with less apprehension or fear, and that by reason of the rule 'little difficulty, comparatively speaking, is found in obtaining voluntary evidence for the purposes of justice.' Best, Ev. §§ 605, 606; 3 Wigmore, Ev. § 2041. By what course of logic can these reasons be made to apply to the case of a suborner? Why should the rule as to him be different from that applied in cases of larceny, rape, or other criminal offenses? The presumption of his innocence certainly is of no greater weight than in the case of one accused of larceny or rape. There is no public-policy reason why his conviction should be made more difficult than in the majority of other felonies. He is not convicted of an offense occurring while he is under oath and testifying. The offense that he commits is virtually consummated before the witness gives his testimony. He is not charged with the giving of false testimony. He does not commit his crime while performing any necessary function in the progress of a trial. Why, then, should his conviction require greater proof than in convicting for theft? We do not think it does. All of the authorities hold that a single witness, uncorroborated, can make sufficient proof

of

the suborning. Some, however, hold or infer that as to the proof of the element of perjury the witness should be corroborated. In reviewing these authorities, we find that this position has been unduly influenced by the existence of the rule with reference to perjury, or by statutory provisions which do not exist in this state. The leading case cited by textwriters is that of People v. Evans (1869) 40 N. Y. 1, where the main witness against the suborner was the self-confessed perjurer. At that time the statute of New York made incompetent as a witness a person who had been convicted of perjury. The court, arguing from that statute, held that a self-confessed perjurer was as unworthy of belief as if he had been convicted and sentenced, and that, therefore, his testimony was not sufficient, but must be corroborated before the suborner can be convicted. The court's decision was also builded upon the

maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.' The rule, then, of the courts in applying this maxim was to instruct the jury that, if they found the witness had sworn falsely in one material thing, they should pronounce him false in his whole testimony, and utterly disregard it. But the present rule in applying the maxim is that, if they find the witness had sworn falsely in one matter, they may (not shall) disregard his whole testimony. At the present time it is a matter which the jury weighs; but in former times it was fixed as a matter of law. But later, and after the repeal of the statute referred to, the court of appeals of New York repudiated that doctrine by holding that a witness was competent notwithstanding his crime, and the sufficiency or weight of his testimony was for the jury, and not the court, to decide."

And in Boren v. United States (1906) 75 C. C. A. 531, 144 Fed. 801, the court said: "It is urged that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, for the reason that the proof of each count consists of the testimony of a single witness. It is true that under indictments for perjury the generally accepted rule is that the accused cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. The reason assigned is that the same effect is to be given to the testimony of the party accused as to that of the accusing witness, and the proof would be merely the oath of one person against that of another. The reason of the rule in the form in which it is expressed does not apply to a case of subornation of perjury such as the present case, for the reason that here the testimony does not consist of the oath of one person against that of another. The testimony of each witness for the government involves, it is true, the impeachment of his own former sworn statement, but it is direct evidence against the accused as to his instigation of the perjury. We find that in People v. Evans (N. Y.) supra, it was held that subornation of perjury may not be proven by the uncorroborated testimony of the person suborned. The contrary was held by

Judge Deady in United States v. Thompson (1887; C. C.) 31 Fed. 331. In State v. Renswick (1901) 85 Minn. 19, 88 N. W. 22, it was held that, where it is sought to establish by his own testimony the perjury of the person suborned, his testimony must be corroborated, but that the fact that the accused suborned or induced him to commit the crime may be established by the uncorroborated testimony of the witness if it satisfies the jury 'beyond a reasonable doubt. If corroboration of the testimony of the witnesses in this case as to their perjury in making their oaths was necessary, we find corroboration in the evidence which is in the record."

And see, also, the early New York case of Re Francis (1816) 1 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 121, in which the court took the view that subornation stands upon a different ground from perjury with regard to the mode of proof, and that corroboration was unnecessary. But see People v. Evans (N. Y.) infra, III.

III. Application of accomplice rule. The cases which consider the rule that in general requires corroboration of accomplices usually make the same distinction between the two elements in the crime of subornation of perjury which is drawn by the cases which consider the question from the viewpoint of the two-witness rule, as shown in division II. supra. A comprehensive rule may be announced to the effect that, in so far as the rule requiring corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice is concerned as applied to the testimony of the suborned in prosecutions for subornation of perjury, the suborner and suborned are accomplices in so far as to testimony as to the perjury itself, but as to other elements of the crime, such as procuring or inducing the perjury, they are not accomplices, and testimony as to such matters by the person suborned is not necessary to sustain conviction. State v. Fahey (1902) 3 Penn. (Del.) 594, 54 Atl. 690; State v. Renswick (1901) 85 Minn. 19, 88 N. W. 22; People v. Evans (1869) 40 N. Y. 1; People v. Markan (1924) 123 Misc. 689, 206 N. Y. Supp. 197.

Thus, in State v. Renswick (1901) 85 Minn. 19, 88 N. W. 22, the court said: "The complete crime of subornation of perjury consists of two essential elements, the commission of perjury by the person suborned, and the wilfully procuring or inducing him to so do by the suborner. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 6379. As to the first element of the crime, the suborned and the suborner are principals by virtue of the statute (id. § 6310), and necessarily each is the accomplice of the other; hence this element of the crime cannot be established by the uncorroborated evidence of the suborned (id. § 5767). But, as to the second element of the crime, the suborned is neither a principal nor an accomplice, for legally he cannot be guilty of persuading himself to commit perjury. An indictment of a party for inducing himself to commit a crime would be a legal absurdity. . The conclusion logically follows that if, in the prosecution of a party for subornation of perjury, it is sought to establish the fact that perjury was committed by the testimony of the person committing it, his testimony must be corroborated as to such fact, because as to the perjury he is an accomplice. But the alleged fact that he was induced to commit the crime by the accused may be established by his uncorroborated testimony if it satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."

In New York the position is taken that while as a general rule corroboration of an accomplice is not necessary, yet the crime of subornation of perjury is an exception. People v. Evans (1869) 40 N. Y. 1, a leading case on this question. Mason, J., said: "There must be some exceptions to all general rules, and I would make this case an exception to the general rule that a prisoner may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. In England, whatever once may have been the law, the settled and humane rule now is, to use the language of Serjeant Talfourd, for the judges, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to direct the acquittal of a prisoner, unless the accomplice be corroborated by evidence admitting of no suspicion

(Wharton's Crim. Law, 302); but I do not propose to interfere with the general rule that the prisoner may be convicted on the unsupported and uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but to make this case an exception to the rule. It seems quite necessary to do so to save the rule itself from reproach, and the administration of public justice from disgrace. The charge of the judge, in a case like this, is, in effect, just this: The corpus delicti is that Near was suborned by someone to commit perjury on the trial of Rose, and that he did commit the perjury, and this must be first established. The next question in the case is, Is the defendant, Evans, the person who suborned Near to commit the perjury?

Near swears he was suborned to commit the perjury, and that he did it, and that Evans procured and hired him to do it. The case is thus submitted, and the jury are told by the judge that they may convict Evans on the sole, uncorroborated evidence of Near alone. Now, what is the verdict of the jury in this case, fairly and justly stated? First, we find that this witness Near was hired for $25 to swear to an alibi, and commit wilful and corrupt perjury, to save a proved guilty burglar and thief from the just punishment of his crimes, and that he did thus swear and commit perjury. This we find as the corpus delicti in this case, and we find this on Near's own evidence alone, because he swears to it. Secondly, we find that Evans, the defendant in this case, is guilty of hiring and suborning the said Near to commit such perjury, and we find this on the sole and uncorroborated testimony of Near, because he has sworn to it. We find, in short, first, that Near has been hired to commit wilful and corrupt perjury on the trial of Rose, and did commit wilful and corrupt perjury to save a burglar and thief from just punishment. Second, we find Near is a credible and reliable witness, and will convict the defendant of this high crime on his evidence alone. No jury should ever have the opportunity given them by any court to render so disgraceful a verdict, in a court of justice, as this. The jury

are required literally to stultify themselves."

The rule was applied in People v. Markan (N. Y.) supra, to an indictment for subornation of perjury, which was set aside because the only testimony before the grand jury as to the false swearing was given by the suborned.

And it has been held that, when the subornation consisted in procuring another to make a false oath in an affidavit, without reading its contents to him, or letting him know what they were, if the person making the affidavit knowingly signed such affidavit with knowledge of its contents, he was an accomplice of the defendant and his testimony required corroboration, but if he signed in ignorance of the contents, and without perjurous intent, then he is not an accomplice, and no corroboration of his testimony as such is required. People v. Barber (1922) 118 Misc. 740, 195 N. Y. Supp. 239.

And where there is ample evidence upon the whole case sufficient to support the verdict, and the subornation is amply corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses not accomplices, the fact that the person suborned was an accomplice will not affect the verdict of guilty. People v. Metzler (1913) 21 Cal. App. 80, 130 Pac. 1192.

Another line of cases take the position that the suborned and the suborner are not accomplices, and that the rule requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony has no application at all. See, however, the discussion of the two-witness rule, subd. II. supra, where some of these cases require corroboration under that rule. Stone v. State (1903) 118 Ga. 705, 98 Am. St. Rep. 145, 45 S. E. 630; Bell v. State (1909) 5 Ga. App. 701, 63 S. E. 860; State v. Wilhelm (1923) 114 Kan. 349, 219 Pac. 510; State v. Richardson (1913) 248 Mo. 563, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 307, 154 S. W. 735; State v. White (1924) Mo., 263 S. W. 192.

In United States v. Thompson (1887; C. C.) 31 Fed. 331, the court declared that the person suborned is not tech