Robert Creighton v. Francis Kellermann. ROBERT CREIGHTON V. FRANCIS KELLERMANN. 1. In an answer or reply, there must be a general or specific denial of each material allegation which it is intended to controvert; a single statement that each and all of the allegations are denied, is good as a general denial; but if the denial be intended to be specific, and facts are introduced for that purpose, it must appear, by averment, to which of the material allegations those facts are intended to reply. 2. A general motion to make the reply more definite and certain, will lie where the plaintiff makes allegations of fact in a reply, not addressed to any particular material allegation in an answer setting up a counterclaim; and concludes with a general denial of every allegation in the answer not inconsistent with the reply. SPECIAL TERM.-On motion to make the reply more definite and certain. Petition on a promissory note made by defendant. The answer admits the execution of the note, and by way of counter-claim, alleges that the note was given for the payment of certain specified lumber, agreed to be furnished under a written contract of sale made between the parties, and that afterward, on delivery, it was discovered that part of the lumber was inferior, and not according to contract, to defendant's damage, etc. Plaintiff then replies, alleging, in detail, his understanding of the nature and terms of the agreement between the parties, and without making a specific denial of the written contract, concludes as follows: "And the plaintiff denies all and singular the statements and allegations in said answer, which are or may be inconsistent with the truth of the statement in this replication; and also denies that the defendant has suffered damages in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, or in any sum or sums whatsoever, by reason of any act, omission, or neglect of the plaintiff in the premises." Bates & Scarborough, for plaintiff. Ferguson & Long, for defendant. Robert Creighton v. Francis Kellermann. GHOLSON, J. It is not stated in the motion in what particulars the reply is indefinite and uncertain. Upon such a general motion, the court will only look at the pleading, to see if it presented any matter which could be regarded as a denial of a material allegation in the counter-claim, or as new matter intended to be presented as a defense, and showing with sufficient clearness which it was-but if a party can not put his finger upon something specific to be made definite and certain, he can not show in what particular it is deficient, and a general motion will suffice. 2. A denial may be general or specific. If general, there can be no objection to a single statement that each and all of the allegations in a pleading, are denied. But if the denial be intended to be specific, and facts are introduced for that purpose into the pleading, it must appear, by averment, to which of the material allegations in the pleading those facts are intended to reply. There must be a general or a specific denial of each material allegation which it is intended to controvert. The denial can not be made at the same time general and specific, or to be construed, one or the other, as may be claimed by the pleader. 3. When a counter-claim set out a contract for the sale and delivery of lumber, and the giving of the note sued on as a part of the consideration, the breach of the contract and damages, and a reply set out certain transactions explaining the dealings as to the lumber, but not addressed to any one of the material allegations in the counter-claim, and then concluded with a general denial of every allegation inconsistent with the statements in the reply, the motion to make definite and certain must be sustained. Motion sustained. Frederick Butterfield v. William E. Ogborn, et al. FREDERICK BUTTERFIELD V. Wм. E. OGBORN, ET AL. 1. The laws of Ohio must, in the absence of any express provision, be supposed to apply only to persons and things in Ohio. The legislature, in authorizing proceedings to subject equitable interests in real estate, did not intend to give a remedy where the real estate is situated beyond the limits of the State. 2. A creditor can not be aided, either in law or equity, in enforcing a claim on real property situate out of the jurisdiction. SPECIAL TERM.-Plaintiff alleges that at the January term, A. D. 1857, of this court, he recovered a judgment against Ogborn for the sum of $1,200.87; that the defendant, Ogborn, has no property subject to an execution at law, but that he has an equitable title to certain real estate in Missouri and Illinois to which Thomas Davis and other parties defendant hold the legal title; and plaintiff prays that a receiver may be appointed, and that the lands may be subjected to the payment of the judgment. Mills & Hoadly, for plaintiff. Thos. J. Gallagher and Talbot Jones, for defendants. GHOLSON, J. At a former term, this case was decided upon the ground that a creditor in Ohio could not attach nor file a petition to subject an equitable interest in real estate, situated beyond the limits of the State. This decision was made on the ground that the statute, though using general language, must be understood as being limited to the sphere of its enactment. The counsel for the plaintiff asked to be again heard in the case upon this question. That hearing has been had, and I have again considered the question. It is claimed by counsel that the act must have an effect to give a remedy equivalent to what might have obtained on the general principles of equity jurisdiction-that the statute is really only declaratory. To a certain extent, I think the statute is declaratory. When a creditor has a Frederick Butterfield v. Wm. E. Ogborn, et al. claim to be satisfied out of a legal estate, the courts of equity might, on general principles, aid him in obtaining satisfaction out of an equitable estate. But I do not suppose, and I am confident no authority can be found to sustain, the idea that a creditor, as such, can be aided, either in law or equity, in enforcing a claim on real property out of the jurisdiction. By reference to the authorities, it will clearly appear no such jurisdiction is admitted in courts of equity: 3 Myl. & Cr. 416, 417, Neate v. Duke of Marlborough. It will be seen that the principles of the jurisdiction is that the court lends its aid to enforce a legal right. If there be, or could be, no legal right, then there is no ground for interference in equity. The question is really one of construction. Did the legislature, in authorizing proceedings to subject equitable interests in real estate, intend to give a remedy when the real estate was situated beyond the limits of the State? It is claimed that, because a party in whom is vested the legal title to lands in another State, is found in Ohio, and can be served with process, he can be compelled to convey to a receiver, so as to satisfy a judgment against the party entitled to the equitable estate in the land. The wellestablished rules of construction forbid, in my opinion, a construction of the statute which would admit of the exercise of any such jurisdiction. General words, in statutes, must be restrained to the fitness of the matter in view of the legislature. It would be highly inconvenient to attempt to dispose of property located in a foreign jurisdiction, and, in most cases, the effect would be nugatory. The laws of Ohio must, in the absence of any express provision, be supposed to apply only to persons and things in Ohio. We had occasion to apply this principle in the case of Campbell v. The Owners of the "Queen City." The same principle will be found in many decided cases. 2 My. & Cr. 256, 270, Arnold v. Arnold; 12 Cl. & Fin. 17; 5 Wheaton Ap. 12; 18 Johns. 423; 8 Grattan, 389. The principle, which has been applied in cases of specific Edwin Ludlow v. Edward Hurd, et al. performance, does not reach such a case as the present. That depends on a contract or equity subsisting between the parties. The proceeding, in such cases, is in personam, and the right is created by the act of the parties: 8 Grattan, 411, Dickinson v. Hoome's Adm'r, et al.; 2 White & Tudor, Lead. Eq. cases, part 2, note 319, Penn v. Lord Baltimore. Action dismissed. EDWIN LUDLOW v. EDWARD HURD, ET AL. 1. The power of the Cincinnati and Marietta Railroad Company, under section 13 of the act of February 11, 1848, regulating railroad companies, to borrow money on the security of its property and income, includes the authority to mortgage after-acquired property, and embraces every species of property, owned by the company, necessary to the operation of the road. 2. Office furniture, suitable in kind and of a necessary amount, provided for the use of the employees of the company in the performance of their daily duties, as well as for the directors to transact their business, is covered by such a mortgage; and at the instance of the trustee, will be protected by injunction against the attempts of a judgment creditor, who has levied thereon, and threatens to sell it, when it appears that the other mortgaged property would be insufficient to pay in full the mortgage debt. SPECIAL TERM.-On demurrer to the petition. Action to restrain proceedings under an execution and levy, made at the instance of Hurd as a judgment creditor, upon certain personal property belonging to the Cincinnati and Marietta Railroad Company. The plaintiff claims that he is the mortgagee, in trust, for certain holders of bonds issued by the Cincinnati and Marietta Railroad Company. The conveyance is in due form, properly executed and recorded in the recorder's office of Hamilton county, dated March 1, 1857, to secure the payment of fifteen hundred bonds for one thousand dollars each, which are to become due on September 1, 1880, with seven per cent. interest, payable semi-annually. The property |