alone, it might confuse the jury, and constitute error, an examination of the whole instruction-which is too long to reproduce here-shows that the court was simply trying to instruct the jury that contributory negligence on the part of the respondent was an affirmative defense. We think, from the whole instruction, that the jury were not misled, and that no prejudicial error was committed. The instructions are very long, somewhat involved, and full of repetition, but, as a whole, we think the law was fairly and rightly presented to the jury, and that the instructions asked for by the appellant either had been given in substance by the court in its direct charge, or did not state the law. No prejudicial error was committed in the rejection or admission of testimony. The questions of fact were submitted to the jury, and were found against the appellant. The judgment is affirmed. REAVIS, C. J., and FULLERTON and ANDERS, JJ., con cur. [No. 3511. Decided March 12, 1901.] ELVIRA C. TYLER et vir, Respondents, v. NORTH AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION & TRADING COMPANY, Appellant. NEW TRIAL NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE- DISCRETION OF COURT. The denial of a new trial to defendant on the ground of newly discovered evidence does not constitute an abuse of discretion, when the newly discovered evidence consisted of statements made by plaintiff's husband differing from her own testimony, given in a deposition by him, which was taken on notice, and published during the trial without the knowledge of defendant, when the court gives full effect to any inferences deducible from the deposition in overruling the motion for new trial on condition that plaintiffs remit a portion of their verdict. Mar. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. PLEADING -EXHIBITS STRIKING OUT. The refusal of the court to strike from a complaint an exhibit containing a statement of items of damage demanded from defend. ant, which named a sum in excess of the amount demanded in the complaint, was not prejudicial, when the court fully advised the jury of the limit of damages claimed and what was before them for investigation. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.-Hon. ORANGE JACOBS, Judge. Affirmed. Bausman, Kelleher & Emory, for appellant. The opinion of the court was delivered by REAVIS, C. J.—Action for damages on breach of contract of carriage of plaintiff Elvira C. Tyler from Seattle to Dawson City, by way of St. Michaels and the Yukon. river, in 1897. The damages alleged were injured health and sickness, and expenses incident thereto, as well as expenses attending the delay in failure to transport plaintiff according to contract. There are but two errors assigned: (1) The court erred in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered testimony; (2) the court erred in denying defendant's motion to strike from the complaint the exhibit annexed thereto, and in denying the motion at the close of the argument that the exhibit be stricken from the pleading or that the pleading be withheld from the jury. Relative to the first assignment, it appears that the deposition of the plaintiff George Tyler was taken upon interrogatories propounded by the plaintiffs, and upon notice to the defendant, at Dawson, and that the deposition was filed with the clerk of the trial court during the progress of the trial, and about the time the plaintiff Elvira C. Tyler was testifying; that the testimony at the time of the filing of the deposition was not concluded; that Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. [24 Wash. the deposition was published and counsel for plaintiffs informed that it was filed; that counsel for defendant did not know when it was filed, although they had inquired from time to time previously to its reception to ascertain if it were filed. The respective counsel filed affidavits upon the motion for a new trial, stating the facts substantially as mentioned. Counsel for defendant maintain that the deposition was material, in that it contradicted the testimony of the plaintiff who testified. An examination of the deposition shows, however, some variations in the statements between the plaintiff who testified and the deponent as to the extent of some of the items of damage. The superior court overruled the motion for a new trial upon condition that the plaintiffs remit several hundred dollars in the amount of the verdict; that is, reduced it from $1,999 to $1,332. Apparently the court in its reduction gave full effect to any inferences deduced from the deposition which was not before the jury. It is evident that counsel for each party at the trial were anticipating this deposition. Of course, there was notice of its taking, and either counsel could have been advised of its contents. It cannot be said the superior court abused its discretion in refusal of the order for a new trial. The exhibit complained of was attached to the complaint, and was a statement of the items of damage which were demanded from defendant, and amounted to a large sum, something over $7,000. The amount demanded in the complaint was less. We cannot perceive that the court's ruling upon the exhibit remaining attached to the complaint is reversible error. The instructions of the court. fully advised the jury of the limit of the damages claimed and what was before them for investigation. The assignments of error failing, the judgment is affirmed. DUNBAR and ANDERS, JJ., concur. [No. 3759. Decided March 12, 1901.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SUSAN HALL, ARSON ACT. Appellant. VALIDITY OF STATUTE — PLURAL SUBJECTS EMBRACED IN ONE Laws 1895, p. 173, defining the crimes of arson and attempted arson,and providing a punishment for each, does not violate art. 2, § 19, of the constitution, which provides that "No bill shall embrace more than one subject," since arson and attempted arson are sufficiently connected to permit legislation with reference thereto to be embodied in one act. JUROR QUALIFICATIONS SERVICE ON JURY WITHIN PREVIOUS YEAR. Bal. Code, § 4748, which makes service upon a jury within the previous year a ground for challenge, does not render one incompetent to serve as a juror, in the absence of a challenge. NEW TRIAL — DISCRETION OF COURT FALSE ANSWERS BY JUROR. The refusal of the court to grant a new trial on the ground that a juror had testified falsely on his voir dire as to having formed an opinion of guilt previous to the trial cannot be regarded as an abuse of discretion merely from the fact that two persons make affidavit thereto in opposition to the affidavit of the juror alone. Appeal from Superior Court, Walla Walla County.Hon. THOMAS H. BRENTS, Judge. Affirmed. T. P. & C. C. Gose, for appellant. Oscar Cain, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State. PER CURIAM.-The appellant was informed against by the prosecuting attorney of Walla Walla county for the crime of arson, and upon a trial before the court and a jury a verdict of guilty was returned against her. From the judgment and sentence pronounced upon the verdict, she appeals to this court. It is assigned that the court erred in defining the crime of arson in his instructions to the jury. This is Opinion Per Curiam. [24 Wash. based, not upon the instruction itself, but upon the statute; the contention being that the statute defining the crime of arson, from which the instruction was taken, is unconstitutional and void, because in violation of § 19, art. 2, of the state constitution, which provides, "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The statute in question (Session Laws 1895, p. 173) is entitled, "An act to define and punish the crime of arson and attempted arson, and declaring an emergency;" and the body of the act defines the crime of arson and attempted arson, and provides a punishment for each. It is urged that there is no such connection between the subject-matter of the one and the subject-matter of the other as to permit them to be embodied in one act. But we cannot think the act falls within the rule contended for. The general rule is that if the matters embraced in a statute have congruity, or are naturally connected with each other, or are cognate and germane to each other, the statute does not embrace more than one subject, and in determining these questions the constitution must not be so narrowly construed as to unnecessarily hamper or cripple legislation. It is also a general rule, applicable particularly in construing statutes with reference to their titles, that statutes must be held constitutional unless they are clearly void. Under these general principles, arson and attempted arson are sufficiently connected, we think, to permit legislation with reference thereto to be embodied in one act. The record discloses that one of the jurors, who was called from the bystanders, when being examined upon his voir dire stated that he had no knowledge of the facts of the case, and that he had not served on a jury within the preceding year. A motion for a new trial was filed, in support of which it was shown by affidavits that the juror had in fact been called from the bystanders and |