Lectures on Game Theory

0-1 normalized 3-person Assertion Aumann B-core bargaining game Bargaining Set black can force Bondareva-Shapley theorem chess condition Consider the game continuous function counterobject Definition Diagram equilibrium point Euclidean space Example exists force a win game defined game N,v game theory h¹(s¹,s² Hence justified objection Kernel large parties Lemma lower e.p. market game matching pennies minimal winning coalition minimax value mixed extension mixed strategy N-M solution n-Person Games n-tuple non-empty core Nucleolus outcome payoff matrix payoff to player payoff vector play Princeton Proof prove pure strategy randomized strategy randomized super-strategy Remark Repeated Games resp set of payoffs set of players Shapley value Stochastic Games strategies of player strategy equilibrium strictly competitive subgame subset superadditive supergame symmetry two-person u(xg upper e.p. veto player weighted majority game white can force Zermelo's theorem