Croudson v. had been entertained, to have brought the question before a higher tribunal." Lawrence, J. also speaking of Leonard. the legal effect of a foreign sentence upon this point, says, as to which, after the continued practice which has taken place from the earliest period, in which, in actions on policies of insurance, questions have arisen on warranties, to admit such sentences in evidence, not only as conclusive in rem, but also as conclusive of the several matters they purport to decide directly, I apprehend it is now too late to examine the practice of admitting them to the extent to which they have been received, supposing that practice might, upon the argument, have appeared to have been doubtful at first." Rooke, J. Lord Eldon, and Lord Alvanley, all concur in giving the same testimony, that the doctrine under consideration had been established for a long period of years, by a long series of adjudications in the courts of Westminster Hall. I cite this case for no other purpose but to prove, by the most respectable testimony, that the case of Hughes v. Cornelius, decided in the reign of Car. II. had, by a uniform course of decisions from that time, been considered as warranting the rule now so firmly established in England. And when the inquiry is, whether the application of the principle laid down in that case to questions arising on warranties in actions on policies, be of ancient or modern date, I think I may safely rely upon the declarations of the English judges, when they concur in the evidence they give respecting the fact. It is true that no case was cited at the bar recognising the application of the rule to questions between the insurer and insured prior to the revolution, except that of Fernandez v. Da Costa, which I admit was a Nisi Prius decision. But were I convinced that the long series of decisions upon this point, from the time of Hughes v. Cornelius, spoken of by the judges in the case of Lohian v. Henderson, had been made at Nisi Prius, it *would not, in my mind, weaken the authority of the doctrine. would prove the sense of all the judges of England, as well as of the bar, of the correctness and legal validity of the rule. It is not to be supposed that if a doubt had existed respecting the law of those decisions, the point would not have been reserved for a more deliberate examination, before some of the courts of Westminster Hall. But the case of Fernandez v. Da Costa receives It * 441. Croudson V. Leonard. * 442 additional weight, when it is recollected that the judge who decided it was Lord Mansfield, and when, upon examining it, we find no intimation from him that there was any novelty at that day in the doctrine. To this strong evidence of the antiquity of the rule, may be added that of Judge Buller, who, at the time he wrote his Nisi Prius, considered it as then established. That the doctrine was considered as pefectly fixed in the year 1781, is plainly to be inferred, from the case of Bernardi v. Motteux, decided in that year. Lord Mansfield speaks of it as he would of any other well established principle of law, declaring, in general terms, that the sentence, as to that which is w thin it, is conclusive against all persons, and cannot be collaterally controverted in any other suit. The only difficulty in that case was, to discover the real ground upon which the foreign sentence proceeded, and the court in that and many subsequent cases laid down certain principles auxiliary to the rule, for the purpose of ascertaining the real import of the sentence in relation to the fact decided as between the insurer and insured. For if the sentence did not pro ceed upon the ground of the property not being neutral, it of course concluded nothing against the insured; since upon no other ground could the sentence be said to falsify the warranty. It was admitted by the counsel for the insured, that as between him and the insurer, the sentence is prima facie evidence of a non-compliance with the warranty. But if they are right in their arguments as to the inconclu siveness of the sentence, I would ask for the authority upon which the sentence can be considered as prima facie evidence. Certainly no case was referred to, and I have not met with one to warrant the position. If we look to general principles applicable to domestic judgment, they are opposed to it. We have seen that the judgment is conclusive between the same parties, upon the same matter coming incidentally in question. The judgment of a foreign court is equally conclusive, except in the single instance where the party claiming the benefit of it applies to the courts in England to enforce it, in which case only the judgment is prima facie evidence. But it is to be remarked, that in such a case, the judgment is no more conclusive as to the right it establishes, than as to the fact it decides. Now it is admitted that the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty is conclusive upon the right to the property in question; upon what principle, then, can it be prima facie evidence, if not conclusive, upon the facts directly decided. A domestic judgment is not even prima facie evidence between those not parties to it, or those claiming under them, and that would clearly be the rule, and for a similar reason as to foreign judgments. If between the same parties, the former is conclusive as to the right and as to the facts decided, this principle, if applied at all to foreign sentences, which it certainly is, is either applicable throughout, upon the ground that the parties are the same, or if not so, then by analogy to the rule applying to domestic judgments, the sentence cannot be evidence at all. Upon the whole, I am clearly of opinion, that the sentence of the court of admiralty at Barbadoes, condemning the brig Fame and her cargo as prize, on account of an attempt to break the blockade of Martinique, is conclusive evidence in this case against the insured, to falsify his warranty of neutrality. If the injustice of the belligerent powers, and of their courts, should render this rule oppressive to the citizens of neutral nations, I can only say with the judges who decided the case of Hughes v. Cornelius, let the government in its wisdom adopt the proper means to remedy the mischief. I hold the rules of law, when once firmly established, to be beyond the control *of those who are merely to pronounce what the law is, and if from any circumstance it has become impolitic, in a national point of view, it is for the nation to annul or to modify it. Till this is done, by the competent authority, I consider the rule to be inflexible.(a) (a) Judges Chase and Livingston dissented; and Judge Todd, not having been present at the argument, gave no opinion. So that this judgment is reversed by the opinions of Marshall, Ch. J. Cushing, Washington, and Johnson, Justices. All seizures under laws of of the United THE UNITED STATES v. THE SCHOONER BET- THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the circuit impost, navi court of the district of Columbia, reversing that of the gation or trade district court, which condemned the schooner Betsey States, where and Charlotte, and her cargo, as forfeited, for a violathe seizures tion of the act of congress of the 28th of February, are made on navi- 1806, entitled "An act to suspend the commercial ingable from the tercourse between the United States and certain parts sea by vessels of the island of St. Domingo." Laws U. S. vol. 8. tons burden, p. 11. waters of ten or more are civil causes of admi diction, and claimant to the submit to an The libel being filed, and the monition returned exralty and ma- ecuted, the claimant appeared, and having given fideritime juris jussory caution, to respond the costs, offered a plea adare to be tried mitting all the facts charged in the libel, excepting the without a jury voluntary carrying of the vessel into the port of Cape Quære, whether the an- François, the prohibited port mentioned, in the libel, swer of the which he denied, and "thereof put himself on the country." But the district judge rejected the plea, and orlibel ought not always to be dered the claimant to answer on oath: whereupon the upon oath if claimant offered the same denial on oath, by way of anrequired; and whether he is swer; to the receiving of which the attorney for the not bound to United States objected, unless the claimant would make swer interro Oath to answer truly all interrogatories which might be gatories upon *put to him relative to the cause; but the judge overoath, vivavoce ruled the objection, and received the answer, saying *444 that the United States might except to the answer, in Whether, on the same manner as to an answer in chancery; or, the trial of a might reply, setting forth new facts not inconsistent lation of the with the libel, and put interrogatories thereupon, as law prohibit upon the allegations in a bill in chancery, which, if ing interproper and pertinent, must be answered; as was done certain ports in the case of Maley v. Shattuck, (ante, vol. 3. p. 458.) in St. Domin- The attorney for the United States filed a replicabe admissible tion, and propounded interrogatories, which he prayed sels belonging might be answered by the claimant viva voce, in open to the same court. To this the claimant objected, but the judge owner, were overruled the objection. in open court. vessel for vio course with go, evidence that other ves at the same prohibited port at the same time; as a circumstance tending to discredit the evidence of distress set up as an excuse for going to such prohibited port? V. The Betsey and Charlotte sailed from Alexandria in United States September, 1806, with a clearance for St. Jago de Cuba. Upon the trial, the attorney for the United States produced and offered evidence, that during the months of August and September in the same year, two other vessels, owned in whole or in part by the claimant, sailed from Alexandria, with clearances for St. Jago de Cuba, and, as well as the Betsey and Charlotte, arrived at Cape François. To this evidence the claimant objected, but the judge overruled the objection, and heard the evidence. From the sentence of condemnation by the district judge, the claimant appealed to the circuit court, and new evidence being admitted, the sentence was reversed, and restoration awarded. From this sentence the United States appealed to this court, where witnesses were examined viva voce, both on the part of the United States and on that of the claimant. C. Lee, for the claimant, stated that he should contend, 1. That the proceedings ought to have been according to the course of the common law, and the facts ought to have been tried by a jury. *2. That the judge ought not to have compelled the claimant to answer upon oath; and, 3. That the vessel ought to be acquitted upon the facts of the case. Fones, for the United States, was stopped by the court, who expressed a wish to hear the other side. He wished, however, to be heard, upon the question of putting the claimant to answer upon oath, and was indulged. He observed that this was not a proceeding in personam, but in rem. The United States did not bring in the claimant by process, and compel him to answer upon oath, as is done in chancery cases; but the claimant comes in voluntarily to support his interest, and submits to the jurisdiction of the court. He ought to come with clean hands and a pure heart. If this be a case of admiralty jurisdiction, the proceedings must be Betsey. *445 |