issued by him, and terminate the risk. Under this general authority, Fredenburgh had insured the Eagle Hotel property in the defendant's company for several years, to the amount of $2,000, the last policy for that amount expiring July 1, 1876. The alleged limitation of his authority to insure the Eagle Hotel property is contained in a paper called an "expiration sheet," sent by the company to Fredenburgh, according to its usual custom, showing the policies which would expire during the month ensuing that in which it was sent, and containing notations opposite each risk. The particular sheet now in question was sent in June, 1876, and contained a list of seven policies, issued at his agency, which would expire in July. Opposite the policy on the Eagle Hotel property was the word "drop," and opposite the others the word "renew." Whether this expiration sheet was seen by Winne before he made the agreement with Fredenburgh for the policy now in question, was a subject of controversy on the trial. But assuming that it was exhibited to and read by Winne before that time, so that he is chargeable with notice of its contents, we are nevertheless of opinion that the language used was not equivalent to an absolute instruction to Fredenburgh not to insure the Eagle Hotel property for any amount, and that an insurance of the property by him for a smaller sum was not prohibited. The evidence tends to show, and the jury have found that the agent so interpreted the instruction. The prior policy was in fact dropped. The risk was reduced in amount. The agent prepared the new policy, directed it to be reported to the company, and it was entered by the clerk in the register of completed contracts. The word "drop" in the expiration sheet, to say the least, was ambiguous and equivocal, and the principle applies that a letter of instruction from a principal to an agent should be expressed in clear language, and that if not expressed in “plain and unequivocal terms, but the language is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, and the agent in fact is misled and adopts and follows one, while the principal intended. another, then the principal will be bound, and the agent will be exonerated." Story on Agency, § 74. See, also, Herrman v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 188; 37 Am. Rep. 488. In the absence of special limitation, the authority of Fredenburgh to make the contract in question is unquestionable. The limita tion proved, simply prohibited the renewal of the existing risk, or an equivalent insurance. Winne had a right to put this interpretation upon the instruction. If the company intended to decline any insurance on the property, it should have said so. It cannot in justice defeat the contract in question by putting an interpretation upon its instructions at variance with that of its agent and Winne, and of which the language was clearly capable. The remaining question is whether a joint action lies in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff Henry W. Winne was the owner of the property insured, and the plaintiff Benjamin J. Winne was the mortgagee. The policy contains the clause, "loss, if any, payable to Benjamin J. Winne, to the extent of his mortgage interest therein." We think a joint action is proper. The plaintiffs have a common interest in enforcing the contract. The plaintiff Henry W. Winne has no adverse interest to that of his co-plaintiff. The fund is applicable, first upon the mortgage debt, and when that is paid, the balance belongs to the mortgagor. It is, we think, quite appropriate, and in accord with the flexible rule of procedure now applied to courts of justice, to allow persons situated as are the plaintiffs to unite in maintaining the action, and the practice is sanctioned by the language of the code, and of adjudged cases. Code, 466; Boynton v. Clinton, etc., Ins. Co., 16 Barb. 254; Ennis v. Harmony F. Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 516; Lasher v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 18 Hun, 101. We find no error in the record, and the judgment should therefore be affirmed. All concur. Judgment affirmed. CHAPTER IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. Representations and Concealments. JNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1886. PHOENIX LIFE INS. CO. v. RADDIN.1 (120 U. S. 183.) Representations; concealments. MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action brought by Sewell Raddin, and prosecuted by his administrator, upon a policy of life insurance, dated April 25, 1872, the material parts of which were as follows: "This policy of insurance witnesseth, that the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., in consideration of the representations made to them in the application for this policy, and of the sum of," etc., "do assure the life of Charles E. Raddin, of Lynn, in, the county of Essex, State of Massachusetts, in the amount of ten thousand dollars, for the term of his natural life." "This policy is issued and accepted by the assured upon the following express conditions and agreements;" namely, among others, that "if any of the declarations or statements made in the application for this policy, upon the faith of which this policy is issued, shall be found in any respect untrue, this policy shall be null and void.” The application was signed by Sewell Raddin, both for his son and for himself, and contained twenty-nine printed "ques As to whether application forms part of the contract, compare Cushman v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 404. tions to be answered by the person whose life is proposed to be insured, and which form the basis of the contract," two of which, with the written answers to them, and the concluding paragraph of the application, were as follows: "28. Has any application been made to this or any other company for assurance on the life of the party? If so, with what result? What amounts $10,000, Equitable Life As are now assured on the life of surance Society. "29. Is the party and the applicant aware that any untrue or fraudulent answers to the above queries, or any suppression of facts in regard to the health, habits, or circumstances of the party to be assured, will vitiate the policy, and forfeit all payments thereon? Yes. "It is hereby declared that the above are fair and true answers to the foregoing questions, and it is acknowledged and agreed by the undersigned that this application shall form the basis of the contract for insurance, which contract shall be completed only by delivery of policy, and that any untrue or fraudulent answers, any suppression of facts," etc., "shall and will render the policy null and void, and forfeit all payments made thereon." It was admitted at the trial, that Charles E. Raddin died July 18, 1881; and that at the date of this policy he had an endowment policy in the Equitable Life Assurance Society for $19,000, which was afterwards paid to him. One of the defenses relied on at the trial was that the answer to question 28 in the application was untrue, and that there was a fraudulent suppression of facts material to the insurance, because the plaintiff, by his answer to that question, "$10,000, Equitable Life Assurance Society," intended to have the defendant understand that the only application which had been made to any other company for assurance upon the life of his son was one made to the Equitable Life Assurance Society, upon which that society had issued a policy of $10,000; whereas in fact the plaintiff, within three weeks before the application for the policy in suit, had made applications to that society and to the New York Life Insurance Company for additional insurance upon the son's life, each of which had been declined. The defendant offered to prove that the two other applications were made and declined as alleged, and that the facts as to the making and the rejection of both those applications were known to the plaintiff, and intentionally concealed by him, at the time of his application to the defendant; and upon these offers of proof asked the court to rule, First, that the answer to question 28 was untrue, and therefore no recovery could be had on this policy; second, that there was a suppression of facts by the plaintiff, and therefore he could not recover; and, third, "that the answer to question 28 must be construed to be an answer to all the clauses of that question, and as such was misleading, and amounted to a concealment of facts which the defendant was entitled to know and the plaintiff was bound to communicate." But the court excluded all the evidence so offered, declined to give any of the rulings asked for, and ruled "that if the answer to one of the interrogatories of question 28 was true, there would be no breach of the warranty; that the failure to answer the other interrogatories of question 28 was no breach of the contract; and that if the company took the defective application, it would be a waiver on their part of the answers to the other interrogatories of that question." The jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the full amount of the policy, the defendant's exceptions to the refusal to rule as requested and to the rulings aforesaid present the principal question in the case. The rules of law which govern the decision of this question are well settled, and the only difficulty is in applying those rules to the facts before us. Answers to questions propounded by the insurers in an |