2920. Cities and towns incorporated exempted and authorized. SEO. 2920. The lands of the state situate in the city and county of San Francisco, and those otherwise disposed of or situate within the limits of any incorporated town or city of this state, are excluded from the provisions of this chapter. The municipal authorities of any incorporated city or town other than San Francisco may grant authority to construct wharves, chutes, and piers, as is herein provided for the board of supervisors. CHAPTER VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS RELATING TO PUBLIC WAYS. 2931. Laws of the highway. SEC. 2931. When vehicles meet, the drivers of each must turn seasonably to the right of the center of the highway, so as to pass without interference, under a penalty of twenty-five dollars for every neglect, to be recovered by the party injured. Where the whole breadth of a roadway is not worked, the center of the worked part is to be deemed the center of the highway. In time of snow, where there is a beaten track, the center of that is to be deemed the center of the highway. But this section does not apply to vehicles meeting cars running on rails or grooved tracks. This chapter is to our state new, but its utility and necessity is apparent. It provides 2932. Driver addicted to intoxication. a 'law of the road' corresponding with general usage: "Commissioners' note. SEC. 2932. No person must employ to drive any vehicle for the conveyance passengers upon any public highway a person addicted to drunkenness, under penalty of five dollars for every day such person is in his employment. 2933. Notice to employer of driver's intoxication. SEC. 2933. If any driver, whilst actually employed in driving any such vehicle, is intoxicated to such a degree as to endanger the safety of his passengers, the owner, on receiving from any such passenger a written notice of the fact, verified by his oath, must forthwith discharge such driver; and if he has such driver in his service within six months after such notice he incurs a like penalty. See Pen. Code, sec. 391. 2934. Horses to be fastened while standing. SEC. 2934. The driver of any vehicle used to convey passengers must not leave the horses attached thereto while passengers remain in the same without first securely fastening the horses or placing the lines in the hands of some person, so as to prevent their running, under a penalty of twenty dollars other for each offense. 2935. Penalties, how and by whom recovered. SEC. 2935. The penalties provided by the three preceding sections are to be recovered by the district attorney of the county in which the offender resides, for the use of the county road fund. Any action for a penalty incurred under the last section must be commenced within six months. 2936. Liability of owners for damages done by drivers. SEC. 2936. The owner of every vehicle running or traveling upon any road for the conveyance of passengers is liable for all damages to persons or property done by any person in his employment as a driver while driving such POL. CODE-28 433 vehicle, whether done willfully or negligently, or otherwise, in the same manner as such driver would be liable. Common carriers: Civ. Code, secs. 2186 et seq. Carriers of persons: Id., sec. 2096. 2937. Exceptions to preceding sections. SEC. 2937. Nothing contained in the six preceding sections must affect any law concerning hackney-coaches or carriages in any city, nor affect laws or ordinances of any city for the licensing or regulating such coaches or carriages. "It may be well enough to call attention here to section 177, Penal Code of California, which punishes as a misdemeanor the doing of an act prohibited by law, for which no penalty 2938. Protection of bridges. is fixed by law. This section of the Penal Code applies to all prohibited acts under any of the provisions of this code:" Commissioners' note. SEC. 2938. The owner of any toll-bridge, and any plank-road company owning a bridge of not less than twenty feet span, may put up conspicuously at each end of it notice in these words in large characters: "Five dollars fine for riding or driving on this bridge faster than a walk;" and whoever rides or drives faster than a walk on such bridge forfeits to the owner the sum of five dollars. 2949. Duties of masters of vessels arriving in California. SEC. 2949. Within twenty-four hours after the arrival of any vessel arriving at any of the ports of this state, bringing passengers from any place out of this state, the master of such vessel must make on oath to the commissioner of immigration at such port a written report. General police of the state. "The police system of a state," says Cooley, Const. Lim., sec. 572, "in a comprehensive sense, embraces its whole system of internal regulation by which the state seeks, not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish for the inter course of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consist ent with a like enjoyment of rights by others." The variety of cases to which the police power may be applied is as great as are the needs of a community. For examples, see Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 286; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; In re Wong Yung Quy, 6 Saw. 442; Ex parte Frazer, 54 Cal. 94, recognizing the state's right to provide for a board of medical examiners; Green v. Swift, 47 Id. 536, involving the power of the state to straighten the channel of a river. But it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise: Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. Immigration. One of the most important uses to which the general supervisory power of a state may be applied is the protection of its people from the influx of dangerous foreigners. The importance of the power in this particular is measured by the difficulty of the questions arising in connection with its exercise. The right of the state legislature to direct what immigrants should be permitted to land upon its shores was brought for decision before the supreme court of the United States in the celebrated Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, and in New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103. The question was involved in each of those cases in a general way, the precise point in controversy being how far certain state statutes, with respect to the duties of masters on the landing of passengers from other countries, conflicted with the constitutional right of congress to regulate While those decisions and others, Holmes v. Jamieson, 14 Pet. 540; Grove v. Slaughter, 15 Id. 449; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Id. 539, seemed to establish the constitutionality of police regulations by the state to protect itself from foreign paupers, the question is not yet finally determined; recent adjudications have settled what the state cannot do in this particular, but have not defined the extent commerce. of state power. It has been repeatedly said by the United States supreme court, and now may be fairly deemed a closed question, that a law or a rule emanating from any lawful authority which prescribes terms or conditions on which alone a more than that the requirement from the master of a vessel of a catalogue of his passengers landed in the city, rendered to the mayor on oath, with a correct description of their names, ages, occupations, places of birth, and of last legal settlement, was a police regulation within the power of the state to enact, and not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States. The result of the Passenger Cases, supra, they declared, was to hold that a tax demanded of the owner of the vessel for every such passenger was a regulation of commerce by the state, in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore void. A re The New York and Louisiana statutes were pronounced unconstitutional. They were deemed to be clearly attempted regulations of commerce, as imposing upon masters of vessels onerous and perhaps impossible conditions upon their right to land passengers. It did not help the statutes to call them police regulations, as the court insisted, for they invaded the domain of legislation which belonged exclu sively to the congress of the United States. similar statute came before the supreme court of California, in State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. The bond to indemnify the state, counties, and cities thereof against all cost for support of the passengers landed was quired from the master from each and every passenger. By reason of its extending to all persons, and not being confined to such as would be likely to. be a burden upon the community, the act was pronounced void. Said Judge Crockett, for the court: "Whilst the legislature may exercise a wide discretion as to the proper subjects for police and sanitary regulations, it cannot, under color of this power, enact laws which in no proximate degree are germane to the subject. I am therefore of opinion that a statute which obstructs the entrance into this state of persons who are neither paupers, vagabonds, nor criminals, or in any wise unsound or infirm in body or mind, is not an exercise of the police power of the state in any just sense of that term." Both in this case and in Henderson v. Mayor Vessel can discharge its passengers is a regula- of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, was suggested the vital tion of commerce, and in case of vessels and proposition, Cannot the state legislatures pass passengers coming from foreign ports is a regu- such acts as were then under scrutiny, where lation of commerce with foreign nations: Gib- congress has not moved in the matter? In other bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 189; Passenger Cases, words, is the regulation of commerce an exclu7 How. 253; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, sive power in congress? The California su92 U. S. 259. It is because the dealing with preme court came to the conclusion, based on the right of passengers to land may come in condecisions of the United States supreme court, fict with the congressional right to regulate that when a regulation of foreign commerce is commerce, that gives rise to the difficulty. In national in its character, when it is of such a the Henderson case, above cited, the New York nature that the power to enact can be most adstatute under consideration required the master vantageously and appropriately exercised by of a vessel to give a bond for every passenger congress under a general system, applicable landed, conditioned to indemnify the commis- alike to the whole nation and all its parts, then sioner of immigration, and every county, city, congress has the exclusive power to legislate the relief or support of the person named in the to deal with it. and town in the state, against any expense for upon it, and the states severally have no power bond, demanding varying rules so as provided, however, that the owner or consignee to adapt it to particular localities, it is within might commute such bond by paying one dollar the province of the state legislatures to adopt and fifty cents for each playinger, within such local rules and regulations, in the absence twenty-four hours after his or her landing. A of legislation by congress on that particular similar statute from Louisiana was also before subject. Similar views seem to be entertained the court at the same time. The justices took by Cooley, Const. Lim., sec. 586. Pomeroy, occasion to refer to earlier decisions of that court, Const. Law, sec. 330, as a conclusion from an stating the extent to which the Passenger Cases, examination of the principles involved and of supra, and New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103, were the adjudications bearing upon them, states that authority. The latter, they said, decided no where congress has not legislated, the states are But if the regulation be local free to act, their action being constantly subject to be displaced by the laws of congress, and that where congress has "legislated upon any subject connected with foreign commerce, the several states are entirely deprived of any authority over the same subjectmatter. See also the same view adopted in Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205. The language employed in Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, clearly shows that the relations of the states and the United States in regard to regulating commerce is not finally determined. It will be seen that the court notices the distinction pointed out in State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578, between regulations of a local character and regulations capable of being made part of one national system, and decides that as to the latter the power in congress is exclusive, whereas as to the former, they may perhaps be controlled by the state legislature in the absence of congressional action. The court in the Henderson case say: "It is said, however, that under the decisions of this court, there is a kind of neutral ground, especially in that covered by the regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by the state, and its legislation is valid so long as it interferes with no act of congress or treaty of the United States. Such a proposition is supported by the opinions of several of the judges in the Passenger Cases, supra; by the decisions of this court in Cooly v. The Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299: and by the cases of Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Id. 713. But this doctrine has always been controverted in this court, and has seldom, if ever, been stated without dissent. These decisions, however, all agree that under the commerce clause of the constitution, or within its compass, there are powers which, from their nature, are exclusive in congress; and in the case of Cooly v. The Board of Wardens, supra, it was said, that whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by congress.' A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible, conditions on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations must of necessity be national in its character." Speaking of the statutes then before the court, it was declared: "It is equally clear that the matter of these statutes may be, and ought to be, the subject of a uniform system or plan. It is apparent, therefore, that if there be a class of laws which may be valid when passed by the states until the same ground is occupied by a treaty or an act of congress, this statute is not of that class." And in conclusion, it was said: "We are of opinion that this whole subject has been confided to congress by the constitution; that congress can more appropriately and with more acceptance exercise it than any other body known to our law, state or national; that by providing a system of laws in these matters applicable to all ports and to all vessels, a serious question, which has long been matter of contest and complaint, may be effectually and satisfactorily settled. Whether in the absence of such action the states can, or how far they can, by appropriate legislation protect themselves against actual paupers, vagrants, criminals, and diseased persons arriving in their territory from foreign countries, we do not decide." It is interesting, in view of the uncertainty upon the power of the state to regulate commerce, even to the extent of guarding against the influx of undesirable strangers, to read in connection with Mr. Justice Miller's words above quoted the dictum of Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471, delivered two years later: "It may also be ad mitted that the police powers of a state justify the adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a state may legislate to prevent the spread of crime or pauperism or disturbance of the peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded, as intimated in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, by Mr. Justice Greer, in the sacred law of self-defense." The court, however, reiterates the doctrine: "But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a state, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to congress by the federal constitu tion"-a doctrine sufficiently well settled, but, as has been seen, not clearly defined upon the subject we are considering. In Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, a statute of California was before the court, in effect giving to the commissioner of immigration power to determine what passengers arriving from a foreign port were lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, criminal, or what woman was lewd or debauched, and to demand from the master or owner or consignee a bond to indem nify the people against loss for the support of such person, which bond could be commuted for such sum as the commissioner might see fit to exact, twenty per cent of which sum went into his own pocket. The statute was pronounced unconstitutional beyond a doubt. Said Mr. Justice Miller, for the court: "It is hardly possible to conceive a statute more skillfully framed to place in the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from carrying passengers, or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind. * We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a state, in the absence of legislation by congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit of such, if it exist. Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a state statute limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone shall, in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time enough to decide that question. The statute of California goes so far beyond what is necessary, or even appropriate for this purpose, as to be wholly without any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed to be justified." The same statute was brought before the circuit court of the United States for the district of California in In re Ah Fong, 3 Saw. 144, and was declared unconstitutional, in an able opinion, instructive in this connection, delivered by Judge Field. By the supreme court of that state the statute has been upheld: Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402. The supreme court of California, in Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Id. 534, have probably gone to the full extent in admitting the exclusive right of congress to prescribe conditions to the entrance of immigrants into the state. In that case a statute which imposed an arbitrary tax upon Chinamen was declared unconstitutional, as it tended to drive them away, and by so doing indirectly interfered with passenger traffic, which congress was alone competent to regulate. It is noticeable that Judge Field, then a member of that court, expressed a dissenting opinion. As a still further and additional illustration of the principles above adverted to, comes the recent decision of People ex rel. Bunker v. P. 2950. Form of report. SEC. 2950. The report must state: M. S. Co., 8 Saw. 640, declaring section 2955 of this code unconstitional, a decision based upon a like construction of a similar New York statute in People v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59. Regulating immigration by treaty.-With respect to the treaty of the United States with China, and the act of congress of May 6, 1882, thereunder, prohibiting the immigration of Chinese to this country, see the decisions in exposition thereof: Chinese Cabin Waiter Case, 7 Saw. 536; Chinese Laborers Case, Id. 542; Chinese Merchant Case, Id. 547. 1. The name, place of birth, last residence, age, and occupation of all such passengers who are not citizens, or who shall have, within the last preceding twelve months, arrived from any country out of the United States, and who have not been examined, bonded, or paid commutation money, as provided in this chapter, or have been landed from any such vessel, at any place during her last voyage, or who have gone on board of any vessel with the intention of coming into this state, or who may have died during the last voyage of such vessel; and, 2. Whether any of the passengers so reported are lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, infirm, or are lepers, or persons affected with any of the diseases known as leprosy or elephantiasis; 3. The names and residences of the owners of such vessel. [Amendment, approved March 25, 1876; Amendments 1875-6, 53; took effect immediately.] 2951. Oath to be administered to certain passengers. SEC. 2951. The master or commander of the vessel must administer to any passenger of foreign birth, who declares himself a citizen of the United States, the following oath: "I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I was born in —; that I am a naturalized citizen of the United States; that I was naturalized and received my certificate of naturalization in the state of Sections 2952 and 2953, as originally adopted, were repealed by act approved March 30, 1874, Amendments 1873-4, 39, and a single new sec 2952. Lazarettos for lepers. in the tion substituted in their place. This substituted section was amended in 1876 as follows: SEC. 2952. It shall not be lawful for lepers or persons affected with leprosy, or elephantiasis, to live in ordinary intercourse with the population of this state; but all such persons shall be compelled to inhabit such lazarettos, or lepers' quarters, as may be assigned to them by the board of supervisors of the city or county in which they shall be domiciled or settled; and the board of supervisors are vested with power and are required to make all necessary provisions for the separation, detention, and care of lepers or persons affected with leprosy, or elephantiasis, settled or domiciled in their respective cities or counties. The superintendent or manager of all lepers' quarters under this chapter shall forward quarterly statements, showing the name, age, sex, and birthplace of each leper in such quarter, to the secretary of state, who shall keep a proper record of such matters for the information of the public. [Amendment, approved March 25, 1876; Amendments 1875-6, 53; took effect immediately.] 2953. Bond to protect state. Repealed: See note to sec. 2951. |