Com mence CHAPTER IV. THE OPERATION OF STATUTES. be re We have now to consider the operation of statutes, when it commences, how it may strained, enlarged or otherwise affected. The date of an Act has sometimes been regarded ment of as part of the Act, but it seems more convenient operation. and more logical to look upon the bearing which it may have on the operation of a statute. Unless the Act itself provides a time from which its operation is to begin, the day when it receives the royal assent is the date of its commencement (a), and the Act takes effect from the first moment of that day (b). Before, however, "a continuous act or proceeding, not originally unlawful, can be treated as unlawful by reason of the passing of an Act of Parliament by which it is in terms made so, a reasonable time must be allowed for its discontinuance" (c). Until the passing of the 33 Geo. III. c. 13, it was held that every Act dated from the first day of the session in which it was passed (d), and this (a) 33 Geo. III. c. 13. (b) Tomlinson v. Bullock, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 230. fiction of law was carried to such an extent that a statute passed at a late period of the session rendered invalid annuities granted four months before (e). This decision certainly went beyond the old theory, which was that "as soon as the Parliament hath concluded anything, the law intends that every person hath notice thereof, for the Parliament represents the body of the whole nation" (f). It was even more strongly opposed to the principle established by the Code Napoléon, which has received the marked approval of Chancellor Kent, and which is that laws should take effect from the time when the public may reasonably be supposed to know of their existence (g). The modern practice of appointing some particular day as the time from which any statute is to take effect, and allowing a sufficient interval between the time when the royal assent is given and the commencement of the operation of the Act, probably answers every purpose. Where the date is so fixed, the Act does not refer to anything that may be done between the time when it actually passes and the time when it comes into operation (h), although when it has once come into operation there may be a relation back to the time of its passing (i). Where the day named for the (e) Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. (f) 4 Inst. 26. (g) 1 Kent, 458. (h) Paddon v. Bartlett, 3 A. & E. at p. 896, per Lord Abinger, C.B; Wood v. Riley, L. R. 3 C. P. 26. (i) Ings v. L. & S. W. Rail. Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 17; Ex parte Rashleigh, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 9. commencement of the Act precedes the day on which it receives the royal assent, a section prospective in its terms does not operate on anything done before the royal assent was given (k). But where an Act which received the royal assent on the 16th of July, 1830, imposed certain duties on spirits "from and after the 15th of March, 1830," it was held that spirits warehoused after March 15th, 1830, although taken out of the warehouse before July 16th, were liable to those duties (). Where two Acts are passed on the same day, a recital in one of them that the other has already passed is conclusive evidence of the priority in date of the other (m). Where, however, an Act passed on the 11th of August, 1803, referred to "any Act to be passed in the present session of Parliament," it was held that these words properly described an Act passed on the 27th of July, 1803, as "the session is a thing of continuity, and, therefore, when the Legislature speaks of any Act to be passed in that session they mean any Act that shall be passed from the commencement to the conclusion of the session, embracing both the past and future portions of it" (n). It may be added that in the United States statutes operate either from the date of their enactment, if no other time is fixed (0), or from the time of their approval by the Presi (k) Burn v. Carvalho, 1 A. & E. 895; 4 N. & M. 893. (1) Jamieson v. Att.-Gen., Alcock & Napier, 375. (m) R. v. Delahunt, Arm., Mac. & O'G. 255. (n) Nares v. Rowles, 14 East, 510, 518. (0) Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheaton, 164; Warren Manufacturing Co. v. Etna Insurance Co., 2 Paine, 502; The Ann, 1 Gallison, 62; but see The Cotton Planter, 1 Paine, 23. dent (p), but that an Act imposing duties "from and after the passage of this Act" takes effect from the day on which it was passed (q). of statutes As a general rule the operation of statutes is not Operation retrospective. Nova constitutio futuris formam not retroimponere debet, non præteritis (r). It is confined spective. to matters which arise after the passing of each Act, and does not affect any right or title already existing. There is a general presumption against retrospective legislation (s), although that presumption may be rebutted by considerations of the remedial nature of an enactment (t). Retrospective laws are of questionable policy, and need express words or necessary implication, but are not necessarily opposed to natural justice (u). "Those whose duty it is to administer the law very properly guard against giving to an Act of Parliament a retrospective operation, unless the intention of the Legislature that it should be so construed is expressed in clear, plain, and unambiguous language; because it manifestly shocks our sense of justice that an act legal at the time of doing it should be made unlawful by some (p) Richardson's Case, 2 Story, 571; Ankrim's Case, 3 M'Lean, 285; Welmont's Case, 20 Vermont, 653; Howes's Case, 21 Vermont, 619. (q) U. S. v. Williams, 1 Paine, 261. (r) 2 Inst. 95, 292. (s) Urquhart v. Urquhart, 1 Macq. Sc. Ap. at p. 662, per Lord Cranworth. (t) The Ironsides, Lush. 458; 31 L. J. Adm. 129. (u) Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. at p. 23, per Willes, J. See the principles of retrospective legislation stated by Chancellor Kent, Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johnson, 477, 502. It is laid down by Story, J., that in the United States a retrospective interpretation is never adopted without absolute necessity: Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 164, 172. Instances of statutes which are new enactment" (x). "Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect " (y). "It is a broad principle of construction that unless the Court sees a clear intention in an Act of Parliament to legislate ex post facto, and to give to the Act the effect of depriving a man of a right which belonged to him at the time of the passing of the Act, the Court will not give the Act a retrospective operation” (z). The principles thus stated have been followed in Thus it was held that a great variety of cases. not retro- the Mortmain Act did not apply to wills made before its passing (a); that the Acts abolishing special demurrer, allowing error to be brought on a special case, or verdicts to be entered on points reserved at the trial, did not apply to pleadings demurred to (b), special cases agreed upon (c), or points reserved (d), before those Acts came into operation. The Act which gives a settlement to any person who has resided in a parish long enough to be irremovable, does not confer a settlement on a person whose residence was complete already (e). The Judicature Act, 1875, does not affect windings spective. (x) Midland Rail. Co. v. Pye, 10 C. B. N. S. at p. 191, per Erle, C.J. (y) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. at p. 391, per Chase, J. (2) Evans v. Williams, 2 Drewry & Smale, at p. 329, per Kindersley, V.-C. (a) Ashburnham v. Bradshaw, 2 Atk. 36; Att.-Gen. v. Lloyd, 3 Atk. 551; Att.-Gen. v. Andrews, 1 Ves. Sen. 225. (b) Pinhorn v. Souster, 8 Ex. 138. (c) Hughes v. Lumley, 4 E. & B. 358. (d) Vansittart v. Taylor, 4 E. & B. 910. (e) R. v. Ipswich Union, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 269. |