(24 Am. Rep. 189); Hinton v. Goode, 73 Ga. 233; Donnelly v. Johnes, 44 Atl. 180; Ricks v. Redwine, 73 Ga. 273. The rule that mechanic's lien statutes are to be liberally construed does not extend to the determination of what persons are entitled to liens thereunder, as to which matter a statute cannot be extended by construction. Nanz v. Cumberland Gap Park Co., 52 S. W. 999 (76 Am. St. Rep. 650, 47 L. R. A. 273).

The act is void because it grants special privileges to certain persons, and lays special burdens upon others, and is purely "class legislation," wherein it violates both the state and federal constitutions. Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101;Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696 (33 L. R. A. 589); In re Morgan, 58 Pac. 1071 (77 Am. St. Rep. 269, 47 L. R. A. 52); Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 59 Pac. 304 (78 Am. St. Rep. 17, 47 L. R. A. 338); Tacoma v. Krech, 15 Wash. 296 (34 L. R. A. 68); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (41 L. ed. 666); Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co., 44 Atl. 1051 (46 L. R. A. 393); In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 (50 Am. Rep. 636); State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179 (25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 6 L. R. A. 621).

The act is void wherein it undertakes to make a laborer's lien take precedence of an antecedent incumbrance on real property, because it takes such property without due process of law. Croskey v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 48 Ill. 481; Getchell v. Allen, 34 Iowa, 559; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Slye, 45 Iowa, 618; Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537 (40 L. R. A. 302). It has been the invariable policy of our laws to protect prior incumbrances, in all kinds of cases where liens are provided for. Home Savings & Loan Association v. Burton, 20 Wash. 688 (56 Pac. 940).

A statute providing for the allowance of attorney fees

on the foreclosure of laborers' statutory liens is unconstitutional. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (41 L. ed. 666); Los Angeles Gold Mine Co. v. Campbell, 56 Pac. 246.

F. S. Blattner, for respondents:

If several distinct liens are united in one complaint and there is a distinct statement of the facts as to each lien, there is a sufficient separate statement of each cause of action, though they are not numbered or otherwise formally designated. Booth v. Pendola, 88 Cal. 36 (23 Pac. 200).

Where the bill of particulars, when taken in connection with the statement of the petition, gives as full information of the petitioner's claim as if a specific statement of everything were fully set out, it has been held sufficient. McLaughlin v. Shaughnessey, 42 Miss. 520.

The language of the statute is anyone performing labor in the "operation" of a mill. Certainly a manager of a mill performs labor in the operation of it as much as the engineer who controls the machinery, the carrier who operates the carriage upon which the logs are carried to the saw, or the man who wheels away saw dust. Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50 (32 Am. Rep. 262).

The act is not special. All persons brought under its influence are treated alike. So long as its provisions apply to all persons under substantially like circumstances, it is not an arbitrary exercise of power. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. 1163; Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210 (32 L. ed. 109, 8 Sup. Ct. 1176); Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Fed. 182, 193; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180 (41 L. ed. 677);

Feb. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-Dunbar, J.

Holden v. Hardy, 37 L. R. A. 103 (46 Pac. 756); Magoun v. Illinois T. & S. B., 170 U. S. 283 (42 L. ed. 1037); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 577 (43 L. ed. 552).

Upon the point that the statute is valid in giving laborers' liens priority over antecedent mortgages, counsel cites Georgia, etc., Banking Co. v. Dunlop, 33 S. E. 882; Atlantic Dynamite Co. v. Ropes Gold & Silver Co., 77 N. W. 938; Sitton v. Dubois, 14 Wash. 624; Gilchrist v. Helena, etc., Co., 58 Fed. 709; Virginia Development Co. v. Crozier Iron Co., 17 S. E. 806 (44 Am. St. Rep. 893).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DUNBAR, J.-This action was brought under the act of March 6, 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 55), to foreclose eight laborers' liens upon a saw mill and the land on which it stood. Applegate and wife were the owners of the land described in the complaint, and the defendants Caesar and wife were the assignees of certain mortgages upon the land described, which mortgages were made to other parties to secure liens by which money was obtained by Applegate and wife, and were recorded prior to the time of the commencement of the work for which the liens were filed, and which had been assigned to Caesar and wife before the commencement of this action. Caesar and wife were brought in as defendants for the purpose of settling their rights. Upon the trial of the cause, judgment was given for the plaintiffs for the amount demanded, and it was adjudged that the rights of the lienors took precedence over the liens of the mortgages which Caesar and wife owned. From this judgment an appeal is taken.

A demurrer was interposed to the complaint and over

case.

Opinion of the Court-Dunbar, J.

[24 Wash.

ruled. Applegate and wife did not further appear in the Motion was made by the defendants to require the complainants' causes of action to be stated separately, which motion was overruled, and the action of the court in that respect is assigned as error. We think this motion was properly overruled. The law provides that liens of this kind shall be foreclosed in the same manner as mechanics' liens; and § 5910 of Bal. Code provides that any number of lien claimants who have legally filed claims of liens, against the same property, or any part thereof, shall be joined as parties, either plaintiff or defendant. If the complaint was so indefinite that the defendants could not properly plead to it, they should have interposed a motion to make it more definite and certain. The complaint stated a cause of action.

It is objected that the statement of the terms and conditions of the contract was not incorporated in the first part of the complaint, and that the law allowing exhibits to be referred to extends only to documents, instruments, and the like; but the statement of the terms and conditions in this case is not an exhibit in that sense. The contract is set forth in paragraph one of the complaint. The statement that the lien is for labor performed by the said claimants at the instance and request of the Applegates, who were, at the time of said request and at the time of the performance of said labor, the owners of said real estate and the saw mill situated thereon, and that the Applegates conducted said business under a certain name, and the particulars of the employment and of the labor, are set forth in the statement of terms and conditions, and, by express language, made a part of the complaint. The object of the Code is to simplify the old common-law practice of pleading, and the law provides that the complaint shall be sufficient if it states the title of the

Feb. 1901.]

Opinion of the Court-Dunbar, J.

cause, the name of the court, the venue, the parties to the action, a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, and a demand for relief. These requirements are all met by this complaint. There is no question but that the defendants were fairly apprised of the relief which was sought by these plaintiffs, and of the facts upon which the demand for relief was based. This, under the Code, is the test of the sufficiency of the complaint.

On the question of attorney's fees we are content with the rule announced in Ivall v. Willis, 17 Wash. 645 (50 Pac. 467), and Griffith v. Maxwell, 20 Wash. 403 (55 Pac. 571), and think it applies to this kind of a lien.

We also think that the lien notices were sufficient under the law. Overbeck v. Calligan, 6 Wash. 342 (33 Pac. 825).

It is urged that this law falls under the ban of § 12, art. 1, of the state constitution, which provides that "no law shall be passed granting to any citizens, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations." We do not think this criticism is deserved. Laws are uniformly upheld where all persons, even though they may constitute a class, who fall under the operations of the law, are treated alike. We held in Redford v. Spokane Street Ry. Co., 15 Wash. 419 (46 Pac. 650), that where a law is uniform in its operations, in so far as it operates at all, its constitionality is not affected by the number of persons within the scope of its operation. Mr. Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (5th ed.) p. 482, *p. 390, thus tersely states the rule, under the title of "Unequal and Partial Legislation":