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At the beginning of the war we needed a waiver when we flew explosives, for example. Day after day, and time after time, for instance, a factory in Maryland, we will say, had something of importance to catch a convoy, as I mentioned this morning, from San Francisco, and we would pull a plane out of New York and fly it to Baltimore, or pull a plane out of Tennessee and bring it to Maryland; or pull an airplane out of Pensylvania, and we would load them up and fly them out, and they would go across the country on the airways under one regulation and land that thing in time for the convoy. We did not have to bring them in from New York and change the lights, or lengthen them or wait until something else could be done. We did not have to bring them in from Tennessee and alter them, and stop and alter them as they went across all of the 48 States. And, when they got to their destination there was nobody doing something which would affect the other fellow adversely. That is because you had one control.

The CHAIRMAN, Colonel, is this a convenient time to conclude for the day?

Colonel GORRELL. May I have about 2 minutes more?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. · Colonel GORRELL. Figuratively speaking, it was necessary to uproot air lines, reallocate equipment, shift schedules, and move services. That was a complex undertaking brilliantly executed by the Civil Aeronautics Board and by General Donald H. Connolly, Military Director of Civil Aviation. But had there been the regulations of 48 States which had to be taken into account, agencies of 48 States which had to be consulted, and had there been localized development of the commercial network, it is doubtful whether an operation so drastic could ever have been performed without vitally injuring the patient. No such severe shake-up, relatively speaking, has ever been undertaken in any other field of transportation except in connection with our merchant marine, and there the Federal Government regulates the whole industry. And we must never forget that our commercial air transportation is nothing more nor less than our merchant marine of the air, to be depended upon by the armed services as the Navy has depended on the merchant marine of the sea.

Our testimony here, however, is probably supererogation in view of the provisions of section 8 of H. R. 1012, which appear at pages 6 to 8 of the bill. This section sets forth legislative findings and a declaration of policy which state very clearly and concisely the need for the unified safety and economic regulation without which this industry cannot grow to the full extent which, in the Nation's interest, should be its destiny.

Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum of half a dozen pages on this subject. May I insert it in the record at this point ?

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so.
(The memorandum is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM RE EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORT WITH RESPECT

TO ECONOMIC AND SAFETY MATTERS AS PROPOSED IN H. R. 1012

First thought concerning exclusive Federal authority centers upon the lack of uniformity that pervades State action on transportation subjects, and the greater probabiltiy of more uniformity earlier achieved under Federal action. A reference to recent experience in the field of highway regulation is of interest.

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1. State regulation of highway transportation, since its inception in 1916, has produced and retained much diversity, despite much effort to effectuate more uniformity, that is not only vexatious and burdensome to that form of transportation, but by reason of its uneconomic tendencies, must be characterized as not in the public interest. Such diversities pertain to dimensional limitations upon vehicles, the gross and net weights permissible, the types of safety appliances required, and the extent of reciprocity between and among the various States with respect to licenses, certificates, and permits required for interstate and intrastate operation of motor vehicles for hire. The facts are so well-known as to require little demonstration; it should suffice here simply to submit a few examples of nonuniform regulation existing today, with respect to maximum size of vehicles, maximum weights, and certain safety appliances. : (1) Maximum over-all length of vehicle combinations authorized by law: 35 to 40 feet,

11 States. 40 to 50 feet.

16 States. 50 to 60 feet

12 States. 60 to 80 feet

1 State. --------------------80 to 100 feet.

3 States.

------------------------No limitation-

3 States. (2) Maximum gross weight of permissible vehicle combinations: Under 20,000 pounds -

1 State. 20,000 to 40,000 pounds.

16 States. 40,000 to 60,000 pounds.

7 States, 60,000 to 80,000 pounds--

11 States, 80,000 to 100,000 pounds.

2 States. 100,000 to 120,000 pounds -----

3 States. (3) Safety appliances.--The provisions of the laws and administrative determinations specify for clearance lights, one or two amber, green, white, or yellow front lamps; and one or two red, white, or yellow rear lamps in the various States. And similar diversities obtain regarding brake equipment standards, safety glass installations, flares and fuses, and various other items.

(4) The effect of such diversities upon operations between and within States can be illustrated by a truck driven from Chicago, Ill., to Atlanta, Ga., traversing the States of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia.

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(5) The practical consequences of such diversities are extra expenditures to conform to such requirements, delays encountered at State boundaries for in. spection with further outlays to satisfy the State authorities, unloading and re. loading trucks to comply with load limitations, much confusion regarding operations under such provisions, and unnecessary enhancement of costs to the public. · These diversities may result in less safety of operations, and make no significant contribution toward protection of the highways themselves. Indeed, it is probable that much of the diversity sustains no direct relation to safety of transport or preservation of the roads, but are the result of attempts to effectuate economic regulation of highway transport in the guise of safety rules. Such was the manifest intent of the provision of one law, since repealed, that limited the weight to 7,000 pounds, unless the truck was hauling a load to the nearest railroad station.

Despite efforts to achieve reasonable uniformity, and despite the fact that the Motor Carrier Act of 1936 has now been on the statute books some 7 years, and that that act gave some authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission with regard to weights and safety requirements of highway vehicles in interstate commerce, these diversities yet exist. Their manifest interference with efficient .: : 83838–43--11

transportation during wartime led to an agreement of the Governors of the 48 States approving minimum maximum sizes and weights for the duration of war, higher than Some of these otherwise obtaining. Despite this, cases have been reported where an enforcement of State provisions has occasioned loss in transport efficiency. (6) One further diversity in State administration of motor carrier regulation should be noted, namely, not only among the several States, but even within them, the diverse jurisdictional agencies that are involved. Thus the operator must Secure his vehicle licenses from some financial officer, his certificates from some public utility commissioner, and conform to operating rules prescribed by a vehicle commission or State highway department. At the State boundary he may be confronted by the police representatives of any or all three such diverse agencies, in many cases different from those with whom he is accustomed to deal in the State of his principal operations. 2. Such State diversities are, of course, not peculiar to transportation, for they pertain to many other industries as well. But highway transport is still a young industry, hardly more than 25 years old—and within that time there has developed by State action all this mass of State regulation with diversities resulting from diverse conditions in part, but also from divergent views of the authorities, and from diverse concepts of public policy. It should be the manifest aim of Congress in establishing the regulatory framework within which the newest mode of transport, namely commercial aviation, is to expand, attain its maturity, and build up its proper place in the economy of this Nation, to avoid these ills which in the past have accompanied the expansion of the older forms of transport; to prevent past practices that clearly are uneconomic and not beneficial to the public interest, from acquiring a foothold here at the very beginning of this industry. For once established, they, too, will expand and flourish; and hope of subsequent elimination will virtually vanish. Better prevent them from coming into existence now than allow them to grow up and then seek to eliminate them. And yet the beginning of a similar condition already exists even in the airtransport industry, new as it is. True, the consequences of such regulation have not yet become very apparent, for contrary to what happened in the other forms of transportation, in aviation the Federal Government has early assumed the role of guide and regulator; and the States have legislated more slowly, and have not yet intervened to a marked degree in the safety and economic aspects of regulation. Yet legislation already does exist on the statute books of the several States that manifest similar diversities in regulatory policy; and if this condition is permitted to continue as aviation expands a condition similar to that now prevalent in highway transportation must be envisioned not only as a possibility but as a probability. For example, while most of the States have some legislation on the statute books relating to commercial aviation, the same confusion that prevailed in highway transport concerning the proper regulatory agency obtains here; indeed, it is probably the result of that diversity in the highway field. Thus 24 States Commit regulation to some specialized aviation commission, aeronautics board, or director; 5 vest the authority in a State railroad or public-utility commission; 6 have reposed it in State highway department or an aeronautical division thereof; and 2 identify it with some fiscal agency of the State. In 10 States there is no authority designated to administer the regulation provided for. State regulation of aviation has largely concerned itself hitherto with ownership of the air subject to right of flight, with ordinary police powers regarding Conduct of citizens in the use of airplanes, and have to a large extent modeled their safety provisions upon those of the Federal Government. But diversities do exist. While 35 States prescribe that aircraft and airmen must have Federal licenses, Virginia requires both ; New Hampshire and Connecticut speak only of State licenses; Iowa calls for Federal unless released in writing by the State commission; Utah, Oregon, North Dakota, Minnesota, Michigan, Maryland, and Louisiana say that aircraft and airmen must have Federal or State license o registration. It should also be observed that 7 States require certificates of public convenience and necessity for operation, issued usually by a public-utility commission ; and some certificates have actually been issued. Massachusetts has provided for State regulation of rates charged by air line common carriers, including filing of tariffis, and the full complement of maximum, minimum, and actual rate prescription. And several other States, notably West Virginia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and California, have also requested the filing of air-line tariffs. Eleven States specifically declare that railroads may own and operate aircraft; and 1 includes steamship companies as well. California forbids operation at less than 1,000 feet over congested places, Delaware at less than 1,000 feet over congested places and 500 feet elsewhere, Vermont at less than 600 feet, and New York has both such limitations. 3. That such diversity of regulation regarding safety matters has been costly to highway transport, and even to railroads, is pretty clear. A repetition of that experience in air transport at the present juncture would certainly be even more burdensome to that form of transport, and might greatly retard that development of air transport which is deemed essential for both the commerce and the national defense of the United States. For aviation is a young industry that has hitherto been largely unprofitable. While all proper measures of regulation essential to maintain safety should be accepted—and On one has a greater practi. cal interest therein than have the air lines themselves—yet the industry should not be burdened with the costs of superfluous and conflicting regulation that not. only does not enhance safety but tends actually to diminish it. If there is State regulation of air transport experience in other fields warns: that we may expect great diversity of State action with regard to such important matters as the following: (1) Standards for inspection of planes, and their maintenance. (2) Standards relating to the qualifications of pilots, mechanics, and others directly involved in the provision of air-line services. (3) Maximum hours of service. (4) Safety appliances to be installed on planes. (5) Abatement of nuisance factors. (6) Minimum heights and maximum landing speeds. (7) Width of air lanes. (8) Plane dimensional limitations. (9) Gross and load restrictions. (10) Full-crew requirements. (11) And should the train principle obtain in air transport, then train-length limitation in the air. Remember that all of these, and more, have been the subject of State nonuniform regulation, and may confidently be expected to prevail in air transport as that form of carrying expands in the future. Such extensive State participation in regulation is likely to prove more burdensome to air lines because air-line operating companies of comparatively small revenue potential operate through more jurisdictions than do interstate bus or rail companies. While the Greyhound Management Corporation pretty well covers the United States, the operating subsidiaries are much more restricted, and the largest operators cover but a few States. The railroads operating into or within the largest number of States have but 14 States, there are but 2 of them. The Pennsylvania and Santa Fe respectively operate in 12 States only. Such transport companies are of huge size. By contrast note that air lines, which are very modest in size when compared with small railroad companies, already have much wider extension of service. Thus American Airlines already operates in 22 States, Eastern Airlines in 18, United Air Lines in 18, Pennsylvania-Central in 13, and Transcontinental & Western in 15 States. The average number of States served by the 17 domestic companies is 9, which is much larger than that obtaining for the class I railroads of the United States. Thus, with much smaller revenues and operations, the air lines enter more State jurisdictions than do other forms of transportation with much larger operations. This alone would enhance the burden upon air lines of complying with diverse regulations of the many State jurisdictions they must enter. The most impelling need for exclusive Federal control of safety matters rests: upon the attributes of air transport, namely, its speed, and by necessity fragility of the craft that must be employed in order to attain that speed. With such speeds as now obtain, and will be employed, and with the multiplication of aircraft in the air in the near future, safety undoubtedly is promoted by the greatest practicable degree of uniformity in safety requirements. Hazards due to operations that must conform to State determinations for craft operating; along and across the lanes of interstate and foreign operations, should not be: allowed to develop. The very speed of this vehicle allows little time for judgment to take into account conduct based upon regulatory variations; and uncertainty must often obtain concerning the political jurisdiction occupied at any given time. The probability that foreign operations, without the necessity of port clearances and station stops available to land and water types of carrying, means that safety will be promoted by the minimum number of political jurisdictions participating in the regulation. Neither interstate nor foreign air-line operators should be forced to operate in a safety regulatory melange resulting from the direct participation of each of the 48 States as well as the Federal Government in that activity. Thus far the States have generally shown a disposition to accept or conform to the Federal safety regulations, but not all have done so; and it must be anticipated that what has taken place with regard to other forms of transport in this respect, will tend to be duplicated in air transport. Even under the war emergency difficulty has been experienced with the abatement of State diversity in highway trucking, designed in the interest of vitally needful economy in highway transportation; and reversion to the status quo will take place after the war. Therefore, all previous experience warrants the conclusion that safety of air transport requires the maximum degree of uniformity in regulation, and that this will be obtained most readily and competently, if the subject is remanded at once to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government, as proposed in H. R. 1012. 4. It should be further noted that the case is stronger for exclusive Federal regulation of air-transport safety than for other forms of transportation, by reason of the financial position of State and Federal Governments with reference to air transport. In the case of highway transportation, the case for State intervention in safety regulation was strongly buttressed by the heavy financial outlays by each of the States for the provision, maintenance, and policing of the highways. . Though aided by the Federal Government, the States assumed the major responsibility; and that primary fact has been recognized as warranting State action in safety matters, not only to preserve the safety of operations, , but also to preserve the highways themselves. This condition of course does not obtain in air transport. Except for air navigation facilities including airport development, the air routes require no investment; and State responsibility in this regard is virtually nil. On the other hand, the Federal Government has made heavy expenditures both for the airways and to assist in airport development; and will doubtless incur heavier ones in the future to promote the growth of aeronautics, civil and military. In this respect the role of the State -in providing facilities will be negligible as compared with highway transport; and the case will more nearly resemble that of water transport, where the navigable waterways have been chiefly the responsibility of the Federal Government. State responsibility for providing navigable waterways and attendant facilities has been small ; and their regulation of waterway transport has been of small proportions compared with their intervention in rail and highway transport. 5. Turn now to that phase of transport regulation that has customarily been termed “economic,” as contrasted with safety regulation. (1) Referring again to other forms of transport, it is clear that the term “economic” regulation usually embraces such matters as the following; controlling the right of entry into that field of transportation by certificates of public convenience and necessity, and/or permits, and also the right of withdrawal and abandonment; regulating the amount and quality of service performed by carriers subject to the law; requiring the filing of tariffs and publication of rates; preventing unreasonable rates by the prescription of maximum, minimum, and actual rates; forbidding undue discrimination between persons, places, commodities, localities, etc.; prescribing accounting methods, and depreciation ratios; determining the valuation of the property upon which a fair return is to be earned, and determining what the fair rate of return should be; regulating financial practices and capital structures; formulating policies to govern the relationships between the same and different forms of transportation as regards consolidations and mergers, ownerships and interlocking directorates, leaseholds, joint through services, and rates. All these matters have pervaded the regulation of other forms of transportation for some three-quarters of a century; representing a long course of evolution, expansion, and extension to the newer forms of transport as they came into being. They exist in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 for commercial air transport, interstate and international. (2) Furthermore, during the long course of this evolution, the dual sovereignty of the States and the Nation has also fastened itself upon the regulation of transportation. In fact, rail regulation began with the States, and only subsequently was projected into the Federal Government, when the lack of uni

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