ing on its obverse a head of the President, and on the other side an appropriate inscription. (Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Capt. Du Pont, May 22, 1860, 52 MS. Dom. Let. 261; Mr. Cass to Mr. Floyd, Sec. of War, June 22, 1860, id. 370; Mr. Trescot, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr Harris, No. 12, June 26, 1860, MS. Inst. Japan, I. 33.) The embassy proposed to give to Captain Du Pont $20,000, to be distrib uted among the police of Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York and certain other persons. The Department of State replied: "The President is reluctant to interfere with the wishes of the embassy upon a matter not requiring his official intervention, but he is decidedly of opinion that the proposition, although very hon orable to the envoys, is not of a character to meet the approbation of this government, and this opinion you will communicate to the embassy." (Mr. Trescot, Act. Sec. of State, to Capt. Du Pont, June 26, 1860, 52 MS. Dom. Let. 387.) During the stay of the envoys in Baltimore two swords were purloined from them. One of the swords was afterwards recovered and sent back to Japan. (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pruyn, Dec. 9. 1861, MS. Inst. Japan, I. 57; Dip. Cor. 1863, 963.) The Japanese, when suggesting in 1863 that they might send another embassy to the United States, "begged most earnestly that no such expensive reception should be given to it as on the occasion of the former one." (Mr. Pruyn, min. to Japan, to Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, Dec. 1, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1864, III. 463, 464.) In 1889 Japanese retail merchants dealing in "Scott's Emulsion,' an American medicinal preparation, were informed by their govern ment that they must obtain a special license for its sale. They com plied, but the American legation at Tokio sought to have the exaction removed. Subsequently, in addition to the license tax, they were required to pay an excise duty of 10 per cent in the form of a revenue stamp on each bottle. The Japanese merchants were thus in some cases obliged to return their stock to the. American importers, who invoked the interposition of the legation. The Japanese govern ment defended its action on the twofold ground, first, that "Scott's Emulsion," being in the nature of a medicinal preparation, fell within the Japanese regulations for the sale of licensed medicines, which required a special license to be taken out for the vending of such articles; and, second, that under the treaties the Japanese government had the right to levy internal taxes on all goods or articles of mer chandise imported into the Empire. It was stated, however, that the imperial authorities would not have it understood that they would inflexibly adhere to their opinion or hesitate to abolish the internal taxes upon the imported article if it could be conclusively shown that they are not altogether correct in their position; and they invited an expression of the views of the United States upon the subject. The United States took the ground that the exactions violated Arti cles III. and IV. of the treaty of 1858. Article III. provided that "Americans may freely buy from Japanese and sell to them any articles that either may have for sale, without the intervention of any Japanese officers in such purchase or sale, or in making or receiving payment for the same;" and that "all classes of Japanese may purchase, sell, keep, or use any articles sold to them by the Americans." Article IV. provided that "duties" should be "paid to the government of Japan on all goods landed in the country, according to the tariff hereunto appended;" and that "all goods imported into Japan, and which have paid the duty fixed by this treaty, may be transported by the Japanese into any part of the Empire without the payment of any tax, excise, or transit duty whatever." The Japanese government laid special stress on the words "may be transported," as defining and limiting the scope of the stipulation. The United States replied that, while it might be true that the American negotiator had particularly in mind the "likin" tax, or transit duty, imposed on goods in China, yet the language of the treaty made it clear that it was intended, while doing away with the transit duty, to prevent the imposition of equally onerous and distinctive taxes in other forms, and to preclude the assessment of duties, in addition to those provided in the treaty, by reason of the passage of the goods from American into Japanese hands. This construction, the United States maintained, was confirmed by the practice of thirty years, under which the Japanese government had abstained from imposing internal taxes on goods imported under the conventional tariffs. Mr. Sato, Japanese chargé, to Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, March 7, 1890, In his No. 120, May 20, 1890, Mr. Swift reported that he had communi- 4. DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES. § 848. Treaties with Japan, similar to that of the United States, were made by France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia. The opening of the country to foreign trade was followed by marked antiforeign disturbances. These were ascribed in large measure to the sudden enhancement of the cost of various articles by reason of the foreign demand. This enhancement was said in some instances to amount to as much as 300 per cent. Exportations increased, while little was imported, and loud complaints were heard, especially on the part of the official classes, with fixed and limited incomes, as to the effect of the treaties. In these circumstances the Japanese government sought the postponement for a year of the exercise by the citi zens and subjects of the treaty powers of the right, which they were to possess after January 1, 1862, to reside in Yeddo for purposes of trade, lest it might be impossible to protect them in the enjoyment of the privilege. Mr. Harris seconded, with the concurrence of the English and French ministers, the Japanese government's wishes. No decision had been reached by the government of the United States when news was received of the assassination on the night of January 15, 1861, of Mr. Heusken, secretary to the American lega-, tion, without other cause than the fact of his being a foreigner. The Japanese government appeared to be unable to bring the offenders to punishment. Apprehensive lest any concession might encourage the party opposed to the execution of the treaties and render the posi tion of foreigners in Japan still more insecure, the government of the United States not only announced the opinion that no postponement of the opening of Yeddo ought to be granted, but also proposed to the governments of the treaty powers a plan of cooperation which was to be embodied in an informal convention. Under this plan the diplomatic or consular representatives of the treaty powers were to address to the Japanese government a joint note expressive of the determination of their governments to require the fulfilment of all the stipulations of the treaties, and, if the reply of Japan should be unfavorable or evasive, the powers were then to employ such force as might be necessary. Attention was at the same time called to the circumstance that the assent of Congress was requisite to the commencement of hostilities against a foreign power by the United States. But before any definite action was taken on these proposals a despatch was received from Mr. Harris, under date of May 8, 1861, enclosing communications from the Tycoon of Japan to the President of the United States and from the Japanese ministers for foreign affairs to the Secretary of State. The communications of the Tycoon and his ministers strongly urged the postponement of the opening of the cities of Yeddo and Osaka and the harbors of Hiogo and Nee-egata; and Mr. Harris suggested that discretionary power should be given to himself to act, in concert with his colleagues, in such manner as he might deem most advisable. The government of the United States reconsidered its plan for a naval demonstration, chiefly out of deference to Mr. Harris's judgment, and conferred upon him the discretion which he solicited, at the same time insisting that he should not, except in the extremest necessity, consent to any postponement of any covenant in the treaty without first receiving satisfaction of some marked kind for the assassination of Mr. Heusken. The form and mode of that satisfaction were left to Mr. Harris's discretion. When Mr. Harris received these instructions he advised the Japanese government of their purport, and effected a settlement of the case of Mr. Heusken. The Japanese government promised to use every effort to bring the assassins to justice, and paid the sum of $10,000 for the use of the victim's widowed mother, who was dependent upon him for support. It was expressly understood that the payment of this sum should not in any way release the Japanese government from its obligation to bring the murderers of Mr. Heusken to punish ment. Mr. Harris, min. to Japan, to Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, No. 26, Aug. 1, 1860, Dip. Cor. 1862, 793; Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, No. 20, May 8, 1861, id. 794; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Harris, No. 17, July 23, 1861, id. 813; same to same, No. 18, Aug. 1, 1861, id. 814; same to same, No. 20, Oct. 7, 1861, id. 816; Mr. Harris to Mr. Seward, No. 50, Nov. 27, 1861, id. 806. For Mr. Seward's proposal of a joint naval demonstration, see his note For the form of the proposed convention or joint note relative to a joint For the Japanese record of Harris's reception, see For. Rel. 1879, 620. On the night of July 5, 1861, an attack was made on the British legation at Yeddo. Mr. Alcock, the British minister, escaped uninjured, but Mr. Oliphant, secretary of legation, and Mr. Morrison, consul for Nagasaki, were wounded. The attack seems to have been in some measure due to a feeling of dislike to the English, and in particular to the British minister; but Mr. Harris, in reporting the incident, said that it was not to be concealed that he himself, in common with his colleague, was "subject to the same unpopularity that attaches to the presence of all foreigners in Japan." Mr. Harris's successor, Mr. Pruyn, was instructed to "seek no exclusive advantages," but to consult freely with his colleagues on all subjects, with a view to maintain the prestige of Western civilization in Yeddo. The antiforeign feeling continued, and in June, 1862, another attack was made on the guards of the British legation. The British chargé d'affaires withdrew from Yeddo to Yokohama, and, with the return of the Dutch consul-general to Nagasaki, Mr. Pruyn was the only minister resident left in Yeddo. The antiforeign agitation continued; all the foreign legations were threatened with attack, and individual foreigners were subjected to personal violence sometimes resulting in their death. On the morning of May 24, 1863, the American legation was burned. Mr. Pruyn stated that he desired to believe that the fire was purely accidental, although for months attempts had been made to induce him to leave Yeddo. On the 31st of June, he retired to Yokohama. Before this incident occurred, Mr. Pruyn was instructed on June 18, 1863, to "cooperate with the representatives of the other treaty powers" in any difficulties that might arise, and was informed that the U. S. S. Wyoming would obey his orders. The situation was fully reviewed by Mr. Seward in instructions to Mr. Pruyn of July 7 and 10, and September 1, 1863. These instructions enjoined the importance of "concert and unity among the treaty powers," in "the common interests of civilization and humanity," "unobstructed by jealousy or suspicion, or unkind debate of any sort." It appeared that the British legation had demanded indemnities before a certain date on pain of hostilities, and that the French naval forces were prepared to act in concert with the English. It was apprehended, however, that, if the government should conclude to grant the indemnities, a civil war was likely to break out under the auspices of the Mikado and a combination of daimios hostile to the foreign policy of the Tycoon. In these circumstances, Mr. Pruyn was directed to exert his "whole moral influence" to preserve peace between the other treaty powers and Japan, on the basis if necessary of a compliance by the latter with the terms prescribed by the powers, since it was not doubted that those terms would be formulated simply with a view to the necessary security of foreigners of all nations. As to the injuries suffered by Americans, if the Japanese should grant adequate indemnities and guarantee the safety of American residents, the Wyoming was not to commit any hostile act against the Japanese government or power. But if, on the contrary, it should seem to Mr. Pruyn to be necessary "for the Wyoming to use her guns, for the safety of the legation or of Americans residing in Japan, then her commander will employ all necessary force for that purpose." The prime objects of the United States were declared to be: "First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese government and people, if possible, with a view to the common interest of all the treaty powers; secondly, to sustain and cooperate with the legations of those powers, in good faith, so as to render their efforts to the same end effective." When news was received at Washington |