the comparative patronage of the three governments of France, England, and the United States : No. Population. of voters. Civil list No. em- Army and Interest expense. $92,310,620 Total expenditure. France... 35,000,000 England..27,000,000 190.000 788,180 14,675,000 931.997 $94,000,000 76,000 000 $262,310,620 23,578 77.335.000 159,100,000 251,110,000 2,400,000 6,044,399 35,000 20,426,709 1,408,344 27,879,452 The direct patronage of the Federal Government, it would seem from this comparison, is very insignificant, as compared with the other two countries named; but it will be remembered that, owing to the centralization of those governments, those local and municipal offices and expenses figure in the aggregate, which, in the United States, appear only in the returns of the State sovereignties. While, however, the patronage of the Federal Government is the reward of a successful party, that success carries with it not only the federal offices, but those of the several States also; because, to be successful in federal elections, it is necessary that the same party should triumph in the several States. The number of offices in the gift of state executives is about 60,000, making about 100,000 offices dependent upon elections, and for those offices experience has shown, that there will be an average of ten applicants for each, from either successful party. Hence, altogether there are 2,000,000 persons-a number nearly equal to that of the whole of the voters-to whom the hope of office is the stimulant to partizan activity, and whose political exertions in towns, cities, counties and states, constitute the merits on which they base their claims; and those claims have heretofore been adjudged in central committees and regencies with absolute and tyrannic sway. The public have become accustomed to see all politicians alike dispose of place with a view to party objects or private interest; and the press has yet to discharge the duty of showing that whenever, and by whomsoever, such objects are made of primary consideration, and individual merit or aptitude for special duties entirely disregarded, the public interest is betrayed. It is not from the mere combined interest of this horde of office-seekers that the greatest evils result. They are but the machinery by which the Federal patronage, on a broader and more magnificent scale, is sought to promote the pecuniary interests of parties. The great fertility of the soil of the United States, the enterprise and energy of the people, as well as their universal industry, assisted by the greatest improvements in science and arts, are elements of vast national wealth, far in advance of what any nation in the present, or of any former age of the world could present. As all these are elements of great national prosperity, so are they the elements of one of the most powerful nations that ever existed, if a central government should have the means of drawing any considerable portion of this wealth from the people by taxes, direct or indirect, and expending it upon particular classes or interests, which would thereby become the creatures and supports of the government, ready to sustain an ambitious executive in any attempt to extend the " area of power." To effect this object, there have been constant attempts made to construe the powers granted to Congress in the constitution, into the right to collect and squander money for other than the direct and legitimate objects of government. The leading scheme to extend the power of the Federal Government, and to make state, local, and private interests depend upon its patronage, may be thus enumerated-1st, the fishing and salt bounties; 2d, the protective system; 3d, a national debt; 4th, a national bank; 5th, a system of internal improvements; 6th, assumption of the state debts; 7th, distribution of the public lands; 8th, to abolish postage, and make the post office dependent upon the treasury; 9th, to arrogate for Congress powers over new territories and new states that may be created, not granted to it by the Constitution. The first eight of these schemes were of a pecuniary nature to make the private pecuniary interests of individuals in all the States dependent upon the Federal Government. The fishing interests have drawn from the Federal Treasury, since the formation of the government, over $4,000,000 in direct bounties, being money collected from all other citizens, and paid over to them as a gift: a natural result has been that the recipients of those bounties are those who bave prospered less than any other branch of navigation, and they loudly assert that they cannot exist without them. They are stipendiaries of the Federal Treasury. The manufacturing interest, which, as reported by the census of 1840, comprises 791,749 out of 4,798,870 active citizens, or 1-17th of the whole population, have long asserted that their interest depends entirely upon the patronage of the government. That unless that government maintains for them a high tariff mostly admitted to be a tax upon consumers, for the patriotic motive of supporting manufacturers too feeble to compete with foreigners, they must discontinue and become paupers. It was long contended by the friends of a strong government, that "a national debt was a national blessing," inasmuch as that every holder of national scrip was a bound adherent of the government which undertook to pay him by extracting the means to do it from his fellow citizens. A national bank was long clung to, as a most notable scheme for giving strength and consistency to the national government. In 1841, Mr. Clay proposed that Congress should establish a bank of $50,000,000 capital, of which Congress should subscribe one-half, and thus become the partner of at least 20,000 persons, who would subscribe the remainder, and this joint proprietary would become the money centre of at least 100,000 borrowers in all parts of the Union. The greatest scheme of all was, probably, that for internal improvements. This policy was commenced near a quarter of a century since, and grew steadily with increasing impetus until, in 1830, the demands upon Congress, for appropriations, reached $200,000,000, to be expended in all parts of the Union on the wildest schemes for personal emolument at the public expense. The policy was crushed by the Maysville road veto of President Jackson; but so deep a hold had the corrupting influence already produced upon the numberless contractors, providers, surveyors, land speculators, and stockjobbers, that nothing. short of the great influence of Jackson was sufficient to crush it. The vetoed bill was reconsidered by a vote of yeas 96 to 92 nays, in the House, and yeas 21 to 17 nays, 21 to 17 nays, in the Senate, both votes showing a majority in favor, but not sufficient to overrule the veto. The national treasury being thus relieved of the burden of local improvements, these were taken up by the states, the debts of which, for the construction of public works, speedily swelled to over $200,000,000, and stopped only by loss of credit. The holders of those stocks then made the most vigorous attempts to have them assumed by the Federal Government, because, as it was expressed in the circular of the Messrs. Barings, of London, it was necessary to have a more comprehensive guarantee" than state faith for the payment of the debts. Failing in this, the distribution of the public lands was contended for. On that plan, the machinery of the land office was to remain in the hands of the Federal Government, and the money so collected paid out to states. The question of postoffice reform was also seized upon to extend the influence of the government, as explained in our last number, in a review of the report of the Post-Master General-it was sought to continue the lavish expenditure among some 3000 contractors, and to throw the whole expense upon the federal treasury without seeking to reform abuses. All these plans formed parts of a great whole, the direct tendency of which was to consolidate the governments, and centralize the powers of all the states in the hands of the federal executive. In order to estimate the power which would thus have been created, had all these schemes been carried out, we may recapitulate the number of persons interested, and the debt which would have been created, as follows: There is a moderate computation of the patronage which would have resulted from the passage of the Maysville road bill instead of its veto, and the adoption of the other measures proposed. The amount demanded from the Federal Government for internal improvements in 1830, was about $200,000,000; had the policy been adopted by the Federal Government, that amount would have been expended by it instead of by the states, and it would have been increased by an amount as much greater as the credit of the Federal Government exceed. ed that of individual states, and we have estimated it at $500,000,000. Then would there have been some $75,000,000 expended by some of the states for banks, &c., to be assumed. The distribution of the public land revenue would have been about $4,000,000 per annum-the post-office expenses would have been $3,500,000 per annum, and an ultra high tariff would have diminished the revenues at least $4,000,000 per annum. Inasmuch as the revenues have not exceeded the current expenses, the amount of debt would have been increased, by all these figures, to a sum making over $700,000,000, bearing over $42,000,000 interest per annum, on the expenditure of which, one and a quarter millions of people would have been dependent. It is to be observed that this $700,000,000 would have been borrowed, and the lenders would have swollen the government adherents by at least 200,000 more persons. This picture is no idle conjecture; it is what we have barely escaped by two executive vetoes against majorities of Congress, produced by the corruption of patronage. Had this mass of patronage been now in existence, what would have stayed the progress of centralization? The actual officers holding from the executive, are, as we have said; but the machinery through which these different patronage-seeking interests act upon the elections. The campaign of 1840 is a singular instance of the successful combination of these interests. The chief schemes that led that election were, tariff, national bank, distribution and assumption of state debts. All these interests acting with 800,000 office seekers, and most efficiently aided by the 34,000 bankrupts who subsequently took advantage of the bankrupt law then clamored for, carried the election. The debts of those bankrupts amounted to $440,934,615. When we consider the origin of our present form of government, we become singularly struck with the danger which would have resulted to its permanence if the above mass of patronage had been created. The Federal Constitution is the offspring of a convention of delegates from the several states. That convention, with much caution and jealousy, delegated certain specified powers to Congress, reserving the infinity of sovereign authority to the several states. From that moment, as we have seen, the strife has been continually to give a latitudinarian construction to the powers delegated to Congress. If those constructions had prevailed, and an immense debt, with numberless stipendiary interests depending on the Federal Government, all chafing against the restraints of the Constitution were in being, a new convention would doubtless be called, and what would be the results of such a convention? As the present Constitution was framed by a convention which represented the several states, a like extraordinary convention may alter or annul it at their pleasure. The aggregate of the several states, as represented by such convention, is, therefore, sovereign throughout the Union. The Federal Government, which is its creature and minister, and the states' governments, whose powers it can modify at its pleasure, are equally subordinate to it. A convention growing out of interests, all formed under the influence of a central government, would naturally feel a desire to strengthen that government, and would doubtless proceed by taking from the states all but specified powers, and endowing the Federal Government with the infinite residue, thus giving it a character of absolute sovereignty, which would easily be perpetuated through its improved strength, by taking from it its constituent character as dependent upon a convention of delegates to alter or abridge it. The rapid and obvious tendency to such results is manifest in the fact that the veto of the National Bank Bill, in 1841, drew from Mr. Clay a denunciation of the veto power; and the abolition of this power was made one of the issues at the election of 1844. The new attempt to arrogate for Congress the power of laying new states, on their admission into the Union, under disabilities which do not appertain to the old states, is a bold and singular position for any party to assume, and belongs peculiarly to that class of projects meant to raise the supremacy of the Federal Government. Congress, under the Constitution, is entirely without the power to interfere with the domestic concerns of any persons, either in states or territories. The attempts to force such a construction upon the powers of Congress is a singular indication of the recklessness of political aspirants. To insist that Congress shall prohibit in new territory an institution that it tolerates in the District of Columbia, savors little of that principle of equal laws which has been the pride of Americans. The great and manifest evils which have sprung from the executive power to appoint to office, has been productive of a salutary reform in the state of New-York, where the election of officers has been restored to the people, and the state-power decentralized. Instead of being appointed by chief authorities to rule over the people, the following state officers are now elected by the people, and hold office each directly from his individual constituents:-Secretary of State, Comptroller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Surveyors, Canal Commissioners, State Prison Inspectors, eight Judges of Appeal, thirty-two Supreme Judges, Judges of County Courts, Clerks and Judicial Officers. Heretofore there have been three classes of officers in each state. 1st. Those chosen by the people. 2d. Those appointed by state authorities; and 3d. Those appointed by the federal authorities. It is now desirable that these three classes should be reduced to one, and be all chosen by the people. The Custom House Officers, Land-Officers, Post-Masters, District Judges, Marshals and Attorneys, should all be chosen by the localities where their services are required the federal executive having the right of suspending, for sufficient cause, until another election. In such a state of affairs, the infamous scenes that have in past times resulted from presidential elections would spare the blushes of the patriotic citizen, and the public business be conducted all the better for it. THE MEXICAN WAR-ITS ORIGIN, ITS JUSTICE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. (CONCLUDED.)-THE BOUNDARY OF TEXAS DISCUSSED. In discussing this question it must be premised, that it assumes as conceded, that neither the acknowledgment of Texan independence, nor the annexation of Texas, was wrongful, or furnished any just cause for Mexico to commence war against the United States; and that Texas was de facto et de jure an independent state; for if these three points be decided against the United States, Mexico stands justified before the world for her course in the whole Texan controversy,-the march of the United States army to Corpus Christi, was as much an act of war as the march to the Rio Grande, and the act in question would be entirely immaterial. Assuming, then, the rightful independence of Texas as a state or nation, what was its western limit? 1st. Had it any limits? 2d. If it had, were they the Nueces or the Rio Grande? 3d. If it had no limits, had it a right, under the circumstances, to fix them and take possession according to its own will, and its own power? 4th. If it had not the latter right, was it justified by the law of nations in advancing its army to the Rio Grande, in consequence of the hostile or threatening position and conduct of Mexico? None will deny that the rights of the United States in this respect were precisely the same after the annexation, as those of Texas before. More might be expected from the magnanimity of the one which was strong, than the other which was weak; but, as respected a strict justification of acts towards Mexico, both stood just alike. Regarding the annexation as peaceful, and not changing the relations between the United States and Mexico, it must also be considered that no war existed between Texas and Mexico, for if war did exist between the two, then, the annexation itself, being a union with one of two belligerents, was an act of war, and this question of boundary would not arise. If war did exist, and no boundary had ever been settled, it was the undoubted right of either to take possession as far as it could, and fix its boundary whenever it pleased, until the other should be disposed to enter into a just treaty to establish one. Had Texas, as admitted into the United States, any western limits, and if so, what were they? Had it "a local habitation," as well as "a name?" The same Congress which declared its independence, in March 1836, declared the Rio Grande the boundary from its mouth to its source. That this was the setting up of a new state from part of an old one; that it was just as rightful to declare the independence and jurisdiction to extend to the Rio Grande as to any other line not actually occupied by those who declared it; that it was just as good a title to the country up to that line as to any other part of it, can hardly be denied. As to any settlement or portion of |