"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in the court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors—in the court of chancery-in the supreme court, which may, if the legislature shall so direct, be divided into two separate divisions, each division to hold terms at such times and places as may be directed by law-in courts of common pleas, and general sessions of the peace—and in such other inferior courts as the legislature may from time to time establish, subject in all cases to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court."

The same was ordered to lie on the table, and subsequently rejected. MR. TOMPKINS did not rise to take any part in the discussion; but as it seem ed that the committee had not been unanimous, and that a part of the report had been stricken out, he would move, for the purpose of presenting the question fairly to the Convention, to re-insert the same, to constitute the first section, in the following words:

"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a court for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors, to consist of the president of the senate, the senators, the chancellor, and the justices of the supreme court-in a court of chancery, possessing the same jurisdiction and powers as the present court of chancery-in a supreme court, to consist of a chief justice, and not more than four and not less than two associate justices, as the legislature may prescribe, possessing the same jurisdiction and powers as the present supreme court of this state, and the justices thereof now possess-in courts of common pleas-of general sessions of the peace, and in such other courts as may from time to time by law be established."

COL. YOUNG rose to submit a few remarks explanatory of the views of the select committee, whose report was then under consideration. The report was not presented as had been agreed to by the majority of the committee, and although the vote of the committee was not precisely in conformity with the principle for which he contended, he considered it a matter of compromise, and was willing to abide by the report, as far as it was in conformity with the principles thus agreed to. He was in favour of giving to the legislature power to organize subordinate courts on certain conditions; but he was not for fixing in the constitution a provision which should bind the legislature, to rivet upon the people a system which we had never tried, and with which we probably should not be pleased. If the Convention should impose on the legislature the duty of making a number of circuit judges, the number of supreme judges would still be the same, which would be a great additional expense; and as had been remarked by the honourable chancellor, a less number of supreme judges would be equally as good.

The greater the number, the greater would be the delay; and the less would be their responsibility for the faithful performance of their duties individually. If the first section was omitted, there would be no limits to the number of judges, and we might be compelled to pay the district judges in addition to the full number of the supreme court as now established, when it was agreed that three would be as good as five. Why are we to feel any regret at placing the judges of the supreme court on the same footing, with respect to future appointments, as we have the judges of common pleas in the different counties in the state? Indeed it is not proposedto do as bad by them; for we do not vary their tenure of office, whilst the first judges of common pleas are restricted to five years, when they have heretofore held for life, or till they arrived at the age of sixty. For this reason he should vote for retaining the first section.

MR. MUNRO wished to explain the manner in which the report bad been presented to the Convention.-A majority of the select committee had agreed to the report last evening, but this morning they had not concurred in the report. The principle contained in the first section of the report, among others, came up when the subject was under consideration in the select committee. The question on this section produced a tie, in the six members of the committee, leaving the casting vote to him (Mr. Munro ;) and he then told the committee that he preferred measures rather than men. He was more anxious to establish a wholesome system of jurisprudence, than to gratify political ambition by the over

throw of men now in office; still, if public good required that the present incumbents in the judiciary establishment should be thrown from their seats, he would cheerfully acquiesce in the measure; if, by so doing, the committee would give such a system of jurisprudence as should meet his approbation.

It rested with him to put this report in form; he did so; and this morning by note requested the committee again to assemble. He then told them, that he was anxious to bring justice home to the doors of the people in the different parts of the state; and he feared that the plan contended for would give them but the shadow,-the mere semblance of justice without the reality. He was anxious to see justice administered with skilful hands, and in his judgment the district system was not calculated to accomplish that end. It was known full well whence this district system first emanated; and he regretted to have found it springing from such a source. He was fearful that the authors of it would have reason to deplore it themselves.

Here Mr. Munro begged the indulgence of the committee, whilst he should explain the plan which he recommended (plan proposed). Let the court of errors remain as now established; the court of chancery he would not disturb ; but give the legislature power to create vice-chancellors, or subordinate courts of equity, to increase the number of judges of the supreme court, and to divide them into two classes,-locating one class in Albany or New-York, and the other in Utica, or such other place as the legislature should direct; making it the duty of each class to hold four terms every year, and the individuals of both classes to perform all the circuit business in the state. This would be an ample number to perform all the business; and it would be upon the same principle as our present establishment. In this way, we should require but three judges in addition to the present number; and on the plan of district judges, there must be at least double the number. The disadvantages of having local judges had been heretofore sufficiently explained, and the advantages arising from our present system must be obvious. In either case it was very desirable that the judges should not interfere with politics; and if they would attend to the administration of justice, the plan which he recommended was better calculated to obtain the first talents in the state, and to secure an impartial dis charge of duty, than that of having judges preside within their own local districts, among their friends and associates.

From the court of oyer and terminer there is no appeal, unless it is by the consent of the judge who presides; and in this court are determined the causes which affect our liberty and life. Is it not, then, highly important, that the man who is to pass upon the life or death of his fellow mortals, should be a man of integrity and of great legal acquirements? And shall we be confined to a particular district, is better men can be found in the state, out of that district? It is to be hoped this will not be the case.

MR. BUEL was opposed to the proposition before the committee. What, said he, are we about to do? We are about to provide in our constitution for the removal of the incumbents in our high judicial departments, without having altered in any shape their jurisdiction, or the construction of the courts which they compose. By this, what do we say to the world? We say that we are about to make a constitutional provision, which has no other object than that of pulling from the bench of our supreme court certain individuals who may have become odious to a portion of the community. This is not worthy of the people of the state of New-York, or of this Convention. It will be a disgrace to us.

Mr. B. said he did not take this stand from any particular partiality for these judicial officers, but because he considered it beneath the dignity of so enlightened a body, and because he knew there was a method of reaching such offices by law, and that was the wisest course to pursue in this case, if they have done any thing for which they deserve to be removed.

MR. EDWARDS. I do not conceive it proper that a subject of such deep concern should be passed upon without being more thoroughly discussed and seriously considered. However lightly our judicial system may be held by some, yet if we fail in establishing a good one, the community will sooner or later be made to feel that it is a thing of no ordinary importance. A little reflection must satisfy every man, that in a country which is governed solely by laws, as

every free government must be, and where those laws can be brought to bear upon the people only through the instrumentality of judges, that the men who are to administer those laws should be extremely well qualified to perform those duties.

The common law, sir, is so framed as to afford a reasonable rule for the regulation of every question which can arise relative to the rights of persons and the rights of things. As it embraces all the transactions which occur in civil society, its rules must necessarily be extremely multifarious. A thorough knowledge of those laws is only to be acquired by long and laborious study; and to enable the community to enjoy the full benefit of them, it is necessary that they should avail themselves of the services of learned men. When our ancestors came to this country, although they fled from the persecutions they experienced in their native land, yet such was their attachment to the common law, that they brought it along with them, and subjected their conduct to its regulation. We have been long flourishing under it, administered as it has been by institutions similar to those under which it was nurtured. The mother country is indebted to it for whatever of liberty remains among them: and it is generalJy admitted, that the judicial establishments are the only sound parts of their government. By the wisdom of the founders of the English government in this state, those institutions were here established, and the consequence has been, that while other states have gone on in a course of experiments, our judicial establishments have remained firm and stable: revered by the people of this state, and admired by those of our sister states. Now, sir, with all this blaze of experience in favour of maintaining those institutions, shall we rudely prostrate them? What oracle is there among us who can afford us a sufficient assurance that we shall benefit by the change? As it respects myself, sir, I know of none: and I doubt whether any thing short of inspiration could satisfy me of the expediency of making it.

Let it not be said, sir, that the change contemplated by the report on your table, is not material. True, the supreme court is to be continued, but how is it to be with the circuits? Let no gentleman deceive himself into a belief that it is matter of trifling concern who presides there. Who, sir, I would ask, consigns your fellow beings to the gloomy recesses of your state prisons? Who dooms them to the scaffold? Under whose presiding genius is it that your juries proceed in the investigation of facts which are to regulate the disposition of your property? Is it not the circuit judges? If ignorance and stupidity there preside, what will be the consequence? I entreat you, gentlemen, while bending your minds to this subject, not to let them glance for a moment from the grand object to be obtained--the faithful and intelligent administration of the laws--the faithful administration of justice.

But it will be urged that under the contemplated system, you may have as intelligent judges upon the circuits, as you would ordinarily have under the present arrangement. But, sir, will this be the case? If this power is delegated to the legislature, they will be passed upon from time to time, by two-penny lawyers, who will confederate to secure these places. The legislature never can be induced to give adequate salaries to ten or a dozen circuit judges to command the services of suitable men, and the consequence will be, that those places will be usurped by ignorance.

Although, sir, I cannot give my consent to the adoption of the present plan, yet, sir, it is apparent that some enlargement of the judiciary is necessary to enable the courts to despatch the business. There is such an accumulation of it, and so much delay has ensued in consequence of it, that it amounts almost to a denial of justice, The system originally reported by the committee, met with my entire approbation, but that has been voted down. The plan now proposed by the honourable gentleman from Westchester (Mr. Munro) I also highly apprave of. It simply contemplates the adding of three judges tothe supre me court, and vesting the legislature with the power of authorizing one half of the judges to hold the terms. Under this arrangement, ten terms could be held in New-York and in Albany, Utica and Canandaigua, and abundance of time would be left to enable the judges to hold the circuits. The advantages of this system over that proposed, of creating circuit judges,are very great. The peculiar duties of circuit judges are to investigate facts, and do not lead them to pay

that attention to the study of the laws which the public welfare requires. Judges, on the other hand, who both sit at the terms and hold the circuits, must of necessity give much of their attention to their books. By this arrangement, therefore, you will have able men, and at a much less expense than you will be subjected to by the plan reported by the committee. In the one case your laws will be administered in their true spirit, by learned and able men; and in the other, not unfrequently by ignorant men, who, from lack of knowledge, must substitute their own discretion. Discretionary power in the hands of a judge is but another term for arbitrary power; and under such an order of things, your judges might ride the circuits the terror of the land.

It appears, sir, from the motion made by the honourable gentleman from Richmond, (Mr. Tompkins,) that another object in view, is so to frame the constitution as to drive the present judges from their stations. Justice to myself, and to the station I here occupy, demands from me some remarks on this subject. I have, sir, so freely and so frequently expressed myself in terms of reprehension of the political course pursued by some of those gentlemen, that my sentiments respecting them cannot be unknown to many of the members of this Convention. But, sir, I was sent here to assist in revising the constitution of this state, and to establish fundamental laws for its future government, and not to try any man or set of men for their transgressions: and I should be for ever ashamed of myself, if I could for a moment be brought to avail myself of a "little brief authority," for the purpose of gratifying any hostile feelings. You have provided tribunals, and invested them with power to animadvert upon the conduct of your judicial officers. Turn them over to those tribunals; it is not our business to pass upon their conduct. Such a proceeding would fix a blemish, a stain upon the character of this Convention. It is, to be sure, urged, that we have dismissed the senate and the first judges of the counties. But, sir, the new organization of the senatorial districts, which the public good demanded, rendered the proceeding, with respect to the senators, indispensable. As to the first judges, it was matter of general complaint, that the permanent duration of their offices, owing to the appointment of incompetent men, was a source of serious inconvenience in many of the counties. You were also led to believe, that the welfare of the state would be promoted by shortening the terms of their offices. You, therefore, made their private interest yield to the public good. But, sir, no alteration has been made in the organization of the supreme court to render this change necessary. There is not a veil to conceal the motive which induces to the adoption of this amendment. It stands naked before the world, that the motive, and the only motive, is to dismiss the judges. This cannot be concealed from the people, and it may as well be frankly acknowledged at once. I have nothing to say in justification of their conduct: but I repeat it, that we are out of the line of our duty in inflicting punishment upon them. It is unbecoming the dignity of this honourable body. You have established tribunals who are invested with the necessary power: leave it to them to do what justice may require.

MR. VAN VECHTEN said, the Convention was assembled for the purpose of amending our constitution; and no man had ever dreamed of its being for the purpose of dismissing officers from our government. We ought to confine our labours to fundamental principles. He was willing to authorize the legislature to increase the number of judges in the supreme court; because he considered it necessary, in order to get along with the business which must necessarily be done in that court. The plan recommended by the chairman of the select commmittee, does not at all interfere with our present established courts; but merely provides, that the legislature shall make arrangements to meet the increase of business in this growing state. It is asserted, that some of our judges have interfered too much with the politics of the state: if they have, and it is a curse, is there not a remedy at hand, without squandering our time, and encumbering the constitution with that which does not come within our jurisdiction? If these men are guilty of the charges alleged, are we prepared to go into an investigation of the subject at this time? Is it seemly, or is it consonant with the dignity of this Convention, for the purpose of driving these men from office, to insert In the constitution which we are forming for generations to come, a clause which

has no object in view but to gratify personal revenge? We have already declared by our acts, that these men shall hold till they arrive at the age of sixty years; and we have also provided that if they shall conduct in such a manner as to forfeit their claim to a continuance in office, a majority of the assembly may impeach, and by two-thirds of the same, and a majority of the senate, they may be removed. With respect to the interference of our judges in politics who has not had to do with politics? Have we had a governor for the last fifteen or twenty years that has not been a warm partizen? and have we not countenanced it in them, and called them to our counsels? It is not till quite lately that we have heard this great outcry. Have we not chosen the judges of our supreme court as electors for president and vice-president of the United States? We have gone hand in hand with these men, approving and leading them forward, and now we are to destroy them at a blow, contrary to the rule which we have ourselves established :-leaving the stain upon our constitution, that future generations may read our disgrace with shame and confusion.

GEN. ROOT having been honoured by an appointment as a member of that committee, hoped he should be indulged in an exposition of its proceedings. They convened yesterday afternoon, and although they were not unanimous, yet a compromise was the result of the deliberations. Had the subject been referred to us individually, (said Mr. R.) or to my honourable friend from Saratoga, (Mr. Young,) we should probably have presented a report with different provisions. But this was adopted in a spirit of compromise. When we retired from the committee, we had verily supposed that the only remaining duty that devolved upon the honourable Chairman, was to condense and compress those matters in a compact form, to which the committee had assented. This morning we received a summons to attend in the committee room, and with astonishment he (Gen. Root) found that a proposition was made to re-consider the first section of the proposed report, because the honourable Chairman had altered his opinion. The Convention was then in session, and we retired from the committee to our appropriate duties, and here, when the report was presented, we found that the pen had been drawn across the first section of the report.

It is undoubtedly laudable for gentlemen to alter their opinions after a night of repose. After consulting his pillow, the Chairman thought it was dishonourable this morning to report what was honourable last evening. I have not, (said Mr. Root) from consultation with my pillow, or with any individual, found cause to change my opinion.

It has been said by honourable gentlemen, that it would be a stain upon the constitution to send forth to the people such a provision. What? To organize our courts of justice, a stain? To submit to the representatives of the people the question, whether there shall be three, four, or five members of the supreme court is this a stain? If it be a stain, let that instrument be stained.

But, sir, there are other stains if this be one. It is already provided, that your present corps of senators shall be disbanded. The honourable gentleman from Queens, (Mr. King) has told us that it is necessary that they should be reduced to the ranks, and the Convention has acted accordingly. I made a proposition that was calculated to retain twenty-four of them; but it was voted down, and both the gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Edwards) and the gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Van Vechten) thought it was necessary to begin anew, and dismiss the present incumbents. The first judges of the courts of common pleas also, who, under the present constitution, held their offices by the same tenure as the judges of the supreme court, are now reduced to the term of five years, and made removable both by address of two-thirds of the the assembly and a majority of the senate, and also by impeachment: and this is no stain. The gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Edwards) thinks this to be proper, because some of the judges of the courts of common pleas are incompetent to the discharge of their duties, and therefore we ought to get rid of them. And yet in the next breath he proudly says, that he has not come here to get rid of official incumbents, but to lay the foundation stone in the great political edifice. [Mr. Edwards explained, and denied that he had either advocated that principle or voted for it.] Mr. Root said it was immaterial to him how the gentleman voted. The first judges of the courts of common pleas were stripped