Mar. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-Dunbar, J. "Hence it has become an established rule that where the bequest is simply to A., and in case of his death, or if he die, to B., A., surviving the testator, takes absolutely." See, also, as sustaining this construction, Schouler, Wills (2d ed.), § 565, and Howard v. Carusi, 109 U. S. 725 (3 Sup. Ct. 575), where the authorities are collated and the rule is announced as being almost universal. Also, Moore v. Lyons, 25 Wend. 119; Mulvane v. Rude, 146 Ind. 476 (45 N. E. 659); and the cases cited in the authorities above referred to. In fact, this proposition is not very strongly disputed by the respondents; but it is claimed that the rule is subject to another rule, that the will of the testator is to be determined from the whole will, and that, in addition to that, circumstances occurring before his death may be introduced to explain or construe the language used in the will. This, no doubt, is also a well-established rule, but an examination of the record in this case and a consideration of the circumstances shown by the record are not convincing that it was not the intention of the devisor to grant an absolute title to his son Charles in the residue of his estate after making the exceptions which were made in the will. The language employed in the will is not the language of an ignorant man, but the forms of law are well preserved, technical language is used, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that the language used was used with reference to the construction that has universally been placed upon such language by courts in construing wills. The devise was specific, clear, and unambiguous. Under the provisions of our statute, it carried with it an absolute estate; and the ambiguous expressions afterwards used in the will, and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, are not sufficient to bring it within the other provision of the Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. [24 Wash. statute, viz. "unless it shall clearly appear by the will that he intended to convey a less estate." The judgment is reversed and remanded, with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion. REAVIS, C. J., and FULLERTON and ANDERS, JJ., con cur. [No. 3500. Decided March 22, 1901.] FANNIE MONTROSE, Appellant, v. JOHN BYRNE, Executor, Respondent. Questions as to the construction of a will and as to the vesting of the property mentioned in it are not cognizable in a proceeding to have the will established in probate, the only question for consideration in such a proceeding being the validity of the will. Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County.-Hon. OLIVER V. LINN, Judge. Affirmed. T. L. Bland, for appellant. Troy & Falknor, for respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by REAVIS, C. J.-In July, 1899, Apollonia Hoffman died in Pierce county. She was at the time a resident of Thurston county. About three weeks prior to her death she executed her will. The will, in substance, devised her estate, real and personal, with the exception of one bequest of $100 to a granddaughter, to the appellant, a married daughter, for life, with the remainder to two nieces of the testatrix, and appointed respondent executor, without bonds, and with full power to administer the estate without the intervention of the probate court. In September, Mar. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. 1899, the will was offered for probate by the respondent, after notice, and the appellant appeared and objected to the admission of the will to probate. Appellant set out in her objections that she was the sole surviving heir of the deceased; that deceased could not read or well understand the English language; that the deceased was not of sound mind and competent to dispose of her estate, and was physically and mentally incapacitated to make the will,and denied that deceased published and declared the instrument to be her will. A hearing was had and testimony taken in the superior court, findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed, and an order made admitting the will to probate. The court found the competency of the deceased to execute the will; that it was without undue influence, and was duly published and declared as such will. Upon exceptions made by appellant to the findings of fact, we have examined the testimony carefully, and are not disposed to disturb the conclusions of the superior The measure of testamentary capacity has been very fully discussed in Re Gorkow's Estate, 20 Wash. 563, and it is unnecessary to review the questions here. The only question for consideration in the proceeding to have the will established in probate is as to its validity. The questions which have been discussed by counsel for appellant relative to its construction and the vesting of the real and personal property mentioned in the will are not cognizable in this proceeding, and will not be further considered. court. The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. 19-24 WASH. 24 290 29 623 f29 626 29 632 24 290 30 345 Opinion of the Court-Dunbar, J. [24 Wash. [Nc 3613. Decided March 22, 1901.] CYRUS HAPPY, Respondent, v. HARRIS E. PRICKETT, Defendant, CHARLES N. TRAVOUs et al., Appellants. INTEREST -OPEN ACCOUNT. Interest at the legal rate begins to run on an open account for services rendered from the date of full performance, at which time the right to compensation fully accrued. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS FOREIGN ASSIGNEE- An assignment for the benefit of creditors made in another state in accordance with its statutes, while passing title to the assignor's realty in this state, does so subject to the rights of creditors resident in this state to enforce claims against the assignor by suit and attachment against his property in this state. SAME ATTACHMENT INTERVENTION BY FOREIGN ASSIGNEE. A foreign assignee of an insolvent estate has the right to intervene, in a local attachment suit brought by a resident creditor against the assignor's realty in this state, for the purpose of protecting the estate against any illegality or fraud in the claims. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County.-Hon. WILLIAM E. RICHARDSON, Judge. Reversed. A. G. Avery and Buck & Craven, for appellants. W. W. Hindman, for respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by DUNBAR, J.-On December 14, 1896, defendant Harris E. Prickett and J. A. Prickett, copartners, were engaged in banking in the state of Illinois, and on that date made an assignment of their property, for the benefit of all their creditors, to the appellants, who duly qualified and now are the assignees of said estate. The assignment was duly recorded in the proper county in the state of Illinois, and on Mar. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-Dunbar, J. December 21, 1896, was recorded in the office of the auditor of Spokane county, Washington. At the time said assignment was made, defendant Harris E. Prickett, one of the assignors, was the owner of record of several parcels of real estate in Spokane county. In July, 1899, plaintiff (respondent here) commenced an action against defendant Harris E. Prickett to recover the sum of $4,950, alleged to be due on an open account for legal services between January 1, 1891, and December 14, 1896, which was before the making of the assignment, and attached the real estate which is the subject of this controversy. Service was by publication. Upon the commencement of the action the appellants filed their petition in intervention, denying the indebtedness, pleading payment thereof, setting up the statute of limitations, setting up the matters and things heretofore stated in regard to the assignment, and praying for a dismissal. Motion to strike the petition in intervention and for judgment was made by the plaintiff and overruled; after which he replied. Thereupon the intervenors made a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was denied, and the plaintiff made another motion for judgment against defendant as prayed for in the complaint, and dismissing the intervenors. This motion was sustained and judgment was rendered in accordance therewith. The defendant did not appear in the action. It is evident that the complaint states a cause of action, and that the statute of limitations has not run. We also think that, under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the account. Paragraph 4 of the complaint is as follows: "That between the 1st day of January, 1891, and the 14th day of December, 1896, the plaintiff herein performed professional work, labor and services for said parties, under the firm names and style of J. A. Prickett & Sons, and J. A. Prickett & Son, at their especial instance |