. Gunther, 116 U. S. 113. 4 Kyte v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 149 Mass. 116. Jennings v. Chenango Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Den. 75. "North British & Mercantile Ins. 'Daniels v. Equitable Fire Ins. Co., Co. v. Steiger, 13 Ill. App. 482. 48 Conn. 105. for more than the required time, without a permit, he will of course vitiate his policy.1 In the Massachusetts policy this subject is not specifically covered, but repairs fall within the operation of the general clause in regard to an alteration in the situation or circumstances affecting the risk. § 143. Interest of Insured.-Or if interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership. This provision is reasonable and valid.2 If the character of the title of the insured to the property is a fee, but he is only a part owrer, the policy, of course, is void unless he discloses the fact. Or if, though invested with the legal title, the equitable estate and the right to the legal estate are in another, the policy is voided unless the fact is stated.3 A surviving partner is not the sole and unconditional owner of the undivided partnership estate. But as a rule any encumbrances or liens upon the property of the insured need not be disclosed under this clause." And a lease from the insured need not be mentioned; but under a policy which by its terms required that the “true title and interest" of the insured must be stated, it was held that a mortgage must be disclosed. A vendee in possession, with an equitable right to the whole title unencumbered, is considered the unconditional and sole owner, although he may not yet have received his deed. If it is equitably true that the insured is the unconditional and sole owner, the clause will not be held to have been violated. So where two agreed to carry on a cotton plantation, one to furnish stock, money, and supplies, 'Mack v. Rochester German Ins. Fire Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 521. Clay Co., 106 N. Y. 560. Fire & M. S. Ins. Co. v. Beck, 43 Md. * Barnard v. National Fire Ins. Co., 358. 27 Mo. App. 26. Clay F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Huron Salt & L. M. Co., 31 Mich. 346. * Crescent Ins. Co. v. Camp, 64 Tex. 521. Woodward v. Republic F. Ins. Co., 32 Hun, 365. Dolliver v. St. Joseph F. & M. Ins. Co., 128 Mass. 315; s.c., 35 Am. Rep. 378. Judge v. Conn. Ins. Co. v. Haven, 95 U. S. 242. Bowditch Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Winslow, 3 Gray, 415. Bonham v. Iowa Central Ins. Co., 25 Iowa, 328. "Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erb, 112 Penn. St. 149. Martin v. State Ins. Co., 44 N. J. Law, 485; s.C., 43 Am. R. 397. the other to furnish the plantation and superintend the business, the former to be indemnified for his advances out of the proceeds of the cotton, and the stock and implements used to be equally divided at the end of the year, it was held, that, the cotton not being worth enough to pay the advances, the partner who had made them was the sole and unconditional owner of the cotton but not of the stock and implements;1 but one who held only a quit claim deed from a second mortgagee was not unconditional and sole owner; 2 and a purchaser at a sheriff's sale who has not paid the purchase money, there being an outstanding right to claim the premises, has not such an ownership.3 A person in possession of property, with a reservation of title in the seller until payment of the notes given for the purchase price, is not sole and unconditional owner. Where the use of real estate was contributed as a partner's share of the capital, there being no deed directly or in trust, the firm cannot truly describe the property as belonging to them by an entire, unconditional, and sole ownership.5 This clause is not in the Massachusetts policy. § 144. Leased Ground.-Or if building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple. If the insured owns only part of the fee, it has been held that the clause would be violated unless as provided an agreement giving necessary consent is indorsed upon the policy;" or if he has only a life estate; but if he has the equitable right to a fee simple it has been held that the clause would not be violated, though the special written permission had not been obtained.8 This clause is not in the Massachusetts policy. § 145. Chattel Mortgage.-Or if personal property be or become encumbered by a chattel mortgage. Except for this restriction, or some provision of the policy ex pressly indicating that incumbrances must be disclosed, it would not be necessary to state the existence of a chattel mortgage. By the weight of authority it does not constitute a change of interest, title, or possession, or an increase of risk. The dictum to this effect in a recent Iowa case is not to be approved. But the giving of a chattel mortgage has been held to be an "alteration of ownership,' "3 and has also been said to be an "alienation in part." But this could not be held to be so under the New York standard policy. This provision also is absent from the Massachusetts policy. § 146. Foreclosure.-Or if with the knowledge of the insured foreclosure proceedings be commenced or notice of sale by virtue of any mortgage or trust deed. If the insured obtains such knowledge, of course, he must inform the insurers and give them the opportunity of cancelling the policy if they so desire.5 As the decisions are somewhat conflicting in regard to whether giving a mortgage constitutes a change of interest or an increase of risk, it is important to notice that this clause of the standard policy by implication would seem to indicate that giving a mortgage need not be disclosed to the company by virtue of any requirement in the policy, unless under the mortgage a default should have occurred on the part of the insured, and foreclosure proceedings begun. There are cases suggesting a contrary rule. This clause is not contained in the Massachusetts form of policy. 1 Wytheville Ins. Co. v. Stultz, 87 Va. 629 (1891). Hennessey v. Manhattan Fire Ins. Co., 28 Hun. 98. Orrell v. Hampden Fire Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 431. 2 Lee v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 79 Iowa, 379 (1890). * Edmunds v. Mut. Safety Fire Ins. Co., 1 Allen, 311. Abbott v. Hampden Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Me. 414. • Quinlan v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. St. Rep. 820. Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 410. • Conover v. Mutual Ins. Co., 1 Comst. 29). Judge v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 521. Bishop v. Clay F. & M. Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 430. Shepherd v. Union Mut. F. Ins. Co., 38 N. H. 232. Smith v. Monmouth Mut. F. Ins. Co., 50 Me. 96. Byers v. Farmers Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 606; 35 Am. Rep. 623. 7 Western Mass. Ins. Co. v. Riker, 10 Mich. 279. McCulloch v. Indiana Mut. Fire Ins Co., 8 Blackford (Ind.), 50. |