The president or secretary of the company, however, may waive a forfeiture for non-payment of premium, or give credit, although the terms of the policy forbid it.1 And the plaintiff is at liberty to show, as matter of fact, if he can, that the company has given the agent sufficient authority to waive this or any condition of the contract.2 If the previous course of dealing between the company and the insured warrants it, payment may be by check instead of cash.3 Where the beneficiaries named in a life policy had no knowledge of the existence of the policy, which had been fraudulently surrendered to the company by the insured before his death, the court decided that there was a valid excuse for the non-payment of premiums.1 But, in general, as we have already seen, sickness, paralysis, or other inability to comply with the terms of the contract furnishes no excuse, but the receipt and retention of the premium at the home office constitutes a waiver of any informality in the method of payment, and also of all known breaches of the policy. § 183. Assessments.-In mutual companies the premiums are often paid in the form of assessments, and it is customary on the happening of the loss to call for an assessment with which to meet it. Notice of the time and place of payment is given by the company." The jury determines whether or not the notice has been received. If not received there is no forfeiture, unless the policy provides that sending or mailing of the notice is sufficient.9 § 184. Suicide.-Exemption of insurers from liability for suicide, sane or insane. The insurer is still liable, in spite of this clause, where the death is purely accidental without any intent to commit suicide.1 Where the insured is named as beneficiary, a criminal act of suicide or a death by hanging would vitiate the contract without any express provision, inasmuch as a contract of insurance presupposes good faith.2 Though a recent writer on life insurance suggests the contrary view.3 But if the interest in the policy is vested in other beneficiaries, and the contract is valid at the time when it was entered into, the guilty act of the insured does not vitiate it to the prejudice of the beneficiaries.1 If, however, the insured took out the policy with the guilty intent of committing suicide, the contract would be void. ab initio.5 So, also, if the beneficiaries intentionally compass the death of the insured after the policy is taken out, they can recover nothing upon it." Frequently in life policies, and almost invariably in accident policies, there is a provision that the company shall not be liable in case the injuries named are self-inflicted, or, as it is often worded, if the insured dies by "suicide," or "by his own hand," or "takes his own life," which have been held to be equivalent forms of expression." 66 The proper meaning of the suicide clause, where the words 'sane or insane" do not form a part of it, has been the subject 1 Phillips v. La. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 404; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 549. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 333. Knights of Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. Lawrence v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Bradw. (Ill.) 280. 2 Knights of Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. State, 466. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121. 3 Cooke on Life Ins., Sec. 41. Darrow v. Family Fund Society, 116 N. Y. 537; s. c., 15 Am. St. Rep. 430. Fitch v. American Popular Life Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 557; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 372. Smith v. National Benefit Soc., 123 N. Y. 85. Prince of Wales, &c, Assoc. v. Palmer, 25 Beav. 605. 'Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 527. of much discussion by the courts, which is traced historically at great length in May on Insurance.1 Where the exemption from liability is simply death from suicide or other equivalent form of expression, without the words "sane or insane," it has been held that the exception does not avail the insurers as a defence if it appears that the assured was devoid of reason when he took his life. This con⚫clusion is put upon the ground that an act beyond the control of the assured is, in effect, nothing but an accident. As to the degree of insanity which will operate in such a case as an excuse to the insured to prevent the application of the exception, two rules have been laid down. The English, New York, and Massachusetts courts, and others, have adopted the view that to take a case out of the proviso of the policy on the ground of insanity the assured must have been so mentally disordered as not to understand that the act he committed would cause his death, or he must have committed it under the influence of some uncontrollable insane impulse. These courts hold that it is not sufficient to show that his mind was so impaired that he was not conscious of the moral obliquity of the act.2 The United States Supreme Court and others following its authority have, on the contrary, defined the rule as follows: "This court on full consideration of the conflicting authorities upon that subject has repeatedly and uniformly held that such a provision, not containing the words 'sane or insane,' does not include a self-killing by an insane person, whether his unsoundness of mind is such as to prevent him from understanding the physical nature and consequences of his act or only such as to prevent him, while foreseeing and premeditating its physical consequences, from understanding its moral nature and aspect.' 993 The distinction between these two rules of law is probably too metaphysical to make it of any practical consequence whether the jury is charged in terms of the one or in terms of the other. 1 Chapter XV. 2 Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169; s. c., 14 Am. Rep. 215. Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 M. & G. 639. Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227; s. c., 3 Am. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 531. Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284; s.c., 19 Am. R. 628, note. To secure the benefit of the restriction, which it is hardly necessary to say was really intended to be secured by the earlier forms of expression, the insurers have generally added to the suicide clause the words "sane or insane," and with this addition the exemption covers all cases of intentional selfdestruction. The insurers are thus relieved from responsibility, unless the death of the insured was purely accidental.1 In one case it was held, by a strict construction against the insurers, that the taking of poison through mistake or ignorance would not avoid the policy, although the words of the suicide exception clause were, whether "voluntary or otherwise," instead of "sane or insane"; which forms of expression the court regarded as synonymous.2 If the company sets up the defence of suicide, the burden of proof rests upon it, and if the facts are equally susceptible of either construction, it will be presumed that death was the result of an accident and not of a criminal intent.3 But, on the other hand, every man is presumed to be sane, and the burden of proving insanity is on him who alleges it, and the fact of suicide is not of itself sufficient to establish it.4 Missouri has adopted a statute that suicide will not avail as a defense. § 185. Exception of Death by the Hands of Justice or in Violation of Law. This, though similar to the last clause, is considered distinct from it.5 In the Cluff case it was held that a forcible taking of property under the ill-founded claim of legal right was not a violation of this clause, which is generally confined to those cases in which the act is known to be a violation of law; and by the better view the clause is further confined to cases of violation of criminal law, in which the violation of law and the 1 De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 232. Penfold v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; s. c., 39 Am. Rep. 660. 'Mallory v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; s. c., 7 Am. Rep. 410. Travellers' Ins. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661. Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 561. McClure v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 651. Meacham v. N. Y. State Mutual Benefit Assn., 120 N. Y. 237. Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308. act causing death are a part of one and the same continuous transaction. Thus where the insured met his death by being shot by a person with whose property he was interfering, it was held that this clause of the policy would not avail the insurer as a defense.1 But where the insured was killed by a shot fired in provocation caused by an affray that had ended, a judgment in favor of the insurer was sustained on the ground that if the acts of the insured were such as to produce in his slayer a high degree of passion, and while he was in such a state he shot and killed the insured, the death was the natural consequence of the assault.2 Where the insured was engaged in the lawful defense of his person, there being reasonable cause to apprehend a design to do him personal injury, the exemption clause was held to furnish no defense to the insurers.s But the death was held to be "in the known violation of the law" where the insured died within a few hours from wounds inflicted by the husband of a woman upon whom he was committing assault and battery.1 § 186. Authority of Agents.-Agents not authorized to make, alter, or discharge this or any other contract in relation to the matter of this insurance, or to waive any forfeiture hereof, or to grant permits, or to receive for cash due for premiums anything but cash. The effect of this clause has been discussed under the subject of general principles, in Chapters VII. and VIII. As was observed in the introductory chapter, there is ordinarily nothing in the usual course of business, as transacted by the local agents of life insurance companies, from which any one dealing with them has the right to infer that they possess any authority to make or unmake a policy, or to alter its terms, except in some instances in regard to the method of 1 Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 422; s. c., 6 Am. Rep. 115. 2 Murray v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614; s. c., 48 Am. Rep. 658. Overton v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 39 Mo. 122; s. c., 90 Am. Dec. 455. 4 Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478; s. c., 49 Am. Rep. 469. |