ernment, and for the one acknowledged republic, which is now at work in opposing secession, and which, even though secession should to some extent be accomplished, will, we may hope, nevertheless, and not the less on account of such secession, conquer and put down the spirit of democracy.

The political contest of parties which is being waged now, and which has been waged throughout the history of the United States, has been pursued on one side in support of that idea of an undivided nationality of which I have spoken,-of a nationality in which the interests of a part should be esteemed as the interests of the whole; and on the other side it has been pursued in opposition to that idea. I will not here go into the interminable question of slavery,-though it is on that question that the southern or democratic States have most loudly declared their own sovereign rights and their aversion to national interference. Were I to do so I should fail in my present object of explaining the nature of the constitution of the United States. But I protest against any argument which shall be used to show that the constitution has failed, because it has allowed slavery to produce the present division among the States. I myself think that the Southern or Gulf States will go. I will not pretend to draw the exact line, or to say how many of them are doomed; but I believe that South Carolina with Georgia, and perhaps five or six others, will be extruded from the Union. But their very extrusion will be a political success, and will, in fact, amount to a virtual acknowledgment in the body of the Union of the truth of that system for which the conservative republican party has contended. If the North obtain the power of settling that question of boundary, the abandonment of those southern States will be a success, even though the privilege of retaining them be the very point for which the North is

now in arms.

The first clause of the constitution declares that all the legislative powers granted by the constitution shall be vested in a Congress, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The House of Representatives is to be rechosen every two years, and shall be elected by the people, such persons in each State having votes for the national Congress as have votes for the legislature of their own States. If therefore South Carolina should choose as she has chosen-to declare that the electors of her own legislature shall possess a property qualification, the electors of members of Congress from South Carolina must also have that qualification. In Massachusetts universal suffrage now prevails, although it is not long since a low property qualification prevailed

even in Massachusetts. It therefore follows that members of the House of Representatives in Congress need by no means be all chosen on the same principle. As a fact, universal suffrage* and vote by ballot, that is by open voting papers, prevail in the States, but they do not so prevail by virtue of any enactment of the constitution. The laws of the States, however, require that the voter shall have been a resident in the State for some period, and generally either deny the right of voting to negroes, or so hamper that privilege that practically it amounts to the same thing.

The Senate of the United States is composed of two senators from each State. These senators are chosen for six years, and áre elected in a manner which shows the conservative tendency of the constitution with more signification than perhaps any other rule which it contains. This branch of Congress, which, as I shall presently endeavour to show, is by far the more influential of the two, is not in any way elected by the people. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years, and each senator shall have one voice." The Senate sent to Congress is therefore elected by the State legislatures. Each State legislature has two Houses; and the senators sent from that State to Congress are either chosen by vote of the two Houses voting together-which is, I believe, the mode adopted in most States, or are voted for in the two Houses separately-in which cases, when different candidates have been nominated, the two Houses confer by committees and settle the matter between them. The conservative purpose of the constitution is here sufficiently evident. The intention has been to take the election of the senators away from the people, and to confide it to that body in each State which may be regarded as containing its best trusted citizens. It removes the senators far away from the democratic element, and renders them liable to the necessity of no popular canvas. Nor am I aware that the constitution has failed in keeping the ground which it intended to hold in this matter. On some points its selected rocks and chosen standing ground have slipped from beneath its feet, owing to the weakness of words in defining and making solid the intended pro

*Perhaps the better word would have been manhood suffrage; and even that word should be taken with certain restrictions. Aliens, minors, convicts, and men who pay no taxes cannot vote. In some States none can vote unless they can read and write. In some there is a property qualification. In all there are special restrictions against negroes. There is in none an absolutely universal suffrage. But I keep the name as it best expresses to us in England the system of franchise which has practically come to prevail in the United States.

hibitions against democracy. The wording of the constitution has been regarded by the people as sacred; but the people has considered itself justified in opposing the spirit as long as it revered the letter of the constitution. And this was natural. For the letter / of the constitution can be read by all men; but its spirit can be understood comparatively but by few. As regards the election of the senators, I believe that it has been fairly made by the legislatures of the different States. I have not heard it alleged that members of the State legislatures have been frequently constrained by the outside popular voice to send this or that man as senator to Washington. It was clearly not the intention of those who wrote the constitution that they should be so constrained. But the senators themselves in Washington have submitted to restraint. On subjects in which the people are directly interested they submit to instructions from the legislatures which have sent them as to the side on which they shall vote, and justify themselves in voting against their convictions by the fact that they have received such instructions. Such a practice, even with the members of a House which has been directly returned by popular election, is, I think, false to the intention of the system. It has clearly been intended that confidence should be put in the chosen candidate for the term of his duty, and that the electors are to be bound in the expression of their opinion by his sagacity and patriotism for that term. A member of a representative House so chosen, who votes at the bidding of his constituency in opposition to his convictions, is manifestly false to his charge, and may be presumed to be thus false in deference to his own personal interests, and with a view to his own future standing with his constituents. Pledges before election may be fair, because a pledge given is after all but the answer to a question asked. A voter may reasonably desire to know a candidate's opinion on any matter of political interest before he votes for or against him. The representative when returned should be free from the necessity of further pledges. But if this be true with a House elected by popular suffrage, how much more than true must it be with a chamber collected together as the Senate of the United States is collected! Nevertheless it is the fact that many senators, especially those who have been sent to the House as democrats, do allow the State legislatures to dictate to them their votes, and that they do hold themselves absolved from the personal responsibility of their votes by such dictation. This is one place in which the rock which was thought to have been firm has slipped away, and the sands of democracy have made their way through. But with reference to this it is always in the

power of the Senate to recover its own ground, and re-establish its own dignity; to the people in this matter the words of the constitution give no authority, and all that is necessary for the recovery of the old practice is a more conservative tendency throughout the country generally. That there is such a conservative tendency no one can doubt; the fear is whether it may not work too quickly and go too far.

In speaking of these instructions given to senators at Washington, I should explain that such instructions are not given by all States, nor are they obeyed by all senators. Occasionally they are made in the form of requests, the word "instruct" being purposely laid aside. Requests of the same kind are also made to representatives, who, as they are not returned by the State legislatures, are not considered to be subject to such instructions. The form used is as follows, "We instruct our senators and request our representatives,” &c. &c.

The senators are elected for six years, but the same Senate does not sit entire throughout that term. The whole chamber is divided into three equal portions or classes, and a portion goes out at the end of every second year; so that a third of the Senate comes in afresh with every new House of Representatives. The Vice-President of the United States, who is elected with the President, and who is not a senator by election from any State, is the ex-officio President of the Senate. Should the President of the United States vacate his seat by death or otherwise, the VicePresident becomes President of the United States; and in such case the Senate elects its own President pro tempore.

In speaking of the Senate, I must point out a matter to which the constitution does not allude, but which is of the gravest moment in the political fabric of the nation. Each State sends two senators to Congress. These two are sent altogether independently of the population which they represent, or of the number of members which the same State supplies to the Lower House. When the constitution was framed, Delaware was to send one member to the House of Representatives, and Pennsylvania eight; nevertheless, each of these States sent two senators. It would seem strange that a young people, commencing business as a nation on a basis intended to be democratic, should consent to a system so directly at variance with the theory of popular representation. It reminds one of the old days when Yorkshire returned two members, and Rutlandshire two also. And the discrepancy has greatly increased as young States have been added to the Union, while the old States have increased in population. New

York, with a population of about 4,000,000, and with thirty-three members in the House of Representatives, sends two senators to Congress. The new State of Oregon, with a population of 50,000 or 60,000, and with one member in the House of Representatives, sends also two senators to Congress. But though it would seem that in such a distribution of legislative power, the young nation was determined to preserve some of the old fantastic traditions of the mother-country which it had just repudiated; the fact, I believe, is that this system, apparently so opposed to all democratic tendencies, was produced and specially insisted upon by democracy itself. Where would be the State sovereignty and individual existence of Rhode Island and Delaware, unless they could maintain, in at least one House of Congress, their State equality with that of all other States in the Union? In those early days, when the Constitution was being framed, there was nothing to force the small States into a Union with those whose populations preponderated. Each State was sovereign in its municipal system, having preserved the boundaries of the old colony, together with the liberties and laws given to it under its old colonial charter. A union might be, and no doubt was, desirable; but it was to be a union of sovereign States, each retaining equal privileges in that union, and not a fusion of the different populations into one homogeneous whole. No State was willing to abandon its own individuality, and least of all were the small States willing to do so. It was therefore ordained that the House of Representatives should represent the people, and that the Senate should represent the States.

From that day to the present time the arrangement of which I am speaking has enabled the democratic or southern party to contend at a great advantage with the republicans of the North. When the constitution was founded, the seven northern StatesI call those northern which are now free-soil States, and those southern in which the institution of slavery now prevails-the seven northern States were held to be entitled by their population. to send thirty-five members to the House of Representatives, and they sent fourteen members to the Senate. The six southern States were entitled to thirty members in the Lower House, and to twelve senators. Thus the proportion was about equal for the North and South. But now,- -or rather in 1860, when secession commenced, the northern States, owing to the increase of population in the North, sent one hundred and fifty representatives to Congress, having nineteen States and thirty-eight senators; whereas the South, with fifteen States and thirty senators, was entitled by its population to only ninety representatives, although by a