when the hostile action includes all members of the League as well as all non-members, may be easily appreciated. The prospect of such an isolation would be likely to frighten any member of the League from a reckless violation of its covenant not to begin war. It is inconceivable that any small nation, dependent as it must be on larger nations for its trade and sustenance, indeed for its food and raw material, would for a moment court such a destructive ostracism as this would be.

Other covenants of the penalizing article impose on the members of the League the duty of sharing the expense of a boycott with any nation upon which it has fallen with uneven weight and of supporting such a nation in its resistance to any special measure directed against it by the outlaw nation. But there is no specific requirement as to the character of the support beyond the obligation of the boycott, the contribution of expenses and the obligation of each member of the League to permit the passage through its territory of forces of other members of the League cooperating with military forces against the outlaw nation.

If, however, the boycott does not prove sufficient, then the Executive Council is to recommend the number of the military and naval forces to be contributed by the members of the League to protect the covenants of the League in such a case. There is no specific covenant by which they agree to furnish a definite force, or, indeed, any force at all, to a league army. The use of the word "recommend " in describing the function of the Executive Council shows that the question whether such forces shall be contributed and what shall be their amount must ultimately address itself to the members of the League severally for their several decision and action. There is this radical and impor

tant difference, therefore, between the obligation to lay a boycott and the obligation to furnish military force, and doubtless this distinction was insisted upon and reached by a compromise. The term "recommendation" cannot be interpreted to impose any imperative obligation on those to whom the recommendation is directed.

By Article X, the high contracting parties undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the political independence and territorial integrity of every member of the League, and when these are attacked or threatened the Executive Council is to advise as to the proper means to fulfill this obligation. The same acts or series of acts which make Article X applicable will be a breach of the covenant which creates an outlaw nation under Article XVI, so that all nations must begin a boycott against any nation thus breaking the territorial integrity or overthrowing the independence of a member of the League. Indeed Article X will usually not be applicable until a war shall be fought to the point of disclosing its specific purpose. Action under it will usually take the form of preventing, in a treaty of peace, the appropriation of territory or the interference with the sovereignty of the attacked and defeated nation. We have seen this in the construction put upon the Monroe Doctrine by Secretary Seward and President Roosevelt. The former, when Spain attacked Chili and that country appealed to the United States to protect it, advised Spain that under our policy we would not interfere to prevent the punishment by war of an American nation by a non-American nation, provided it did not extend to a permanent deprivation of its territory or an overthrow of its sovereignty. President Roosevelt, in the Venezuelan matter, also announced that the Monroe Doctrine did not prevent nations

from proceeding by force to collect their debts provided oppressive measures were not used which would deprive the nation of its independence or territorial integrity. This furnishes an analogy for the proper construction of Article X.

The fact that the Executive Council is to advise what means shall be taken to fulfill the obligation shows that they are to be such as each nation shall deem proper and fair under the circumstances. Remoteness from the seat of trouble and the fact that the nearer presence of other nations should induce them to furnish the requisite military force would naturally be included among the factors considered. It thus seems to me clear that the question, both under Article XVIII, and under Article X, as to whether the United States shall declare war and what forces it shall furnish, are remitted to the voluntary action of the Congress of the United States under the Constitution, regard being had to the matter of a fair division between all the nations of the burden to be borne under the League and the proper means to be adopted, whether the enjoined and inevitable boycott alone, or the advance of loans of money, or the declaration of war and the use of military force. This is as it should be. It fixes the obligation of action in such a way that American nations will attend to America, European nations will attend to Europe, and Asiatic nations to Asia, unless all deem the situation so threatening to the world and to their own interests that they should take a more active part. It seems to me that appropriate words might be added to the pact which would show distinctly this distribution of obligation. This would relieve those anxious to exclude European or Asiatic nations from forcible intervention in issues between American nations until

requested to intervene by the United States, or by an executive council of the American nations formed for the purpose.

Objection is made that Great Britain might have more representatives in the Executive Council than other countries. This is an error. The British Empire, which, of course, includes its dominions, is limited to one delegate in the Executive Council. As regards the other central organ, known as the Body of Delegates, provision is made by which, upon a two-thirds vote of that body, new members may be admitted who are independent states or are self-governing dominions or colonies. Under this Canada and Australia and South Africa might be allowed to send delegates. I presume, too, the Philippines might be admitted. But the function of the Body of Delegates is not one which makes membership in it of great importance. When it acts as a mediating and compromising body, its reports must be unanimous to have any effect. And the addition of members is not likely to create greater probability of unanimity. More than this, the large number of countries who will become members will minimize any increase of British influence from the addition of such dominions and colonies, which are really admitted because they have different interests from their mother country. When analyzed, the suggestion that Great Britain will have any greater power than other member nations in shaping the policy of the League in really critical matters will be seen to have no foundation whatever.

A proposed resolution in the Senate recites that the Constitution of the League of Nations in the form now offered should not be accepted by the United States, although the sense of the Senate is that the nations of the world should

unite to promote peace and general disarmament. The resolution further recites that the efforts of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German Government, and that the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should be taken up for careful and serious consideration later. It is said that this resolution will be supported by thirty-seven members of the new Senate, and thus prevent the confirmation of any treaty which includes the present proposed Covenant of Paris.

The President of the United States is the authority under the Federal Constitution which initiates the form of treaties and which at the outset determines what subject matter they shall include. Therefore, if it shall seem to the President of the United States, and to those acting with him with similar authority for other nations, that a treaty of peace cannot be concluded except with a covenant providing for a league of nations, in substance like that now proposed, as a condition precedent to the proper operation and effectiveness of the treaty itself, it will be the duty of the President and his fellow delegates to the Conference to insert such a covenant in the treaty. If accordingly such a covenant should be incorporated in a Treaty of Peace, signed by the representatives of the Powers and should be brought back by the President and submitted by him to the Senate, the question which will address itself to the proponents of this Senate resolution will be not whether they would prefer to consider a league of nations after a Treaty of Peace but whether they will feel justified in defeating or post