on merchandise, in the case of the annexation of Porto Rico by the Dooley . United States (1901), 182 U. S. 222, citing Haver r. Yaker, 9 See also, Armstrong v. Bidwell (1903), 124 Fed. Rep. 690. "When a treaty requires a series of legislative enactments to take place after exchange of ratifications before it can become operative, it will take effect as a national compact, on its being proclaimed, but it cannot become operative as to the particular engagements until all the requisite legislation has taken place." Davis, Notes, U. S. Treaty Vol. (1776–1887), 1228, citing Cushing, At. A treaty which does not require legislation to make it operative will be executed by the courts from the time of its proclamation. Cushing, At. Gen., 1854, 6 Op. 750; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 725. The United States adhered to the Industrial Property Convention, "this adhesion to take effect internationally from the date of deposit of their ratifications at Berne." See For. Rel. 1884, 548. Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Ervin, April 26, 1887, 164 MS. Dom. See, however, as to the need of legislation to give effect to this treaty, Where an Indian treaty provided that it should be obligatory as soon as it should be ratified by the President and the Senate, it did not take effect until signed by the President, although it should have been previously ratified by the Senate, and accepted by the Indians. Shepard r. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 341. During the Revolutionary war various States, among which was Virginia, passed acts of sequestration and confiscation, by which it was provided that, if the American debtor should pay into the State treasury the debt due to his British creditor, such payment should constitute an effectual plea in bar to a subsequent action for the recov ery of the debt. When the representatives of the United States and Great Britain met at Paris to negotiate for peace, the question of the confiscated debts became a subject of controversy, especially in connection with that of the claims of the loyalists for the confiscation of their estates. Franklin and Jay, though they did not advocate the policy of confiscating debts, hesitated, chiefly on the ground of a want of authority in the existing national government to override the acts of the States. John Adams, however, when he arrived on the scene, took high national ground, and ended the discussion by declaring, in the presence of the British plenipotentiaries, that, so far as he was concerned, he "had no notion of cheating anybody; that the question of paying debts and the question of compensating the loyalists were two, and that, while he was opposed to compensating the loyalists, he would agree to a stipulation to secure the payment of debts. It was therefore provided, in the 4th article of the treaty of peace, that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery in full sterling money of bona fide debts contracted prior to the war. This stipulation not only purported to override State laws, but was strongly retroactive. The State courts, holding themselves to be bound by the local statutes, refused to enforce it. To meet this difficulty, there was inserted in the Constitution of the United States the clause declaring treaties then made, or which should be made, to be the supreme law of the land, in spite of anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary. On the strength of this provision, the question was carried before the Supreme Court of the United States, by which it was held that the treaty restored to the original creditor his right to sue. Ware. Hylton, 3 Dallas 199; John Marshall, by J. B. Moore, Politica "In mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns, where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation." Marshall, C. J., United States r. Schooner Peggy (1801), 1 Cranch, 103, 109. This language was used with reference to the provisions of the convention between the United States and France of September 30, 1800, for the restoration of property captured but not definitively condemned. The convention having intervened since the judgment below, it was held that the Supreme Court was bound to order the restoration, without regard to the merits of the judgment. By an act of the legislature of Maryland of 1780 French subjects were empowered to inherit real estate in that State, subject to the proviso that, within ten years after inheriting, they should settle in and become citizens of the State, or else enfeoff a citizen of some one of the United States. Certain French subjects inherited lands under this statute in 1799, but, having failed to perform the conditions of the proviso, claimed that they were protected in their estate by Article VII. of the treaty between the United States and France of September 30, 1800, by which it was provided that, in case the laws of either country should restrict the rights of foreigners with respect to real estate, such real estate "might be sold, or otherwise disposed of, to citizens or inhabitants of the country where it may be." It was claimed that these stipulations secured the right of disposal for life, and also that they operated on an estate which was vested when they were entered into. These positions were sustained, Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion. Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259, 276. A treaty giving certain rights of succession to realty to subjects of a foreign sovereign is not retroactive so as to affect the succession of a person who died before the treaty. Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 How. 1. "The principle that a treaty is not to be held to operate retroactively in respect to vested rights does not apply to conventions of extradition. It is a general principle that such conventions apply to offences committed prior to their conclusion, unless there is an express limitation.” Moore on Extradition, I. 99, citing Twiss, Law of Nations (1884), 411; A fugitive has no vested right of asylum; nor does the provision of the A stipulation that a treaty should not apply to crimes "committed an- See, also, In re Vandervelpen, 14 Blatchf. 137. The covenants or guarantees in a treaty, when dependent on certain concessions, cannot be enforced until the concessions are actually made. Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Baxter, min. to Honduras, No. 19, Mar. 20. 1871, For. Rel. 1871, 577, as to the guarantee by the United States of the neutrality of the proposed Honduras Interoceanic Railway under Art. XIV. of the treaty of 1864. VI. INTERPRETATION. 1. GENERAL RULES. § 763. Treaties should be interpreted "in a spirit of uberrima fides," and in a manner to carry out their manifest purpose. Tucker . Alexandroff (1902), 183 U. S. 424, 437. A treaty is to be construed so as to exclude fraud and to make its operation consistent with good faith. The Amistad, 15 Pet. 518. That a reservation in a treaty may operate as a grant of lands, see That construction of a treaty most favorable to its execution, as designed by the parties, will be preferred. United States v. Payne, 2 McCrary, 289, 8 Fed. Rep. 883. A treaty is not only a law, but also a contract between two nations, and, under familiar rules, it must, if possible, be so construed as to give full force and effect to all its parts. Goetze v. United States (1900), 103 Fed. Rep. 72. “Vattel says that the interpretation which would render a treaty null and inefficient can not be admitted; that it ought to be interpreted in such a manner as that it may have its effect, and not prove vain and nugatory." Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Beaupré, No. 331, Nov. 16, 1900, MS. Inst. "There is no rule of construction better settled either in relation to covenants between individuals or treaties between nations than that the whole instrument containing the stipulations is to be taken together, and that all articles in pari materia should be considered as parts of the same stipulations." Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Baron Lederer, consul-general of Austria, Nov. 5, 1832, MS. Notes to For. Legs., V. 63; with reference to Articles V.-IX., inclusive, of the treaty with Austria-Hungary, Aug. 27, 1829, as to the treatment of vessels touching duties and other charges. It is a rule, in construing treaties as well as laws, to give a sensible meaning to all their provisions, if that be practicable. Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258, 270, citing Vattel, Bk. II. ch. xvii. "The reason of the law, or of the treaty-that is to say, the motive which led to the making of it, and the object in contemplation at the time, is the most certain clue to lead us to the discovery of its true meaning; and great attention should be paid to this circumstance, whenever there is question either of explaining an obscure, ambiguous, indeterminate passage in a law or treaty, or of applying it to a particular case. When once we certainly know the reason which alone has determined the will of the person speaking, we ought to interpret and apply his words in a manner suitable to that reason alone; otherwise, he will be made to speak and act contrary to his intention, and in opposition to his own views." Vattel, Book II. ch. 17, sec. 287. The original of the treaty of 1819 with Spain being in the Spanish language, not corresponding precisely with the original in English, the language of the former is to be taken as expressing the intent of the grantor as to the lands granted and reserved. The King of Spain was the grantor; the treaty was his deed; the exception was made by him; and its nature and effect depended on his intention, expressed by his words, in reference to the thing granted and the thing reserved and excepted in and by the grant. The Spanish version was in his words and expressed his intention, and, though the American version showed the intention of this government to be different, we can not adopt it as the rule by which to decide what was granted, what excepted, and what reserved. The court must be governed by the clearly expressed and manifest intention of the grantor and not the grantee in private, a fortiori in public, grants. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691. It has been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court (1) that compacts between governments or nations, like those between individuals, should be interpreted according to the natural, fair, and received acceptation of the terms in which they are expressed; (2) that the obligation of such compacts, unless suspended by some condition or stipulation therein contained, commences with their execution by the authorized agents of the contracting parties, and that their subsequent ratification by the principals themselves has relation to the period of signature; (3) that any act or proceeding, therefore, between the signing and ratification of a treaty, by either of the contracting parties, in contravention of the stipulations of the compact, would be a fraud upon the other party, and could have no validity consistently with a recognition of the compact itself; (4) that a nation which has ceded away her sovereignty and dominion over a territory can, with respect to that territory, rightfully exert no power by which the dominion and sovereignty so ceded would be impaired or diminished. United States v. D'Auterive, 10 How, 609. |