in four places, the vast and pervading system of federal executive patronage : the press—the post-office--the armed force—and the appointing power. They are few, compared to the whole number of points which the system presents; but they are points vital to the liberties of the country. The press is put foremost, because it is the moving power of human action; the post-office is the handmaid of the press; the armed force its executor; and the appointing power the directress of the whole. If the appointing power was itself an emanation of the popular will-if the president was himself the officer and the organ of the people—there would be less danger in leaving to his will the sole direction of all these arbiters of human fate. But things must be taken as they are; statesmen must act for the country they live in, and not for the island of Utopia; they must act upon the state of facts in that country, and not upon the visions of fancy. In the country for which the committee act, the press, with some exceptions, the post-office, the armed force, and the appointing power, are in the hands of the president, and the president himself is not in the hands of the people. The president may, and in the current of human affairs, will be, against the people; and, in his hands, the arbiters of human fate must be against them also. This will not do. The possibility of it must be avoided. The safety of the people is the supreme law;' and to insure that safety, these arbiters of human fate must change position, and take post on the side of the people.”

By the first of these bills, the selection of newspapers for the publication of the laws, then made by the secretary of state, was to be made in each state by its senators and representatives in congress. The second bill required the president, in all nominations to fill vacancies, occasioned by the exercise of the president's power to remove from office, to state to the senate his reasons for the removal. And the offices of all collectors and disbursers of public moneys who should fail to account for the same, were to be vacated. Postmasters whose emoluments exceeded a certain sum, were to be appointed by the president and senate. Cadets and midshipmen were to be taken, one of each from each congressional district in the state, and the two corresponding to the number of senators, from the state at large. Officers in the army and navy were not thereafter to hold their offices" during the pleasure of the president,” but "during good behavior."

Mr. Tazewell having moved the printing of an extra number of the report and bills, Mr. Randolph said he “hoped the largest number would be printed that had been printed of any document during the present session." He wished the number to be equal to that of a certain document which he called " a message to the house to announce an elec

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tioneering arrangement;" alluding, as is supposed, to the message on the proposed Panama mission. Mr. R. said: “Though he had little faith in the strength of the virus of the executive poison which was attempted to be instilled into the public mind, he wished the antidote to proceed with it, pari passu.” Accordingly 6,000 copies were ordered printed.

The bills were at the same time ordered to a second reading; but no farther action appears to have been taken upon them at that session, except to lay them on the table, on the motion of Mr. Macon, who had collected the facts and matured the subject, but whose ill health prevented his entering into the discussion of it.

From the unusual number of candidates for the presidency for more than a year before the election of 1824, it was apprehended that there would be no election by the presidential electors. To prevent an ultimate resort to the house of representatives, as well as to secure a uni. form mode of choosing electors in the several states, numerous attempts were made in congress to propose to the states certain amendments to the constitution. Also bills were introduced into the legislatures of several states in which electors were chosen by the legislature, proposing to place the election in the hands of the people.

In the legislature of New York, a bill for this purpose passed the assembly, but was negatived in the senate. The defeat of the bill produced general dissatisfaction, which was plainly expressed at the next election of members of the legislature. In accordance with the will of the people, indicated by the return of a majority to both houses in favor of the proposed change, an electoral law was passed at the next session. This law, however, did not prescribe the mode of choosing the electors, but provided for submitting to the people, at their next annual election, (in 1825,) the question, whether the electors should be chosen by general ticket, or singly in the several congressional districts. The district tem was adopted; sbut before the next presidential election, it was changed to the general ticket system, for the purpose of securing to the state an undivided vote in the election of president.

Propositions to amend the constitution were renewed at the next ses. sion. Among the plans submitted, was that of Col. Benton, just alluded to, proposing, (1.) A uniform mode by districts. (2.) The president and vice-president to be elected by a direct vote of the people. (3.) In case no candidate had received a majority of the votes first given, a second election was to be held and conducted as the first; the choice to be made from the two candidates having received the highest numbers of votes for the same office. This plan was very elaborately and ably argued in the report.

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Choosing by electors, it was said, enabled the majority to impress the minority into their service, put it into the power of a few to control the election, and enabled the populous states to consolidate their votes, and to overwhelm the small ones. Electing by legislative ballot, took the election out of the hands of the people, left it with a preëxisting body chosen for a different purpose, and enabled the dominant party in the legislature to bestow the vote of the state according to their own sense of duty or private interest. Whereas, the district system gave to every state, and to the several sections of the state, due weight in the election. Besides, it was a mode of election in which either electors might be used, or a direct vote might be given by the people.

The advantages expected from the institution of electors, the report continued, had never been realized. It was the intention of the framers of the constitution to provide an independent body of men, chosen by the people from among themselves, on account of their superior discernment, virtue, and information, who should be left to make the election according to their own will. But the electors were not the independent body they were intended to be: they had no discretion. Candidates were selected by the people; and the electors were mere agents, and in a case where no agency was necessary. If, on the other hand, they were really independent, such independence was incompatible with the safety of the people. As was well known, they were oftener selected for their devotion to a party and electioneering tact, than for excellence of character. Hence the propriety of giving to the qualified electors a direct vote in the election of president and vice-president.

A direct election, it was also said, accorded better with the theory of our government. The principle that the mass, upon whom the laws operated, should elect those who make the laws, was equally applicable to those who execute the laws, and especially in the case of the president, who, in executing them, has at bis command, not only the army and the navy, but the judiciary, and numerous other officers of his own appointment. The apprehension, on the part of the framers, that a popular election of president would be too tumultuous, and likely to be attended with violence, was without foundation. The state elections, at which the highest state officers and representatives in congress, had for nearly forty years been chosen directly by the popular vote, afforded no cause of alarm. Our liberties had far more to fear from indifference and a neglect of the elective franchise, than from excesses of violence. The last election was eminently adapted to excite the feelings of the people; yet not one-half of the voters of the United States had been got to the polls.

The committee laid down these axioms: To prevent corruption, (1.) Multiply the voters. (2.), Keep the candidates from among them.

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(3.) Avoid preexisting bodies of electors. To prevent violence and avoid coalitions, separate the electors. The plan of the committee, the report said, had been brought to the test of each of these axioms, and found to abide them. The voters would consist of millions, and could not be corrupted; they would be scattered over the territory of the whole confederation, and could not hold intercourse with the candidates; they would vote at several thousand different places on the same hours of the day, and could neither fight nor coalesce; they were not a preëxisting body, in the sense of the objection, for that term applied only to small selected bodies.

Notwithstanding numerous and various amendments were moved in congress for several successive sessions, no proposition of amendment to be submitted to the states, at any time received the sanction of both houses.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE PANAMA MISSION.

One of the principal topics of discussion at the session of 1825–26, was the “ Panama Mission,” so called from the proposition to send commissioners to a congress of the southern republics which was to assemble at Panama. This subject was thus alluded to in the annual message of the president:

“ Among the measures which have been suggested to them by the new relations with one another, resulting from the recent changes of their condition, is that of assembling at the isthmus of Panama, a congress, at which each of them should be represented, to deliberate upon objects important to the welfare of all. The republics of Colombia, of Mexico, and of Central America, bave already deputed plenipotentiaries to such a meeting, and they have invited the United States to be also represented there by their ministers. The invitation has been accepted; and ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations, and to take a part in them, so far as may be compatible with that neutrality, from which it is neither our intention, nor the desire of the other American states, that we should depart.”

The first suggestion of the proposed congress was ascribed to Bolivar, a conspicuous leader in the South American revolution, and for several years president of Colombia, one of the southern republics; and who, in

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1823, invited Mexico, Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres to send delegates to Panama, with the design of forming a confederacy, for the purpose, as was by some alleged, of providing for a successful resistance to Spain, and for giving security to their independence. Appreciating the interest felt by the people of the United States for their southern neighbors in their revolutionary struggle, and the early recognition of their independence by our government, they extended the invitation to the United States. Verbal conferences on the subject had been held with the secretary of state, by the ministers of Mexico, Colombia, and Central America, at Washington; and in November, the invitation was formally given in letters to Mr. Clay; and several subjects were named as being deemed proper for the consideration of the congress.

In his answer to the ministers of Mexico and Colombia, Mr. Clay says: “In your note, there is not so exact a compliance with the conditions on which the president expressed his willingness that the United States should be represented at Panama, as could have been desired. It would have been, perhaps, better, if there had been a full understanding between all the American powers who may assemble by their representatives, of the precise questions on which they are to deliberate; and that some other matters respecting the powers of the deputies, and the organization of the congress, should have been distinctly arranged prior to the opening of its deliberations. But as the want of the adjustment of these preliminaries, if it should occasion any inconvenience, could be only productive of some delay, the president has determined, at once, to manifest the sensibility of the United States, to whatever concerns the prosperity of the American hemisphere, and to the friendly motives which have actuated your government in transmitting the invitation which you have communicated. He has, therefore, resolved, should the senate of the United States, now expected to assemble in a few days, give their advice and consent, to send commissioners to the congress. Whilst they will not be authorized to enter upon any deliberations, or to concur in any acts inconsistent with the present neutral position of the United States and its obligations, they will be fully empowered and instructed upon all questions likely to arise in the congress, on subjects in which the nations of America have a common interest."

On the 26th of December, the president sent to the senate a confidential message, stating some of the reasons for accepting the invitation, and nominating Richard C. Anderson, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, as commissioners, and William B. Rochester, of New York, as secretary of the mission. He again disclaimed the intention either " to contract alliances, or to engage in any undertaking or project of hostility to any other nation." He believed such a meeting would

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