Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [24 Wash. was two years from its date. A judgment was obtained. on the 11th of October, 1853, upon which execution was issued and levied upon the 4th of October, 1855, and the property sold thereunder on the 20th of October, 1855. The question was whether the issue and levy of the execution before the lien of the judgment expired had the effect to prolong the lien beyond the two years. The supreme court of California says: "The rule that confines the lien of the judgment strictly within the two years, is the most simple and certain in theory, and the most beneficial in practice. If we hold that the lien of the judgment may be prolonged beyond the period stated, by the issue and levy of an execution within the time, then we can fix no definite and certain limits to the continuance of the lien. Once we pass the limits of the statute, we open a door to the most vexatious litigation. The titles to real estate would become uncertain, and the useful end intended to be accomplished by our recording system would, in fact, be defeated. A party wishing to purchase the land of the judgment debtor could not do so with safety without the exercise of extraordinary diligence. The provisions of the code give the judgment creditor ample protection. He can cause an execution to issue at any time; and, under it, the sheriff can advertise and sell within the short period of twenty days. There is,therefore, no reason for allow ing him the privilege of delaying the issue of execution until it is too late to sell before the lien expires. It is true that an occasional hard case may arise under the strict rule, but upon the whole, it must be productive of the most good." Isaac v. Swift, 10 Cal. 71 (70 Am. Dec. 698); Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal. 121 (99 Am. Dec. 256 and note); Roe v. Swart, 5 Cow. 294; Little v. Harvey, 9 Wend. 157; Lawson v. Jordan, 19 Ark. 297 (70 Am. Dec. 596); McCormick v. Alexander, 2 Ohio, 66. In Lawson v. Jordan, supra, where the lien of the judgment had expired, it was also held that a junior judgment with a lien would have priority over one with April, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. out, but of older date. In Iowa it was held that a judg ment lienor, whose judgment had terminated by limitation before the rendition of a judgment in favor of a second judgment creditor against the same debtor, and who had at the time of recovery of the second judgment taken no steps to preserve or revive his lien, could not revive the same to the prejudice of such subsequent judgment. See, also, Boyle v. Maroney, 73 Iowa, 70 (35 N. W. 145); Virden v. Shepard, 72 Iowa, 546 (34 N. W. 325). We now come to the consideration of cases which are identical with the case at bar in principle, and nearly so in fact. In the case of Flagg v. Flagg, 39 Neb. 229 (58 N. W. 109), the facts show certain judgments were recovered against a debtor, who thereafter executed a mortgage upon premises owned by him, which were subject to the lien of the judgments. At the time of com mencement of an action for the foreclosure of a first mortgage in favor of a plaintiff who had purchased the outstanding judgments against the debtor, the same were a valid and subsisting lien upon the real estate in controversy, superior to the lien of the second mortgage. During the pendency of the action, the lien of the judg ments, as provided by the statute of Nebraska, expired. The second mortgagee, by leave of court, filed an amended answer in the suit to foreclose the first mortgage, setting up the dormancy of the judgment pending the prosecution of the action. It is provided by the Code of Nebraska that: "If execution shall not be sued out within five years from the date of any judgment that now is or may hereafter be rendered in any court of record in this state, or if five years shall have intervened between the date of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of suing out the writ of execution, such judgment shall Opinion of the Court--WHITE, J. [24 Wash. become dormant and cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment debtor." The court says: "In construing a statute where the meaning is not clear, the rule is to give it such interpretation as will comport with what is supposed to have been the purpose or intention of the legislature; in other words, where the intention is manifest, it will control, rather than the language employed by the lawgivers. In the section quoted, however, there is no ambiguity; no words employed which operate to defeat the clear and manifest intention of the enacting power. In fact, there is no room for construction. We must, therefore, apply the section according to its literal meaning. It is obvious that in case a judgment creditor fails for more than five years after the date of his judgment to sue out an execution, the judgment becomes dormant, and ceases to be a lien upon the real estate of the defendant. We see no escaping the conclusion that, where a judgment becomes dormant, its lien is thereby lost as against a mortgage made by the debtor during the life of the judgment." In the case of Tucker v. Shade, 25 Ohio St. 355, it is said: "Judgment liens are created by the statute, and their extent and duration are such as the statute prescribes." The Code of Ohio provides that: "The lands and tenements of the debtor within the county where the judgment is entered, shall be bound for the satisfaction thereof, from the first day of the term at which the judgment is rendered. All other lands shall be bound from the time they shall be seized on execution." A further provision is made that: "If execution shall not be sued out within five years from the date of any judgment, or if five years shall have intervened between the date of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of the suing April, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. out another writ of execution thereon, such judgment shall become dormant, and shall cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment debtor." The court said: "It is well settled that the title of a purchaser from the judgment debtor is, on the judgment becoming dormant, discharged from the lien, and that the subsequent revivor of the judgment will not affect such title." In the case of Norton v. Beaver, 5 Ohio, 178, it was held that the rights of others, acquired or subsisting under the dormancy of the judgment, are subordinate to the revived lien. That court says: "In a country where land is one of the most familiar and ordinary subjects of trade, the policy of the law does not favor liens which impose embarrassments on their transfer. The purchaser who acquires title to land at the time when no lien exists, or at a time when, by the creditor's delay, a once existing lien becomes dormant, appears to us to have an equity preferable to him who has indulged in delay. The lien of the creditor, at this time, is indefinite and contingent. It is not a subsisting interest in the lands, but a power to set up an interest that may never be exercised. He may prefer to enforce payment of his debt against other property, or against the person of the debtor. The purchaser has no means in his hands to guard against future dormant claims. It is, therefore, better that such sleeping creditors should sometimes lose their money, than that titles acquired in good faith, while they slumbered, should be rendered precarious." In the case of Miner v. Wallace, 10 Ohio, 404, it was held that a mortgage executed by a judgment debtor after recovery of the judgment takes priority over the judgment after its dormancy and revival. As was well said by the court in the case of Graff v. Kipp, 1 Edw. Ch. 619: "A plaintiff must take care to sell the lands of the Opinion of the Court-WHITE. J. [24 Wash. defendant before the expiration of the ten years, in order to avoid the danger of other incumbrances intervening; or if he wishes to continue a lien without a sale, then he must have a fresh judgment docketed before other creditors come in and obtain judgments." Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland Ch. 284 (22 Am. Dec. 236); McCormick v. Wheeler, 36 Ill. 114 (85 Am. Dec. 388). We conclude that, when a judgment ceases to be effective, the lien likewise ceases, and it cannot be revived so as to affect the rights of intervening purchasers; and that from November 24, 1896, until March 17, 1897, the judgment of respondent ceased to be effective for any purpose, and the lien thereof also ceased, and was not binding upon the property in controversy; that the sale on execution on the revived judgment passed only the interest of the judgment debtors subject to the intervening interest of the appellant which attached to the property under her deed, unless the decree entered in the suit brought by the respondent in 1893 against the appellant and the Schorrs estopped the appellant from setting up that interest. "The question of the conclusiveness of records most frequently arises on judgments. The doctrine is well established that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal or some proceeding for the annulment of the judgment between the parties on the merits by any competent tribunal, cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding either before the same or any other tribunal. But there is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the judgment as rendered upon the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them not only |