Opinion of the Court. we have a stipulation for loading in a particular steamer, which is a condition, but quâ all that relates to the mode of transportation, there is neither contract nor condition. The seller, in the event of disaster, and the shipowner, are each given an option as to that, but not the purchaser. Which is the more reasonable construction of a contract resting on mutual promises? See Iasigi v. Rosenstein, 141 N. Y. 414. Mr. William Allen Butler, (with whom was Mr. Wilhelmus Mynderse on the brief,) for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. The single question is whether the contract between the parties required all the sugar to be brought to Philadelphia in the Empress of India, upon which it was originally shipped. This depends upon the meaning of the terms of the writing in which the parties must be assumed to have embodied and expressed their whole intention, and to have defined all the conditions of the contract. The court is not at liberty, either to disregard words used by the parties, descriptive of the subject matter, or of any material incident, or to insert words which the parties have not made use of. Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188; Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213; Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353; Cleveland Rolling Mill v. Rhodes, 121 U. S. 255; Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., 141 U. S. 510; Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455; Welsh v. Gossler, 89 N. Y. 540; Cunningham v. Judson, 100 N. Y. 179; Iasigi v. Rosenstein, 141 N. Y. 414. This contract was made in June, 1889, for the sale of sugar, described as "shipping or to be shipped during this month from the Philippines to Philadelphia, per steamer Empress of India." A contract "to ship by " a certain vessel for a particular voyage ordinarily means simply "to put on board," not including the subsequent carriage; and there is nothing in this contract to show that a different meaning was in the contemplation of the parties. Opinion of the Court. The words "ex ship" are not restricted to any particular ship; and by the usage of merchants, as shown in this case, simply denote that the property in the goods shall pass to the buyer upon their leaving the ship's tackle, and that he shall be liable for all subsequent charges of landing. They do not constitute a condition of the contract, but are inserted for the benefit of the seller. See Neill v. Whitworth, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 435, and L. R. 1 C. P. 684. The clause "sea-damaged, if any, to be taken at a fair allowance," contemplates the risk of damage to the goods by perils of the sea, and does not restrict to any particular ship the subsequent transportation of such goods to their destination. In the clause "no arrival, no sale," the word "arrival" evidently refers, as the word "sale" must necessarily refer, to the goods which are the subject of the contract, and not to the particular vessel on which they are shipped; and the whole effect of the clause is that, if the goods never arrive at their destination, the buyers acquire no property in them, and do not become liable to the sellers for the price. The remaining clause, which provides that, if the Empress of India, by unforeseen accident, is unable to load in June, and the sellers cannot secure another steamer during that month, the contract is to be void, touches the matter of loading only. The contract fixes no limitation of time in any other respect. The contract nowhere requires that the sugar shall arrive at Philadelphia by the Empress of India; and essentially differs in this respect from the cases, cited at the bar, of contracts for the sale of goods "to arrive" by, or "on the arrival" of, a ship named, as in Lovatt v. Hamilton, 5 M. & W. 639; Johnson v. Macdonald, 9 M. & W. 600; and Hale v. Rawson, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 85. A particular ship being designated as to the putting on board only, and not as to the arrival, it is not to be inferred that the goods must be carried to their destination in the same ship. The sugar in question having been put on board the Empress of India, and the conditions of the contract thus satisfied, so far as that ship was concerned, the subsequent transportation and delivery of the goods were to be governed by the Syllabus. general rules of the maritime law. By that law, as understood in England, the master, from the necessity of the case, had the right, and, by our law, the duty, in case of disaster to his ship, to transship the goods and send them on by another vessel, if one could be had. The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 458; 3 Kent Com. 212. In the able argument for the plaintiffs in error, it was admitted that the rule, that the master in case of necessity is the agent of all concerned, applied to the seller, who was the owner, and to the insurer, and to any one having an insurable interest in the goods; but it was contended that the plaintiffs in error, before the arrival of the goods, had no insurable interest therein, and Stockdale v. Dunlop, 6 M. & W. 224, was relied on as decisive of this. But that case was decided upon the single ground that there the contract for the sale of goods was oral, and therefore incapable of being enforced. It is well settled that any person has an insurable interest in property, by the existence of which he will gain an advantage, or by the destruction of which he will suffer a loss, whether he has or has not any title in, or lien upon, or possession of the property itself. In the present case, the plaintiffs in error, under a valid contract in writing, had an insurable interest, by reason of the title which would accrue to them upon arrival and delivery, and of the injury which they might suffer by a previous loss of the goods. Insurance Co. v. Chase, 5 Wall. 509, 513; Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213, 220; Wilson v. Jones, L. R. 2 Ex. 131, 151; 3 Kent Com. 276. Judgment affirmed. FRANCE v. CONNOR. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WYOMING. No. 68. Argued May 2, 3, 1895. - Decided March 2, 1896. Section 18 of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, c. 397, conferring and regulating the right of dower, applies to the Territory of Utah only, and not to other Territories of the United States. VOL. CLXI-5 Opinion of the Court. THIS was a petition for the assignment and setting off of dower in lands in the county of Carbon and Territory of Wyoming, filed April 1, 1889, in the district court for that county, and alleging that the plaintiff on February 7, 1887, intermarried with James France, then and until his death a resident and citizen of that county and Territory; that he died August 21, 1888, intestate, leaving the plaintiff his widow, and having been seized, during the marriage, of an estate of inheritance in land situated in that county, and fully described in the petition; that upon his death the plaintiff, by virtue of the marriage, became entitled to dower in these lands, which had never been assigned or set off to her, and which she had never received any compensation or equivalent for, or at any time lawfully released her right to; that on March 16, 1888, he, being insolvent, made an assignment, according to the laws of the Territory, to the defendants, for the benefit of his creditors, of all his property, including these lands; and that the defendants took and since held possession of these lands, and refused to assign and set off to the plaintiff her dower therein. The defendants filed a general demurrer, which was sustained, and judgment entered for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a petition in error in the Supreme Court of the Territory, which, upon the admission of the State of Wyoming into the Union, was entered and argued in the Supreme Court of the State, and the judgment affirmed, upon the ground that the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, c. 397, 18, did not apply to the Territory of Wyoming. 3 Wyoming, 445. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error. Mr. Charles N. Potter and Mr. A. B. Browne for plaintiff in error. Mr. Samuel Shellabarger for defendants in error. Mr. Melville C. Brown filed a brief for same. MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. Opinion of the Court. By a statute of the Territory of Wyoming, passed December 10, 1869, and embodied in the subsequent codes of the Territory, "Dower and the tenancy by the curtesy are abolished, and neither husband nor wife shall have any share in the estate of the other, save as herein provided." Wyoming Stat. 1869, c. 41, § 1; Compiled Laws of 1876, c. 42, §1; Rev. Stat. of 1887, 2221. The single question in this case is whether this provision of the territorial statute has been annulled or superseded by section 18 of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, c. 397, conferring and regulating the right of dower; or, in other words, whether this section applies to the Territory of Utah only, or extends to all the Territories of the United States. In order to determine this question, it becomes necessary to consider the scope and the connection of the various parts of the act. 24 Stat. 635. The act is entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to amend section fifty-three hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,' approved March twenty-second, eighteen hundred and eighty-two." Sections 1 and 2 relate to testimony in prosecutions for bigamy, polygamy or unlawful cohabitation. Sections 3-5 define and punish the offences of adultery, incest and fornication. These five sections do not mention the place of commission of any offence; and may perhaps be held to include "any Territory, or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction," since so much of the act of March 22, 1882, c. 47, referred to in the title of this act, as defined and punished offences, expressly included any such Territory or place. 22 Stat. 30. But upon the question whether such provisions apply to the District of Columbia there have been conflicting opinions. United States v. Crawford, 6 Mackey, 319; Knight v. United States, 5 D. C. App.-. And we are not now required to determine the application of those provisions of the act of 1887. The next three sections of this act are in terms limited to the Territory of Utah. Section 6 relates to the institution of |