April, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. forcement of such remedies. The original jurisdiction of this court is fixed by constitutional limitations, and is derived from the constitution, and not in pursuance of any legislative enactment. In the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 157, the supreme court of the United States decided that such court derived its jurisdiction from the United States constitution; that it was not within the power of Congress to confer further or additional jurisdiction upon that court. The distinction drawn between the federal and state governments in matters of legislation, that the former is one of delegated powers, while the latter is one of limitations, does not affect the reasoning in Marbury v. Madison, supra, as applicable to the case at bar, that this court's original jurisdiction must be measured by the constitution of the state from which it derives its existence and power. See, also, State v. Hogan, supra. The superior court has jurisdiction over "such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for." Article 4, § 6, of the constitution. While it is provided in the same section that the superior court has jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition, meaning, undoubtedly, the common-law writ, there is nothing in the constitution forbidding the legislature, in the exercise of its legislative powers, from providing a proceeding analogous to the writ of prohibition, and making the same applicable in arresting executive, administrative, or legislative action by tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons. But when this is done the original jurisdiction to issue such writs is in the superior court, under the clause above quoted from § 6, art. 4, of the constitution, and in such matters this court can only exercise appellate jurisdiction. In California it has been held that the legislature, under provisions of a constitution similar to our own, could not enlarge or extend the office of the writ of prohibition so as to include Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [24 Wash. ministerial functions; the reason assigned being that, because the constitution specified such writ, the commonlaw writ was intended, and every other character of the writ was thereby necessarily excluded. Farmers' Union v. Thresher, 62 Cal. 407; Hobart v. Tillson, 66 Cal. 210 (5 Pac. 83). The same question came up in Utah under the organic act conferring on the legislature power to legislate on all rightful subjects of legislation. The territorial court say: "The district courts have general common-law and chancery jurisdiction, and that covers about everything of a civil or criminal nature not expressly committed to some other tribunal; Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall. 375. We can readily see that this general jurisdiction would embrace the common-law writ of prohibition, and that the legis lature could in no way deprive the district courts of such jurisdiction. But the legislature, in pursuance of its authority given by the organic act to legislate upon all 'rightful subjects of legislation,' has seen fit, and has the undoubted right, as occasions arise, to create new offenses, new subjects for judicial investigation, and new ways and means to enforce the authority of the courts and officers, and we can see no reason to conclude that the giving of additional power to the writ of prohibition was not a 'rightful subject of legislation." People v. House, 4 Utah, 369 (10 Pac. 838); State v. Hogan, supra. The construction given by the California court, it seems to us, is too narrow and technical. We conclude that original jurisdiction to issue the statutory writ of prohibition against the board of state land commissioners to arrest their contemplated action in selling or leasing the lands in controversy is in the superior court, and not in this court, and we have no original jurisdiction in the premises, and for that reason we will not pass on the merits of the application. These can only be inquired into on appeal. The writ should be denied, for lack of original jurisdiction, and these proceedings dismissed. REAVIS, C. J., and DUNBAR, FULLERTON and ANDERS, JJ., concur. [No. 3853. Decided April 10, 1901.] A. S. FARQUHARSON, Appellant, v. D. W. YEARGIN et al., CREATION OF NEW COUNTY NECESSARY POPULATION -LEGISLATIVE PRESUMPTIONS. Where a new county has been set off from another county, under art. 11, § 3, of the constitution prohibiting the formation of new counties containing a less population than 2,000, the failure of the legislative records to recite the fact that such new county contains a population of not less than 2,000 would not render the creation of such county illegal, since the legal presumption is that this fact must have been proved to the satisfaction of the legislature and that the passage of the act itself is equivalent to a finding of the necessary facts. SAME APPOINTMENT OF PROVISIONAL COUNTY OFFICERS. Although art. 11, § 5, of the constitution provides for a general and uniform law governing the elections of county officers, a provision in Laws 1899, p. 26, § 5, authorizing the governor to appoint the county commissioners in the newly created county of Ferry, and that they should fill by appointment all other county offices, is not unconstitutional, since the power to fill county offices provisionally in new counties is a necessary incident of the legislative power to create new counties. COUNTY INDEBTEDNESS GATIONS- SALARIES. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT- COMPULSORY OBLİ Warrants issued in payment of salaries of county officers, although in excess of the limit of one and one-half per cent. of the assessed valuation of property, are valid, on the ground of being compulsory obligations imposed upon the county by the constitution and laws of the state. SAME CONSTRUCTION OF NEW COURT HOUSE. Warrants issued in payment for the construction of a county court house properly fall under the rule of compulsory obligations 24 549 25 581 Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [24 Wash. when it appears that, at the time such indebtedness was incurred, the county seat was a new mining camp composed of small frame cabins and tents, the town having been recently destroyed by fire; and that it was necessary, for the proper and orderly administration of county affairs, for the protection and safe keeping of the public records, and in order to provide a place to hold court for said county, that a court house should be constructed, since it may be fairly inferred from existing conditions that no suitable building could otherwise be had. Appeal from Superior Court, Ferry County.-Hon. CHARLES H. NEAL, Judge. Affirmed. Charles P. Bennett, for appellant. Jesseph & Jesseph, for respondents. The opinion of the court was delivered by WHITE, J.-This action was commenced by plaintiff against the defendant for the purpose of having the defendants enjoined from issuing county bonds to the amount of $60,000, the purpose of such bond issue being to fund outstanding county warrants of Ferry county. Ferry county was created by the act of the legislature of the state of Washington on the 21st day of February, 1899. On March 11, 1899, the governor appointed a board of county commissioners for the newly created county, as provided in the act creating the county. The assessed valuation of the property in the newly created county was $408,513, on October 7, 1899, such valuation being agreed upon by the officers of Ferry and Stevens counties, and was based upon the assessment of Stevens county. Ferry county was formed out of part of the territory theretofore included in Stevens county, and the act organizing Ferry county provided that Ferry county should assume and pay to Stevens county its just proportion of the debts of Stevens county in the proportion that the assessed April, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. valuation of Ferry county bore to the valuation of the whole of Stevens county. Ferry county, as provided in art. 11, § 3, of the constitution, was not to be charged with any debt or liability incurred in the purchase of any county property or building which should fall within and be retained by Stevens county, and the same provision applied to Stevens county as to any county property or buildings in Ferry county. The auditor of Ferry county and the auditor of Stevens county were to apportion the indebtedness that Ferry county was to pay, and the county commissioners of Ferry county were to order warrants drawn for such indebtedness in favor of Stevens county. Between the 21st day of March, 1899, and the 7th day of October, 1899, county warrants were issued to the amount of $23,323.99. The cash receipts of the county during this period from licenses and fines was $10,573.10. Add to the cash received, one and one-half per cent. of the assessed valuation, $6,127.69, and deduct the amount from the amount of warrants issued during this period, and we have warrants issued in excess of said amount to the amount of $6,623.20. That of the warrants to the amount of $6,623.20 in excess of the constitutional limit of indebtedness of Ferry county there remain unpaid at this time warrants to the amount of $2,136.71. That of the said amount of $23,323.99 of warrants issued $15,303.56 were issued in payment for a county court house for said county of Ferry, and furniture for the same; $4,156 being for blank books, and $4,233.50 being the amount paid for transcribing records from Stevens county records, as required by the act creating the new county. Between the 11th day of March, 1899, and the 7th day of October, 1899, Ferry county acquired assets to the amount of $15,303.56 in |