ALITO, J., dissenting

tical effect of following the statutory scheme is compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 1017(f), which applies Bankruptcy Rule 9014 to the reconversion. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 1017(f)(1). Rule 9014(a), in turn, requires that the request be made by motion and that "reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing . . . be afforded the party against whom relief is sought." The Court's decision circumvents this process and forecloses the right that a Chapter 13 debtor would otherwise possess to file a Chapter 13 repayment and reorganization plan, 11 U. S. C. § 1321, which must be filed in good faith and which must demonstrate that creditors will receive no less than they would under an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation, §§ 1325(a)(3) and (4); accord, § 1328(b)(2). While the plan must be filed no later than 15 days after filing the petition or conversion, the debtor may file the plan at the time of conversion, i. e., before the reconversion hearing. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3015(b).

Moreover, it is not clear whether, in converting a case "for cause" under § 1307(c), a bankruptcy court must consider the debtor's plan (if already filed) and, if the plan must be considered, whether the court must take into account whether the plan was filed in good faith, whether it honestly discloses the debtor's assets, whether it demonstrates that creditors would in fact fare better under the plan than under a liquidation, and whether the plan in some sense "cures" prior bad faith. Today's opinion renders these questions academic, and little is left to guide what a bankruptcy court must consider, or may disregard, in blocking a § 706(a) conversion.3

The Court notes that the Bankruptcy Code is intended to give a ""fresh start""" to the """honest but unfortunate debtor."'" Ante, at 367, 374 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 286, 287 (1991)). But compliance with the statutory scheme-conversion to Chapter 13 followed by notice

Indeed, the only procedural guidance for such a situation is Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(2), which requires the filing of a motion to convert by the debtor and service thereof.

ALITO, J., dissenting

and a hearing on the question of reconversion-would at least provide some structure to the process of identifying those debtors whose "bad faith'" meets the Court's standard for consignment to liquidation, i. e., “bad faith'" conduct that is "atypical" and "extraordinary." Ante, at 375, n. 11.

III

Finally, the Court notes two alternative bases for its holding. First, the Court points to 11 U. S. C. § 105(a), which governs a bankruptcy court's general powers.1 Second, the Court suggests that even without a textual basis, a bankruptcy court's inherent power may empower it to deny a § 706(a) conversion request for bad faith. Obviously, however, neither of these sources of authority authorizes a bankruptcy court to contravene the Code. On the contrary, a bankruptcy court's general and equitable powers "must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U. S. 197, 206 (1988); accord, SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455 (1940) ("A bankruptcy court . . . is guided by equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as they are inconsistent with the Act").

Ultimately, § 105(a) and a bankruptcy court's inherent powers may have a role to play in a case such as this. The problem the Court identifies is a real one. A debtor who is convinced that he or she can successfully conceal assets has a significant incentive to pursue Chapter 7 liquidation in lieu of a Chapter 13 restructuring. If successful, the debtor preserves wealth; if unsuccessful, the debtor can convert to Chapter 13 and land largely where the debtor would have

4 "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process." § 105(a).

ALITO, J., dissenting

been if he or she had fully disclosed all assets and proceeded in Chapter 13 in the first instance.

7

8

6

5

Bankruptcy courts have used their statutory and equitable authority to craft various remedies for a range of bad faith conduct: requiring accountings or reporting of assets; enjoining debtors from alienating estate property; penalizing counsel; assessing costs and fees; or holding the debtor in contempt. But whatever steps a bankruptcy court may take pursuant to § 105(a) or its general equitable powers, a bankruptcy court cannot contravene the provisions of the Code.

9

Because the provisions of the Code rule out the procedure that was followed in this case by the Bankruptcy Court, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

5 See, e. g., In re All Denominational New Church, 268 B. R. 536 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA8 2001) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with required monthly reporting); In re Martin's Aquarium, Inc., 225 B. R. 868, 880 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1998) (“[A] debtor may, in an appropriate case, be required to produce an accounting, and . . . a bankruptcy court does indeed have the power to so order [this equitable remedy]").

6 See, e. g., In re Bartmann, 320 B. R. 725, 732–733 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Okla. 2004); In re Newport Creamery, Inc., 293 B. R. 293 (Bkrtcy. Ct. RI 2003); In re Peklo, 201 B. R. 331 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1996).

7See, e. g., In re Everly, 346 B. R. 791, 797 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA8 2006) (bankruptcy court's § 105 powers include authority to sanction counsel); In re Brooks-Hamilton, 329 B. R. 270 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA9 2005) (upholding sanction and suspension of debtor's counsel); In re Washington, 297 B. R. 662 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Fla. 2003).

8 See, e. g., In re Deville, 280 B. R. 483 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA9 2002); In re Johnson, 336 B. R. 568, 573 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Fla. 2006); In re CouchRussell, No. 00-02226, 2003 WL 25273863 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Idaho, Apr. 2, 2003); In re Gorshtein, 285 B. R. 118 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 2002).

9 See, e. g., In re Sekendur, 334 B. R. 609 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ill. 2005) (imposing contempt sanction for serial and vexatious bankruptcy filing); In re Tolbert, 258 B. R. 387 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 2001) (same); In re Swanson, 207 B. R. 76 (Bkrtcy. Ct. NJ 1997) (imposing civil contempt under § 105 for failure to vacate property).

Syllabus

WALLACE v. KATO ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1240. Argued November 6, 2006-Decided February 21, 2007 In January 1994, Chicago police arrested petitioner, a minor, for murder. He was tried and convicted, but the charges were ultimately dropped in April 2002. In April 2003, he filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the city and several of its officers, seeking damages for, inter alia, his unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that the § 1983 suit was time barred because petitioner's cause of action accrued at the time of his arrest, not when his conviction was later set aside.

Held: The statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Pp. 387-397.

(a) The statute of limitations in a § 1983 suit is that provided by the State for personal-injury torts, e. g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S. 235, 249250; here, two years under Illinois law. For false imprisonment and its subspecies false arrest, "[t]he ... cause[s] of action . . . provid[ing] the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here," Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 484, the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment ends, see, e. g., 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts $899, Comment c, that is, in the present context, when the victim becomes held pursuant to legal process, see, e. g., Heck, supra, at 484. Thus, petitioner's false imprisonment did not end, as he contends, when he was released from custody after the State dropped the charges against him, but rather when he appeared before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial. Since more than two years elapsed between that date and the filing of this suit-even leaving out of the count the period before he reached his majority-the action was time barred. Pp. 387–392.

(b) Petitioner's contention that Heck compels the conclusion that his suit could not accrue until the State dropped its charges against him is rejected. The Heck Court held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sen

Syllabus

tence has been [set aside]. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." 512 U. S., at 486-487. Even assuming that the Heck deferred-accrual rule would be applied to the date petitioner was first held pursuant to legal process, there was in existence at that time no criminal conviction that the cause of action would impugn. What petitioner seeks is the adoption of a principle going well beyond Heck: that an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside. The impracticality of such a speculative rule is obvious.

The fact that § 1983 actions sometimes accrue before the setting aside of-indeed, even before the existence of-the related criminal conviction raises the question whether, assuming the Heck bar takes effect when the later conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations on the once valid cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar subsists. However, this Court generally refers to state-law tolling rules, e. g., Hardin v. Straub, 490 U. S. 536, 538-539, and is unaware of Illinois cases providing tolling in even remotely comparable circumstances. Moreover, a federal tolling rule to this effect would create a jurisprudential limbo in which it would not be known whether tolling is appropriate by reason of the Heck bar until it is established that the newly entered conviction would be impugned by the not-yet-filed, and thus utterly indeterminate, § 1983 claim. Pp. 392-397.

440 F. 3d 421, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER, J., joined, post, p. 397. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, post, p. 400.

Kenneth N. Flaxman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John J. Bursch.

Benna Ruth Solomon, Deputy Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel, Jane Elinor Notz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and Lawrence Rosenthal.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Michael Scodro, Deputy Solicitor General, and