sufficient when it fails to allege ownership of the prop-
erty taken in some one, other than the defendant.—
State v. Dengel
See INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION, 1.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
County School Superintendent-Term of Office—Extension
of Term. Where a county superintendent of schools was
elected to office under a statute which provided that his
"term of office shall begin on the second Monday in
January next succeeding his election and continue for
two years and until his successor is elected and quali-
fied" and during his term the law was so changed as to
make the term "begin on the first Monday in August
next succeeding his election," such county superintend-
ent is entitled to hold the office until the qualification of
his successor for the term beginning in August, al-
though thereby his term is made greater than two years,
since under the provisions of the statute whereby he
holds office he was to continue therein for more than
two years, in case his successor was not elected and
qualified, and consequently the statute deferring the be-
ginning of his successor's term from January to August
would not be in violation of art. 11, § 8, of the constitu-
tion, which prohibits the extension of the term of any
county officer beyond the period for which he was
elected. State ex rel. Meredith v. Tallman...
Shipping-Bottomry Bond-Collateral Security-Liability
of Owner on Loss of Vessel. Where the master of a
steamship gave a bottomry bond upon a vessel, her
cargo and freight, to cover advances made to enable
her to pursue her voyage, at the same time drawing a
draft upon the owners for the amount of the bottomry
bond; and on the day following the execution of the
bottomry bond and draft another bond was executed by
an attorney in fact of the owners to secure said draft,
in which it is recited that the consideration therefor
is the acceptance by the obligee of a bottomry bond to
secure the sum advanced; the three instruments must
all be considered as part of one transaction, governed by
the rule applicable to bottomry bonds, whereby the
owners' liability is dependent on safe arrival of the
vessel in port; and hence, where the vessel was lost,
the bond given by the owners to secure the draft included
in the bottomry obligation did not create any personal
liability against them.-Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Soel-
berg
1. Arson-Validity of Statute-Plural Subjects Embraced
in One Act. Laws 1895, p. 173, defining the crimes
of arson and attempted arson, and providing a punish-
ment for each, does not violate art. 2, § 19, of the con-
stitution, which provides that "No bill shall embrace
more than one subject," since arson and attempted ar-
son are sufficiently connected to permit legislation with
reference thereto to be embodied in one act.-State v.
Hall....
2. Appropriation Bills-Time of Taking Effect. The act of
March 2, 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 54), entitled "an act
providing for the purchase and completing and fur-
nishing of a state capitol building, and providing for
the payment of interest and making an appropriation,"
took effect immediately upon its passage and approval,
since it must be construed as an appropriation bill, fall-
ing within the exception contained in art. 2, § 31, of the
state constitution, which declares that "no law, except
appropriation bills, shall take effect until ninety days
after the adjournment of the session," unless otherwise
directed by the legislature in case of an emergency.—
State ex rel. Stratton v. Rogers....
See LIENS, 5; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1, 4; TIDE
LANDS.
1. Action for Negligence-Stopping Car for Passenger to
Alight at Dangerous Place. A street railway company is
guilty of negligence, when the conductor on one of the
cars, having been informed by a passenger that he de-
sires to get off at a certain point, calls out the destination
and rings the bell for the motorman to stop, but the
STREET RAILROADS-CONTINUED.
car is allowed to run some fifty feet beyond the landing,
stopping on a trestle where it is dangerous to alight,
and the passenger is put off at that point and informed
that his destination is "Right across there."-Henry v.
Grant Street Electric Ry. Co...
2. Same-Contributory Negligence. A passenger upon a
street car is not guilty of contributory negligence in
alighting therefrom in a dangerous place, though he
was familiar with the surroundings, where the night
was dark, and he had indicated to the conductor to stop
at the proper landing place on a trestle upon which the
track was laid above the tide flats, but the car had
been allowed to run fifty feet beyond the landing, and
the conductor, after calling out the name of the destina-
tion desired by the passenger, put him off in the unusual
and dangerous place at which the car had stopped, and
the passenger, in reliance upon the conductor's having
put him off at the regular stopping place, did not take
the precaution to observe the position he was in, and,
on taking a step away from the car, was precipitated
some twelve or thirteen feet from the trestle upon the
tide flats below.-Id.
3. Instructions-Relevancy to Issues. In an action to re-
cover for personal injuries received by reason of alight-
ing from a street car at a dangerous place, after having
been carried beyond the proper landing place, without
notification from the defendant's employees, it is not
error to refuse a requested instruction by defendant as
to the degree of care required of a carrier of passengers
in maintaining its platforms and landings in a safe con-
dition. Id.
To Rights of Mortgagee. The grantee of a person who has
assumed and agreed to pay a mortgage cannot, on mak-
ing payment, be subrogated to the rights of the mort-
gagee.-DeRoberts v. Stiles
1. Corporations-Right to Tax Franchise-Not Affected by
License Fees. The annual license fee of ten dollars im-
posed by statute upon corporations doing business in this
state, is merely an excise upon the right of the corpora-
tion to exist and does not supersede the right to tax
the franchise of the corporation.-Chehalis Boom Co. v.
Chehalis County
2. Same-Assessment-Objections to Valuation-Time and
Place to Urge. A corporation cannot complain of the ar-
bitrary valuation placed upon its franchise by the as-
sessor, where it has made no application to the board of
equalization for a reduction of the valuation placed
upon its personal property.-Id....
3. Enjoining Void Tax-Jurisdiction. The superior court
has jurisdiction of an action instituted to enjoin the
collection of an illegal and void tax, and the property
owner is not confined to proceedings before the board
of equalization or appeal therefrom.-Lewiston Water
& Power Co. v Asotin County
4. Same-Tender of Due Tax. Where an action is brought
to enjoin the collection of a tax alleged to be void, no
tender is necessary, under the terms of Bal. Code, § 5678,
which requires the payment or tender of what is justly
due as a prerequisite to suit.-Id...
5. Same. Under the requirements of Bal. Code, § 5678, it
is sufficient to plead payment and tender of the taxes
justly admitted to be due, without tendering such por-
tion of the tax as is claimed to be illegal.-Id....
6. Same-Corporate Stock-Double Taxation.
rate listing and taxation of the capital stock of a
corporation and its real and personal property, where
the capital stock is all invested in the real and personal
property, is double taxation, and therefore illegal, in
the absence of specific legislation authorizing it.-Id.. 371
7. Same-Pleading. In an action to enjoin the collection of
taxes illegally assessed, an allegation in the complaint
that the real and personal property of a corporation
had been assessed; that at the same time its capital
stock was listed and assessed; and that all the proceeds
of the capital stock were invested in the real and per-
sonal property assessed, is a sufficient averment, as
against a general demurrer, that all the capital stock is
invested in said real and personal property.-Id.......
8. Illegal Assessment-Remedy by Injunction. The courts
of this state have power by injunction to restrain the
enforcement of an illegal tax upon real property and to
remove the apparent lien created by the invalid levy.—
North Western Lumber Co. v. Chehalis.....
9. Place of Taxation—Personal Property of Corporation.
Section 9 of the act of March 15, 1893 (Laws 1893, p.
327), which provides that personal property pertaining
to the business of a manufacturer shall be listed in the
town or place where his business is carried on, must be
construed in connection with other sections of the same
act which require corporeal personal property to be
assessed in the school district and road district in
which it is actually situated at the time the assess-
ment is made, and hence a milling corporation which has
its office and part of its personal property within the
corporate boundaries of a town cannot be assessed for
municipal taxation upon its corporeal personal property
which is situated just beyond the corporate limits of
the municipality.—Id.
See CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 2.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES. See CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 3, 4; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1.
First and Second Class-Construction of Statute.
der Laws 1897, p. 248, § 39, which provides that tide
lands of the first class shall comprise tide lands "within
or in front of the limits of any incorporated city or
town, or within two miles thereof on either side," and
all tide lands not included in the above class shall be
known as second class, the term "in front of the limits
of any incorporated city" must be construed as refer-
ring to only such lands as lie adjoining and in front of
the limits of a city; and the term "within two miles
thereof on either side" should be construed as refer-
ring to such tide lands as are located, by measurement
along the general direction of the city shore line, within
a distance of two miles from either of its two boun-
dary lines which extend inland from such shore line.—
State ex rel. Lehman v. Bridges....
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