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istrations, voiced its opposition to the transfer of American territory by sale to any European or Asiatic government. The original doctrine is strengthened by the League Covenant in that it is, for the first time, specifically recognized by the nations, and is extended to the world by the provisions of Article X, which preserves “ against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League.” Certainly we are not authorized by that, nor, in fact, by any other article of the Covenant, to acquire territory in Europe by conquest or purchase, and similarly European countries are not authorized by the Covenant to do it in this hemisphere.
The attitude both of Secretary Seward and of President Roosevelt is cited to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine does not forbid non-American Powers from justly disciplining American countries provided the action does not extend to the point of interfering with the latter's independence and territorial integrity. Similarly the guaranties of territorial integrity and political independence under Article X of the Paris Covenant will not come into operation until the character of a war, otherwise legally begun, discloses itself as aggressive in this respect. Neither are wars of independence within the legal purview of the League though it will naturally take notice of them and invite friendly settlement.
The sale of American territory to non-American Powers is not specifically forbidden by the League Covenant; but the motive for such attempted action is lessened by the very existence of the League. When the Monroe Doctrine is to be enforced in the western hemisphere, it is natural to expect that a strong American State, close to the seat of trouble, will be selected to execute the mandate of the League. Similar reason would control the action of the
League in employing the forces of a nearby State to quell disturbances in other parts of the world; so that, unless the struggle be formidable or unless an international force be needed to allay fear of abuse of power, the forces of the United States will rarely be called upon to act abroad.
The “ entangling alliance " argument is met by a whole series of facts and considerations. The detached position of the United States, which obtained in Washington's day, is shown to have disappeared with the spread of dominion and interests since then. From a country limited to a comparatively narrow settlement along the Atlantic seaboard, the United States has extended its empire over the continent to the Pacific, has acquired Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and the Panama Canal strip, while a multiplied commerce and social intercourse tie up her fortunes intimately with the fortunes of other peoples. The life that pulses through her veins today is the life of the world and disease in the body politic elsewhere affects her own health. We have seen that we cannot keep out of a general world conflict and we risk less by assuming the obligations of membership in the family of nations and throwing our great influence in the scale for the preservation of peace than if we were to attempt isolation and play the rôle of onlooker until the conflagration drew us irresistibly in.
Our presence will make the potential strength of the League so overwhelming that the hand of the would be aggressor will be stayed, making serious assault on the world's peace unlikely. In most instances the need for the actual use of force will be avoided; just as the declared purpose of the United States to maintain the Monroe Doctrine has resulted in its being respected without our
being called upon to fire a shot or sacrifice the life of a single soldier in its defence. Accordingly there will be less likelihood of our being called upon to go to war than if we declined the commitments of the League with a view to avoiding war. While the United States, in entering the League, will assume new responsibilities, it will not assume new burdens. The League will prove to be a source of economy rather than of new expense to us; for it should not only enable us to escape the crushing expense of actual warfare, but, in course of time, should likewise relieve us of part of the present burden of armaments.
So much from the standpoint of self-interest. But, irrespective of self-interest, the United States, having become a powerful nation in point of numbers, talent and resources, has a duty to perform in this respect to her sister nations. Modern ingenuity has so multiplied the destructiveness of war that the very preservation of the race is dependent on adequate organization to suppress war. Such organization cannot come about without the participation of the United States. Unless we join, other important countries will remain out and we will witness the world divided once more in hostile groups. Without a League of Nations, the many new States which have come into being, lacking experience and the self-restraint which makes successful self-government possible, will not only be unable to maintain their independence but will be a source of danger to the general peace, by reason of quarrels among themselves and quarrels with the States of which they were formerly a part; for, on the one hand, racial animosity and the memory of the tyranny formerly practiced against them“ will prompt them to be impatient and headstrong" in dealing with their former masters, while, on the other hand, the latter will
harbor resentment against States whose independent existence will remind them of their own “ deserved humiliation." Our experience in Cuba indicates what we may expect of them. After three years of existence as an independent republic, Cuba indulged in a revolution. “Mr. Roosevelt sent me down there to stop it and launch the Republic once more. Well, I could not stop it except by sending for the army and navy of the United States. That step had a wholesome, conciliatory, quieting effect. We were not called upon to fight. We took over the island and held it for two years. We passed a lot of good statutes, among them an election law, held a fair election under it and then turned over the government to those elected. We had launched her once more. If she ever requires it we will do the same thing over again and launch her again, and then again, until she gets strong enough — I hope she is now — to stand alone."
This unpretentious and good-natured recital of the accomplishment of a task which for another might have proved difficult indeed — and lengthy, if not bloody — shows, more clearly than any abstract dissertation possibly could, exactly the patience and fatherly concern which Mr. Taft feels will be required of us in starting the new nations of Europe safely on their way.
Our own sacrifices and the more awful sacrifices of our allies, who were fighting our battle long before we awoke to the fact, were made in order to suppress militarism, to safeguard democracy and to make peace more lasting.
It was the United States, acting through its President, that pointed the way to a league of nations. The hope of it gave new courage to the armies of our allies and to the people that suffered toil and hardship at home; it helped
nerve the arm of our own boys and encouraged the masses in the enemy country to revolt against their leaders. Shall we now disappoint their hope? Prove traitor to our professions ? Tell the maimed and the mothers of the dead, at home and abroad, that we did not mean what we said ? Suffer conditions to grow up which will make similar — nay, far graver — sacrifices necessary in the future? "I say that the men who advocate our staying out of the League by reason of a policy against entangling alliances laid down by Washington for a small nation struggling for existence, whereas today we are one of the most powerful nations in the world — I say deliberately that these men are little Americans and belittle the United States and its people.” Now is the time to set up the international organization which for generations thinking men have sought; now, while the dreadful character of war has so impressed itself on nations that they are willing to make the concessions called for.
Should we not, then, say to the nations of Europe: “We realize that the sea no longer separates us but is become a bond of union. We know that if war comes to you, our neighbor, it is apt to come to us, and we are ready to stand with you in order to suppress this scourge of nations. For love of our brother we will do our share as men and women conscious of the responsibility to help along mankind, a responsibility which God has given this nation in giving it great power.”
Led, by experience in furthering new measures, to expect violent attack on the proposed League from the side of the Federal Constitution, Mr. Taft took early occasion to deal with that important question. His full and satisfactory