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of his letters and present himself to the Emperor for the purpose of opening trade."

Davis' Notes, Treaty Vol. (1776-1887), 1346. See, also, H. Doc. 138, 28
Cong. 2 sess., proposing a mission to Japan in the interest of
American commerce.

In case Roberts went to Japan he was directed not to go in a national
vessel, which could not submit to the indignity of being disarmed,
as foreign vessels were required to do in Japanese ports, a "degrad-
ing custom" with which a Russian frigate, it was said, had "con-
descended to comply." He might charter a coasting vessel, which the
Peacock might convoy. (S. Ex. Doc. 59, 32 Cong. 1 sess. 63.)
Roberts in March, 1833, concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with
Siam, and in the following September a similar treaty with the
Sultan of Muscat. His mission was prematurely ended by his death.
See, generally, Foster's American Diplomacy in the Orient, a work of
great interest and merit. See, also, Early American Visitors to
Japan, by Charles W. Stewart, in Proceedings of the United States
Naval Institute, XXXI. 945; Moore, American Diplomacy, 120 et seq.

In 1845 Alexander Everett, when he went as commissioner to China, took with him a full power to negotiate with Japan. At this time only the Chinese and the Dutch were allowed to trade with that country. The Dutch had a factory at Nagasaki, and were allowed to fit out one ship a year from Batavia for that port. Every third year they were permitted to dispatch an embassy from Nagasaki to Yeddo.

Mr. Everett proceeded to Macao in the U. S. S. Columbus, Commodore James Biddle commanding. Commodore Biddle was instructed to ascertain whether the ports of Japan were accessible, and, if Mr. Everett should incline to endeavor to gain access to them, to hold the squadron at his disposition for that purpose. Should he decline to do so, Commodore Biddle was authorized to " persevere in the design, yet not in such a manner as to excite hostile feeling, or a distrust of the Government of the United States." Mr. Everett did not go to Japan, but transferred his full power to the Commodore. The latter, on the Columbus, accompanied by the Vincennes, anchored in the Bay of Yeddo July 20, 1846. The Japanese surrounded the ships during the whole of their stay. Biddle gave a Japanese officer who came on board, accompanied by a Dutch interpreter, a written statement of the object of his visit. This letter was sent to Yeddo, and an answer was sent refusing access for trade and ordering Biddle away. Biddle consented to go on board a Japanese junk to receive the Emperor's reply, which proved to have no address or signature and to be rude in terms. And when he first attempted to step on board a Japanese gave him a blow or push which threw him back into his boat. Biddle demanded, through the interpreter, that the man be seized, and he then returned to his ship. He was followed on board by the interpreter and some Japanese officers, who declared

that they were not expecting his visit and therefore were not on deck and that they would have the man severely punished. It has been said that this affair produced a very bad effect, as the Japanese spread the report that they had not only refused to treat, but had inflicted an indignity on the American officer.

S. Ex. Doc. 59, 32 Cong. 1 sess. 64, 66 et seq.

An interesting and instructive account of Commodore Biddle's expedition has lately been given by Rear-Admiral S. B. Luce, who was a midshipman on Commodore Biddle's flagship, the Columbus. Admiral Luce repels the report that soon afterwards became current, largely through its publication by the United States government, that the expedition produced an unfavorable impression. He calls attention to the injunction laid upon Commodore Biddle not to excite "a hostile feeling, or a distrust of the government of the United States," and says: " Commodore Biddle was careful to carry out the spirit of his instructions, and from his report to his government it may be readily seen that by his courtesy and conciliatory bearing toward the Japanese officials a most favorable impression was made and one which could not fail of predisposing them to look with favor on those Americans who might subsequently visit Japan." Admiral Luce also speaks of the able and tactful manner" in which Commodore Biddle's negotiations were conducted. (Commodore Biddle's Visit to Japan in 1846, by Rear-Admiral S. B. Luce, U. S. Navy, Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, XXXI. 555.) See, also, Early American Visitors to Japan, by Charles W. Stewart, id. 945.

A French squadron, under Admiral Cécile, made an unsuccessful attempt, about the same time as Commodore Biddle, to open negotiations with the Japanese, but had a displeasing reception. It was surrounded from the time of its arrival at Nagasaki by armed boats, and was not allowed to communicate with the shore. It remained only twentyfour hours. The erroneous report was spread that the French were fired upon and subjected to other violence. (S. Ex. Doc. 59, 32 Cong. 1 sess. 67.)

January 27, 1849, Commodore David Geisinger reported from the U. S. S. Plymouth, then at Whampoa, that he had instructed Commander Glynn to proceed in the Preble to Nagasaki and inquire into the case of the wreck of the American whaler Lagoda on the Japanese coast, and demand the release of the survivors of the crew, who were detained by the Japanese authorities. Commander Glynn found that the men were deserters, but he obtained their release. Besides, as the result of his visit, he took an active interest in urging another effort to open intercourse with Japan. He reported that the time was favorable for entering upon a negotiation. He arrived at New York January 3, 1851, in the Preble, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that to his representations the sending out soon afterwards of the expedition under Commodore Aulick is largely to be ascribed. In a letter to the President on June 10, 1851, the day on which Au

lick's instructions are dated, he refers to a previous conversation with the President on the project of opening an intercourse between the United States and Japan, and the importance of having the use of a port in Japan for the accommodation of a line of steamers then expected to be established between California and China. "These arrangements," said Glynn, " must be effected soon or late, and if not peaceably, then by force."

S. Ex. Doc. 59, 32 Cong. 1 sess. 74; H. Ex. Doc. 84, 31 Cong. 1 sess.

June 10, 1851, Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, instructed Commodore Aulick to proceed with a letter from the President to the Emperor of Japan to Yeddo in his flagship, accompanied by as many vessels of his squadron as might be conveniently employed, and to deliver the letter to such high officers of the Emperor as might be appointed to receive it. The instructions referred to the probable establishment of a line of steamers between California and China and the need of obtaining supplies of coal from Japan. Commodore Aulick was to impress it upon the Japanese that the United States possessed no power over the religion of its citizens, and would not interfere with the religion of other countries. In his letter to the Emperor, President Fillmore said: "I send you this letter by an envoy of my own appointment, an officer of high rank in his country, who is no missionary of religion. He goes by my command to bear to you my greeting and good wishes, and to promote friendship and commerce between the two countries."

Commodore Aulick was furnished with a full power to negotiate. His instructions declared that it was important to secure the opening of one or more ports which vessels might enter to dispose of their cargoes by sale or by barter, but that it was even more important to provide for the protection of American sailors and property wrecked on the Japanese shores.

S. Ex. Doc. 59, 32 Cong. 1 sess. 80.

2. PERRY'S SUCCESSFUL MISSION.

§ 846.

Commodore Aulick was unable to carry out his instructions. Soon after he was ordered to Japan his health became impaired, and the mission was entrusted to Commodore M. C. Perry.

In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, November 5, 1852, Mr. Conrad, Acting Secretary of State, explained the objects of the expedition. The United States desired, he said, specifically (1) a permanent arrangement for stress of weather upon the Japanese coast; (2) permission for American vessels to obtain supplies and refit in one

or more Japanese ports; (3) permission for American ships to enter one or more Japanese ports to dispose of their cargoes by sale or barter. As persuasion had failed to attain these objects, Perry was to take an imposing force-his whole force--and he was to refer particularly to the subject of the ill treatment of wrecked ships and crews. And, as it was understood that the deep-seated aversion of the Japanese to intercourse with Christian nations was due chiefly to the indiscreet zeal with which the early missionaries, particularly those of Portugal, endeavored to propagate their religion, he was to say that the government of the United States, "unlike those of every other Christian country, does not interfere with the religion of its own people, much less with that of other nations." If argument and persuasion should fail to obtain "any relaxation of their system of exclusion, or even any assurance of humane treatment of our shipwrecked seamen," Perry was to change his tone, and say that the United States would insist upon kind treatment of American citizens and vessels wrecked or driven upon the Japanese coasts, and that for any cruelty in such cases in the future the Japanese would be "severely chastised."

The instructions of Mr. Kennedy, Secretary of the Navy, to Commodore Perry, bear date November 13, 1852. The instructions and orders given to Commodore Aulick were transferred to him, and he was informed that to the force of the United States in the East India and China seas, which had consisted of a steam frigate, two sloops, and a store ship, there were to be added a ship of the line, a steam frigate, a corvette, two steamers, a sloop, and a store ship. He was furnished with a letter from the President to the Emperor of Japan, in which he was described as "an officer of the highest rank in the Navy of the United States and commander of the squadron now visiting your Imperial Majesty's dominions." It was stated that the object in sending him out was to propose that the United States and Japan "should live in friendship and have commercial intercourse with each other." "The Constitution and laws of the United States," declared the latter," forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations."

S. Ex. Doc. 34, 33 Cong. 2 sess.

Mr. Conrad, in the letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 5, 1852, above mentioned, said: "He [Perry] will bear in mind that, as the President has no power to declare war, his mission is necessarily of a pacific character, and will not resort to force unless in selfdefense in the protection of the vessels and crews under his command, or to resent an act of personal violence offered to himself, or to one of his officers." Mr. Conrad also said that Perry would be furnished with powers authorizing him to negotiate treaties of amity and navigation with any and all established and independent sovereignties in the regions to be visited by him.

H. Doc. 551-vol 547

Perry, on his way out, suggested the temporary occupation of certain
ports in the Loochoo Islands for shelter and supplies. Mr. Everett,
Secretary of State, instructed him to do so, but added that, if it
could not be done "without resort to force," it would be necessary
to seek them elsewhere. (S. Ex. Doc. 34, 33 Cong. 2 sess.)
Mr. Robert M. McLane, commissioner to China, was to take Commodore
Perry's place, in case anything should prevent him from fulfilling
his mission. (Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. McLane, Nov. 9,
1853, S. Ex. Doc. 39, 36 Cong. 1 sess.)

Perry arrived in the Mississippi at Hongkong April 7, 1853. On the afternoon of Friday, July 8, 1853, with the steamers Susquehanna (flagship) and Mississippi and the sloops Plymouth and Saratoga he anchored in the Bay of Yeddo, off the city of Uraga, 27 miles from Yeddo. In reporting his proceedings he had, he said, decided on a course different from that of others who had visited Japan, viz, "to demand as a right, and not to solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another; to allow of none of those petty annoyances which have been unsparingly visited upon those who had preceded me, and to disregard the acts as well as the threats of the authorities, if they in the least conflicted with my own sense of what was due to the dignity of the American flag. The ques tion of landing by force was left to be decided by the development of succeeding events.”

but

Perry refused to meet, or deliver the President's letter to, any an officer of the highest rank. He declined to go to Nagasaki. July 14, 1853, he was received by the Prince of Idzu, first counselor of the Emperor, and his coadjutor, the Prince of Iwami. To the former he delivered the President's letter, his letter of credence, and other documents. They gave a receipt, saying that they violated the law in receiving the papers there instead of at Nagasaki, but did it because the admiral, in his quality of ambassador of the President, had declared that he would be insulted by a refusal. They ordered Perry, in conclusion, to leave. Instead, he went higher up the bay, ten miles above where any foreign vessel had previously ascended and twenty above the usual anchorage. Perry said that the nearer he approached the imperial city "the more polite and friendly they became."

July 14 he wrote the Emperor that he would return in the next spring for a reply to the propositions of the United States.

Mr. Dobbin, Secretary of the Navy, in acknowledging the receipt of Perry's reports of these transactions, said:

"These communications have all been submitted to the President, who, while he would be happy to see your interesting mission crowned with success, and would aid you as far as he can legitimately, desires to impress you with his conviction that the great end should be attained, not only with credit to the United States, but without wrong

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