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veloping and defining international law, and that is the fourth plank.

As the discussion proceeded Mr. Taft was led to change, in the direction of enlarging, his view of the length to which nations might be expected to go in conferring powers on a central organization. Of the desirability of sanction for all the pronouncements of the League there was never a question. The problem was to avoid wrecking the project by demanding more than the nations would be willing to concede at this time.

It will be observed, for example, that in the earliest speeches, intention to enforce the judgment of an international court is denied; whereas, later on and with Mr. Taft's approval, the platform of the League to Enforce Peace moved up to that demand. At the same time Mr. Taft has stood, from the beginning, for the power to hale a nation into court. The framers of the Paris Covenant were manifestly unwilling to confer both powers conjointly on an international tribunal. They neglected to confer on the League the power to hale offenders before a tribunal or court in matters suitable for arbitration — justiciable matters are included in the term — but, having once submitted the matter, the disputants are bound to respect the judgment or award. On the other hand, disputants in the field of extra-legal matters, including conflicts of political policy, may be haled before a tribunal — the Council or a committee thereof — while the recommendation arrived at by the tribunal is not enforcible. Mr. Taft is of the opinion that there is still a way, through the instrumentality of the Council, to bring a nation into the Court of International Justice under the Covenant. Certainly it is not unreason

able to expect further development of the powers of its tribunals, as well as of the general powers of the League, as time may disclose the need for them.

So, too, the earlier position that the League should operate only on its own members was abandoned by Mr. Taft and his associates in favor of insistence on resort to inquiry in the hope of peaceful settlement before even nations outside the League were suffered to go to war. This is the attitude of the Paris Covenant. The messages printed at the end of the volume reveal the part played by Mr. Taft in securing modification of the covenant originally reported to the Paris Conference (February 14, 1919). His suggestions were made with a view to meeting the objections raised against the instrument by members of the United States Senate. The attitude of the latter, after the objections voiced had been largely met by these modifications, indicates the true nature of much of the opposition, namely, desire to destroy the Covenant itself - a fearful responsibility in view of future consequences to the welfare of mankind.

In addition to meeting, with his usual touch of kindly humor and convincing reasoning, the arguments advanced against the League project, Mr. Taft discloses in these papers a deep conviction that a League of Nations is necessary and that within it lie boundless possibilities for good.

Some one has said that the man whom we are inclined to regard as wise is the man with whose views we happen to agree. Be that as it may, in reviewing Mr. Taft's utterances one is struck with the extent to which the things he has advocated are the things that have been realized or are still regarded as desirable. His basket of discarded no

tions - notions discarded for him by the public — is exceptionally small.

Among the speeches in his best vein is that of Montreal (September 26, 1917) analysing German motive in the light of Prussia's history and reviewing the events which led up inevitably to our own entry into the war. While stamped with his characteristic fairness, it constitutes such a sweeping indictment of Germany, is so eloquent and full of fire, so exact, comprehensive and satisfactory that it should live as a masterpiece in the literature of the war.

It goes without saying that the Papers are replete with new evidence of our honored ex-President's grasp of the guiding legal principles of our government, gathered on the bench and in executive office, and of the attitude of mind which the best thought and feeling of the country heartily accepts as true Americanism.

THEODORE MARBURG. Baltimore, November 11, 1919.




The League to Enforce Peace was organized in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915. Its objects are set forth in the following:

PROPOSALS We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the forego

ing. 1

1 The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized by the Executive Committee:

“The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic


Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.


Adopted at a meeting of the Executive Committee, held in

New York, November 23, 1918, as the official platform of the League to Enforce Peace, superseding the proposals adopted at the organization of the League in Philadelphia, June 17, 1915.

The war now happily brought to a close has been above all a war to end war, but in order to ensure the fruits of victory and to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe there should be formed a League of Free Nations, as universal as possible, based upon treaty and pledged that the security of each state shall rest upon the strength of the whole. The initiating nucleus of the membership of the League should be the nations associated as belligerents in winning the war.

The League should aim at promoting the liberty, progress, pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

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