Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Přední strana obálky
Cambridge University Press, 26. 6. 1992 - Počet stran: 265
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.
 

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Obsah

Introduction
4
the marriage model
15
The structure of the set of stable matchings
54
Strategic questions
78
models in which firms
123
Discrete models with money and more complex
171
Models of onetoone matching with money
187
The assignment game
202
A generalization of the assignment model
222
Epilogue
241
Bibliography
249
Name index
259
Autorská práva

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