administration from the

* I think, however, and would recommend that you would confine yourself to attacks upon Benton, showing that he has allied himself with the whigs on the Texas question. Quote Jackson's letter on Texas, where he denounces all those as traitors to the country who oppose the treaty. Apply it to Benton. Proclaim that Benton, by attacking Mr. Tyler and his friends, and driving them from the party, is aiding the election of Mr. Clay; and charge him with doing this to defeat Mr. Polk, and insure himself the succession in 1848; and claim that full justice be done to the acts and motives of John Tyler by the leaders. Harp upon these strings. Do not propose the union : 'it is the business of the democrats to do this, and arrange it to our perfect satisfaction.' I quote here from our lead. ing friend at the south. Such is the course which I recommend, and which you can pursue, or not, according to your real attachment to the administration.

Look out for my leader of to-morrow as an indication, and regard this letter as of the most strict and inviolate confidence of character.”

Mr. Calhoun disclaimed the authorship of this letter. Mr. Benton said it was the work of one of the organs of the administration, not “ John Jones,” and the instruction had been followed by three hundred newspapers in the pay of the department of state.

Mr. Calhoun defended the treaty of 1819, his course upon tion of the annexation of Texas, and his opinion that no war had been necessary. It might have been avoided, even after the battles of May, by ordering a provisional army to be raised for the protection of our territory. By this means we could have secured the Rio Grande, and been saved the expense of an invading war. In regard to annexation, he said, among other things, that it had been his determination to carry it through, and he had succeeded. It was one of the proudest acts of his life, and the senator from Missouri could not deprive him of the merit of being the author of that great act. If the government had acted afterwards with common prudence, Mexico and ourselves would have been this day good friends. Mr. C. said the settlement of the Oregon question previous to the commencement of hostilities with Mex. ico, was one of the most unfortunate events for this country that bad ever occurred. Had it not been settled before the conflict took place, there would probably have been no settlement of it.

Mr. Clayton, in relation to the commencement of the war, gave the following testimony: During the debate on the Oregon question, in February, 1846, he had learned from sources upon which he could rely, that our government had ordered Gen. Taylor to break up his encampment at Corpus Christi, and march to the Rio Grande. The instant he heard

the quesitthe public having no means of knowing the fact—he was alarmed at the apprehension of a war with Mexico; and it was true, as Mr. Calhoun had said, that he had, in a confidential private conversation, in the senate chamber, given him the information, and had told him, he believed, that, unless he, (Mr. Calhoun,) or some other influential gentleman should interpose to arrest the tendency of things arising from that order, we should be plunged into a war. At the same time there was danger of a war with England, which there was great anxiety to avert. Mr. Calhoun, on receiving the information, exclaimed: “It cannot be so! It is impossible !" just as the senator had related it in this debate; and asked what could be done. Mr. Clayton said that he, as a whig, could effect nothing; and unless Mr. Calhoun and his friends, or some other division of gentlemen on the other side of the chamber, should move in the matter, the whigs would be powerless. “The honorable gentleman," said Mr. Clayton, “was at that time, as he has

, properly stated, devoted to the same great object which, I confess, absorbed my own mind and the minds of those around me, -the prevention of a war with England; and he declined to move, lest his usefulness on that great question should be in any degree contracted. In the course of a short time after that,"

Mr. Calhoun : “The first communication was in January, when you announced the fact; and the second conversation was in February.”

Mr. Clayton: “Yes, the senator is right. Thus, Mr. President, I felt exonerated from all responsibility in the matter.

While the houses of congress remained in ignorance, and those who knew could not move, the president of the United States was ordering the army upon the Rio Grande, and taking a step of which the inevitable consequence proved to be war.

At the time war was declared, (announced,) I denounced it as the act of the president.*

* I believe that the war was brought on by this thing of marching the army,

ching the army, without any necessity, from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande ; done—done, too, while congress was in session, without one word being communicated, as to the intention of the president, to either house, or to any committee or member of either house of congress. Under these circumstances, Mr. President, the responsibility of the war will probably rest on him who ought to bear it.”

The action of congress upon the subject of the Mexican war, gave rise to a question in which an important principle was involved. Is it the duty of the legislature to provide the means of prosecuting a war made unconstitutionally, or by the exercise of usurped power ? It has been seen, that, disconnected from the declaration that war existed by the act of Mexico, bills to furnish supplies of men and money had received an

almost unanimous vote. The whig members, generally, while protesting that the war not only was unjust, but had been made by the executive without constitutional authority, yet voted for the means to help the executive carry his purposes into effect; justifying their votes on the general principle, that, in what manner, or for what purpose soever, a war is begun, it is the duty of congress to furnish the aid to prosecute it, and hold its projector and author responsible.

The question here naturally arises, Can the legislature while it fornishes the aid, avoid the responsibility ? The legislative and executive branches of the government are designed to hold checks upon each other, Can either then be justified in refusing to interpose its constitutional power to arrest or to prevent usurpation by the other? The people who have to bear the burdens of war, have very properly intrusted the war power to their representatives. Does not then the representative violate his trust when he withholds the exercise of his power for the purposes for which it was conferred ? Let the doctrine prevail universally, that, if, by his ingenuity, an executive can only commence a war without the knowledge and consent of the representatives of the people, it is their duty to sustain and aid him in the measure, and what would be the consequence ? Would not the practical effect of such a doctrine be to defeat the purpose of the constitution, and convert the government into a military despotism?

Mr. Corwin, senator from Ohio, who stood almost alone in the senate on this question, vindicated his position in a speech of acknowledged ability. He said: “While the American president can command the army, thank God I can command the purse. While the president, under the penalty of death, can command your officers to proceed, I can tell them to come back for supplies, as he may. He shall have no funds from me in the prosecution of such a war. That I conceive to be the duty of a senator. I am not mistaken in that. If it is my duty to grant whatever the president demands, for what am I here? Have I no will upon the subject ? Is it not placed at my discretion, understanding, and judgment ? Have an American senate and house of representatives nothing to do but to obey the bidding of the president, as the mercenary army he commands is compelled to obey under penalty of death? No! your senate and house of representatives were never elected for such purpose as that. They have been modeled on the good old plan of English liberty, and are intended to represent the English house of commons, who curbed the proud power of the king in olden time, by withholding supplies if they did not approve the war.

While Charles could command the army, he might control the parliament; and because he would not give up that command, our Puritan ancestors laid his head upon the block. How did it fare with others ?

"It was on this very proposition of controlling the executive power of England by withholding the money supplies, that the house of Orange came in; and by their accession to the throne commenced a new epoch in the history of England, distinguishing it from the old reign of the Tudors and Plantagenets and those who preceded it. Then it was that parliament specified the purpose of appropriation; and since 1688, it has been impossible for a king of England to involve the people of Eng. land in a war, which your president, under your republican institutions, and with your republican constitution, has yet managed to do. Here you stand powerless. He commands this army, and you must not withhold their supplies. He involves your country in wasteful and exterminating war against a nation with whom we have no cause of complaint; but congress may say nothing !"

In a letter to a friend, he subsequently wrote: "I differed from all the leading whigs of the senate, and saw plainly that they all were, to some extent, bound to turn, if they could, the current of public opinion against me. They all agreed with me, that the war was unjust on our part; that, if properly begun, (which none of them admitted,) we had already sufficiently chastised Mexico, and that the further prosecution of it was wanton waste of both blood and treasure; yet they would not undertake to stop it. They said the president alone was responsible. I thought we who aided him, or furnished him means, must be in the judgment of reason and conscience, equally responsible, equally guilty, with him."

In the discussion of the war question, a theory was advanced somewhat different from that of the great body of either of the political parties in congress. Mr. Rhett, of South Carolina, pronounced the doctrine, that congress has, under the constitution, the war making power, a fallacy. The whigs, assuming this doctrine, inferred that the president had begun the war with Mexico, and bad begun it unconstitutionally; and that congress had the right to prescribe, limit, and determine the objects and purposes of the war. Mr. R. considered the principle, with all its deductions, false. He held that congress had the power to declare and begin war; but the hostilities which had preceded the declaration of war, or what was the same thing, the declaration that war existed, did not constitute war. To prove this, he referred to the frequent collisions on the sea between our vessels and those of England and France, and also to the Caroline affair; neither of which had been acts of war.

This was evident from the fact that France had long plundered our commerce, and many bloody battles had taken place on the sea, and many ships of war had been captured, yet war did not exist. If the two countries had been in a state of war, we could have had no lawful claims for the spoliation

of our commerce. These claims could rest only on the ground that there was no war with France.

But he said his friends on the other side turned round, and pushed the war clause of the constitution far beyond its meaning, and contended that congress had not only the war declaring, but the war making power.

Mr. R. then argued, that there was a difference between declaring and making war; the one putting a country in a state of war; the other conducting it. The debates in the convention of the framers of the constitution, he said, showed that to make war, was understood to be to conduct it. The word “make,” which had been inserted, was afterward struck out, and "declare" inserted, with the intention, it was presumed, of giving to congress the power only of declaring war, and leaving the power to make or conduct it entirely with the president. But congress had omnipotent power over the supplies, and might refuse to vote a dol. lar for the support of a war. Or, it might vote for supplies, with the condition, that they be used only to withdraw our troops from Mexico to this side of the Rio Grande. Although the president was intrusted with the war making power, he was not beyond responsibility. For the abuse of his power, he was liable to impeachment. Let it be admitted that the war making power was in congress. Those who so affirm speak of it as a power independent of the president, by which he was to be controlled. But was it so ? He had, as parties stood, an absolute veto power, and could arrest any bill. Hence, that congress could do any. thing concerning the war, was a delusion. But concede to congress such power, and it would be made the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and be invested with the treaty making power. Mr. R. laid down this proposition : "Our fathers vested the war making power in the president, the war continuing power in congress (by the supplies) and the president, and the war ending or peace making power in the president and senate : although, by its power over the supplies, congress might, incidentally, also, force the termination of the war."

Gen. Scott, in the progress of his invasion, reached the Mexican capital in August, 1847, where he concluded an armistice with Santa Anna, with a view to a negotiation of peace, our minister, Nicholas P. Trist, having the requisite power for that purpose. Failing to agree upon the terms of a treaty, and the two generals charging each other with a violation of certain articles of the armistice, hostilities were recommenced early in September, and were continued until the following winter, when peace was restored between the two countries. A treaty was concluded in February, 1848.

By the terms of this treaty, the Rio Grande was established as the