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treatment of it is among his most valuable contributions to the discussion of the League project.

The United States is a nation, endowed with all the powers, so far as external relations are concerned, that appertain to a sovereign nation. Practice and legal decisions are cited to show that its treaty-making power extends to all subjects usually dealt with in treaties. These include, in practice and in law, the right to agree to submit to arbitration not only existing disputes but likewise disputes which may arise in future. Among the latter, instance the approval, by the United States Senate, of the Hague convention for an international Court of Prize and of the Bryan treaties. Such agreements may apply to extra-legal controversies as well as to justiciable controversies. The latter are defined as matters resolvable by the rules of law and equity. Precedent for instituting an international Court of Justice to pass upon the latter category of questions is found in the Supreme Court of the United States which is called upon at times to apply international law in controversies between the States of the Union. Settlement of extra-legal questions by a tribunal would simply be arbitration as we commonly know it. A long series of agreements of this nature, beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794, affirms the practice of the country in respect thereto. Submission of an issue to a judge, which this is, is not a delegation of power to an agent.

Nor is the Government exceeding its constitutional powers when it enters into an agreement to go to war under certain conditions. For the complete act, the exercise of two constitutional functions is required. It is the President who, by and with the consent of the Senate, makes a treaty. “For this purpose the President and Senate are the United

States.” That is one thing. It is the Congress which, observing the requirements of the treaty, takes supplementary action. That is quite another thing.

A treaty calling for a declaration of war under certain conditions can no more be carried out without action on the part of Congress than a treaty calling for the payment of money; because in Congress alone resides the power to declare war just as in Congress alone resides the power to make appropriations of money from the Treasury. The requirements of the Constitution are fulfilled only by this double action. But that fact cannot be interpreted as limiting the constitutional power of the Government to make treaties. The treaty we made with France during the Revolution was of that character. The Senate accepted the principle when it approved the treaties under which we guaranteed the independence of Cuba and Panama. “ The obligation was entered into in the constitutional way and is to be performed in the constitutional way.”

Neither can the constitutional power of the country to enter into an agreement to limit armaments be questioned. This power was exercised early in the history of the country by the agreement with Canada (1817) to abolish armaments on the Great Lakes and maintain no fortifications along our lengthy common border.

The charge that the League sets up a Super-State likewise falls before an examination of the project. The central organs of the League recommend — they do not command

definite courses of action by the States of the League. When armaments are in question, the limit prescribed for each State is not definitive until that State has agreed to it. For the United States, it is the Congress, acting under the Constitution, which will finally determine what our arma

ments are to be. When mandates for administering backward regions are assigned, the mandatory is free to accept or reject the mandate. When the use of force is required, each State of the League will decide for itself whether or not it will observe the recommendation of the central organ of the League that force be used. True, among the positive agreements which may not be ignored, are two of major importance, namely, the agreement to institute a boycott against a member of the League which resorts to war in violation of its covenants and the agreement to "afford passage through their territory to the forces" engaged in disciplining the recalcitrant. These provisions abolish neutrality in the case of an aggressive war; but it is a condition which arises not by reason of any command of the central organs of the League but by reason of the act of the recalcitrant itself in waging war illegally.

The power of the League rests, not on a super-government, but on the covenants of the members to coöperate voluntarily by boycott and by the use of force, to punish aggression.

Combatting the views of persons who object to the element of force in the League program, Mr. Taft declares his respect for the motives of the advocates of non-resistance but doubts whether nations are as yet proof against the "temptations to cupidity, cruelty and injustice” manifested in men, and whether, on that account, an international police is not as requisite as the constabulary which “protects the innocent and the just against the criminal and unjust " within the State.

Mr. Bryan, in the written debate with Mr. Taft, urges that the use of force invites violence, and cites the laying aside of weapons by private persons as having made for the

peacefulness of society. Mr. Taft replies that the instance is not well chosen, because "men gave up weapons when they could rely on the police, exercising the force of the community, to protect them against violence. . . . Would Mr. Bryan dispense with the police in city, state and nation?"

“ There is no means of suppressing lawless violence except lawful force.”

Mr. Bryan's view that a popular referendum should be taken before a nation may declare war is met by the supposition that the people of one country to a dispute might well vote for war while that of the other country voted against it. “ Shall another vote be taken ? In which country? Or shall it be in both?” We may add that when the national legislature had gone so far as to submit the question of peace or war by referendum to the people, what likelihood is there that the prospective enemy would await the decision before striking ? Picture any of the great European countries referring to popular vote the question of war against a neighbor. How long would the latter delay warlike action? The debate offers an interesting comparison, throughout, of the minds of the two participants.

The assertion, made in certain quarters, that the League plan has little value because nations will disregard the obligations of the pact is met by the admission that nations are sometimes utterly immoral and shamelessly break treaties on the plea of necessity but that we cannot, on that account, abandon treaty-making “any more than we can give up commercial contracts because men sometimes dishonor themselves by breaking them.” Moreover, Alying in the face of an organized world opinion and combined world power involves very different consequences from those which followed breach of treaty under the old order.

The fear that judgments of an international tribunal will affect adversely the interests of the United States is dismissed in these words: “If the judgment against her is just she ought to obey it. If it is not, why assume that it will be rendered at all, or, that if rendered all nations would join in world war to enforce it? Indeed, may not our imagination, if we let it run riot, as easily conceive such a union of the military forces of the world against the United States without a league and its machinery as with them?” No inconsistency is recognized between intense love of country, which is regarded as helpful and right, and universal brotherhood. “The relation of one to the other should be as love of home and family is to love of country.” They strengthen each other.

A league, such as is now planned, is viewed as a necessary and natural outgrowth of the treaty foreshadowed by the demands of the Allies. In fact the proposed treaty is impossible of fulfillment without the aid of some such organization. Even though drawn “ by the ablest lawyers who ever drew a contract " its numerous provisions will call for authoritative interpretation. What instrument is there better fitted than a court to interpret a contract authoritatively? Next, there are sure to be conflicts which are not justiciable among the nations. What better institution for settling such questions than a tribunal of inquiry and conciliation? Unruliness on the part of backward countries, or of those children among the nations to whom reference has already been made, will call for the use of force to confine and restrain it. “You do not always have to use the broad hand but it is helpful to have it in the family." That was the third plank in the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. Lastly, we cannot escape the task of de

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