Indians. These, however, constituted a very small force in comparison with the number which we put into the field.

These figures bring out very forcibly the necessity of training a large body of officers in advance of war. Especially is this important if we are to depend in any way upon Volunteers.

The lessons of the war are so clear that it seems hardly necessary to state that it was a repetition in the gravest form of many of the blunders of the Revolution, which had only too often their origin in defective military legislation and lack of preparation, making it possible, as Upton puts it, that "less than 5,000 men for a period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory and successfully withstood the misapplied power of seven millions of people."

Shortly after the war the Army was reduced to 10,000. In 1817 came the Semi

nole War and the same haphazard policy through enlistments of many different men. New arms, new equipments, waste of money and waste of life-the same policy runs through the Indian wars in which we were engaged in subsequent years.

During the Seminole and Creek Wars relatively enormous forces of troops were employed in comparison with the small force of Indians who opposed us. The cost in blood, life and treasure was unnecessarily great. The whole conduct of the war spelt poor organization and lack of intelligent military policy.

In 1838 the Army was increased to about 12,500. In 1842 it was again reduced to 8,600. In 1846 the rumble of the approaching Mexican war was heard, and there was a gradual increase in the Army. During that war it was increased to about 39,000 Regulars. At the end of the war it was again reduced to 10,300. There was

a serious effort made during this war to increase the enlistment period and to fix it at a minimum of twelve months, or for the war. The total number of men employed during this war was 104,000. It was a brilliantly successful war, and to quote again from Upton, who is almost the sole authority from which we draw accurate data concerning our wars:

"Successes so brilliant would apparently denote the perfection of military policy, but, paradoxical as it may seem, official documents establish the fact that they were achieved under the very same system of laws and executive orders which in the preceding foreign war had led to a series of disasters culminating in the capture and destruction of our capital.

"The explanation of this paradox is to be found partly in the difference of character of our adversaries, but more especially in the quality of the Regular Army,

with which we began the two wars. For the Mexican War, as for the War of 1812, the Government had ample time to prepare."

This quotation covers the situation very well. Our enemy was not a well prepared enemy, and the scene of action was so distant from the source from which troops were drawn that the troops were in hand for a long enough period to get them into fairly effective shape. There was an exceptionally efficient body of regular officers.

Again there was a relatively small force of militia employed-only 12,500 out of a force of 104,000 as compared with 458,000 out of a force of 521,000 in the War of 1812.

We now come to the great Civil War. Our population was nearly 31,000,000. We had a small regular army scattered over a vast area. It numbered a little

over 16,000 men. Some of it was west of the Mississippi; in fact, it was scattered from the Canadian border to the Mexican frontier, and drawn out in a thin line along our western frontier. We were unprepared as usual. Fortunately the seceding States were equally unprepared, and it was a case of two nations entering into war, both unprepared, and each having to develop its military resources in the way of men and material as the war went on. There is no doubt whatever in the mind of any intelligent student of military matters that had either side possessed a well organized and well disciplined force of 50,000 men, that that side would have occupied the other's capital almost immediately.

Dependence was placed upon both Militia and Volunteers. The Militia was unsatisfactory, as has generally been the case. The conduct of Governors was too often