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tlement upon legal principles were to be submitted to an international court for final decision. These treaties were emasculated by the Senate, yielding to the spirit which proceeds, unconsciously doubtless, but truly, from the conviction that the only thing that will secure to a nation the justice it wishes to secure is force; that agreements between nations to settle controversies justly and peaceably should never be given any weight in national policy; that in dealing between civilized nations we must assume that each nation is conspiring to deprive us of our independence and our prosperity; that there is no impartial tribunal to which we can entrust the decison of any question vitally affecting our interests or our honor, and that we can afford to make no agreement from which we may not immediately withdraw, and whose temporary operation to our detriment may not be expressly a ground for ending it. This is the doctrine of despair. It leads necessarily to the conclusion that our only recourse to avoid war is competitive armament, with its dreadful burdens and its constant temptation to resort to the war it seeks to avoid.

The most important covenant with reference to peace and war in the constitution of the League is that looking to a reduction of armament by all nations. The Executive Council, consisting of representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and of four other nations to be selected by the body of delegates, is to consider how much the armaments of the nations should be reduced, having regard to the safety of each of the nations and their obligations under the League. Having reached a conclusion as to the proportionate limits of each nation's armament, it submits its conclusion to each nation, which may or may not agree to the limit thus recommended; but

when an agreement is reached it covenants to keep within that limit until, by application to the Executive Council, the limit may be raised.

be raised. In other words, each nation agrees to its own limitation. Having so agreed, it must keep within it.

Our Constitution contains no inhibition, express or implied, against making such an agreement. On the contrary, for one hundred years we have maintained an agreement to limit armaments between this country and Canada. The evil of competition in armament as between us has been avoided by abstaining from armament altogether. Could there be a more complete precedent for this provision of the Paris Covenant ?

The importance of providing for a reduction of armament every one recognizes. It is affirmed in the newly proposed Senate resolution. Can we not trust our Congress to fix a limitation which is safe for the country and to stick to it? If we cannot, no country can. Yet all the rest are anxious to do this and they are far more exposed than we.

The character of this obligation is affected by the time during which the covenants of the League remain binding. There is no stipulation as to how long this is. In my judgment there should be a period of ten years or a permission for any member of the League to withdraw from the covenant by giving a reasonable notice of one or two years of its intention to do so.

The members of the League and the non-members are required, the former by their covenant, the latter by an enforced obligation, to submit all differences between them, not capable of being settled by negotiation, to arbitration before a tribunal composed as the parties may agree. They are required to covenant to abide the award. Should either

party deem the question one not proper for arbitration, then it is to be taken up by the Executive Council of the League. The Executive Council mediates between the parties and secures a voluntary settlement of the question if possible. If it fails, it makes a report. If the report is unanimous, the Executive Council is to recommend what shall be done to carry into effect its recommendation. If there is a dissenting vote, then the majority report is published, and also the minority report, if desired, and no further action is taken. If either party or the Executive Council itself desires, the mediating function is to be discharged by the Body of Delegates in which every member of the League has one vote. There is no direction as to what shall be done with reference to the recommendation of proper measures to be taken, and the whole matter is then left for such further action as the members of the League agree upon. There is no covenant by the defeated party that it will comply with the unanimous report of the Executive Council or the Body of Delegates.

And right here I wish to take up the objection made to the League that under this machinery we might be compelled to receive immigrants contrary to our national desire from Japan or China. We could and would refuse to submit the issue to arbitration. It would then go to mediation. In my judgment the Council, as a mediating body, should not take jurisdiction to consider such a difference. Immigration by international law is a domestic question completely within the control of the Government into which immigration is sought, unless the question of immigration is the subject of treaty stipulation between two countries. If, however, it be said that there is no limitation, in the Covenant, of the differences to be mediated, clearly we would

run no risk of receiving from the large body of delegates of all the members of the League a unanimous report recommending a settlement by which Japanese immigrants shall be admitted to our shores, or Japanese applicants be admitted to citizenship, against our protest. But were it made, we are under no covenant to obey such recommendation. If it could be imagined that all of the other nations of the world would thus unite their military forces to compel us to receive Japanese immigrants under the covenant, why would they not do so without the covenant ?

These articles compelling submission of differences either to arbitration or mediation are not complete machinery for settlement by peaceable means of all issues arising between nations. But they are a substantial step forward. They constitute an unambitious plan to settle as many questions as possible by arbitration or mediation. They illustrate the spirit of those who drafted this covenant and their sensible desire not to attempt more till after actual experience.

The next covenant is that the nations shall not begin war until three months after the arbitration award or the recommendation of compromise, and not then if the defendant nation against whom the award or recommendation has been made shall comply with it. This is the great restraint of war imposed by the Covenant upon members of the League and non-members. It is said that this would prevent our resistance to a border raid of Mexico or self-defense against any invasion - a most extreme construction. If a nation refuses submission at all, as it does when it begins an attack, the nation attacked is released instanter from its obligation to submit and is restored to the complete power of self-defense. Had this objection not been

raised in the Senate one would not have deemed it necessary to answer so unwarranted a suggestion.

If the defendant nation does not comply with the award or unanimous report, then the plaintiff nation can begin war and carry out such complete remedy as the circumstances enable it to do. But if the defendant nation does comply with the award or unanimous report, then the plaintiff nation must be content with such compliance. It runs the risk of not getting all that it thought it ought to have or might have by war, but as it is asking affirmative relief it must be seeking some less vital interest than its political independence or territoral integrity, and the limitation is not one which can be dangerous to its sovereignty.

The third covenant, the penalizing covenant, is that if a nation begins war in violation of its covenant, then ipso facto that is an act of war against every member of the League and the members of the League are required definitely and distinctly to levy a boycott on the covenant-breaking nation and to cut off all commercial, trade, financial, personal and official relations between them and their citizens and it and its citizens. Indeed, the boycott is compound or secondary in that it is directed against any non-members of the League continuing to deal with the outlaw nation. This is an obligation operative at once on each member of the League. With us the Executive Council would report the violation of the covenant to the President and it would be reported to Congress. Congress would then, by reason of the covenant of the League, be under a legal and moral obligation to levy an embargo and prevent all intercourse of every kind between this nation and the covenant-breaking nation.

The extent of this penalty and its heavy, withering effect,

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