give birth to discussions and questions calculated to endanger the peace and harmony of the community."

In Smith v. McMasters, 2 Brown's Penn. R., cited 9 Cowen, 180, Rush, president, says, "popular suffrage is the very essence of freedom, and cannot be protected with too much vigilance and firmness by the tribunals of justice ;" and says he, "to the usual motives which actuate voters, it would be monstrous to permit pecuniary considerations to be added." Again he says "though the man cannot vote himself, he may be induced under the influence of the wager to corrupt others." He again says, "in our opinion it is equally repugnant to morality, to sound policy and to the laws of the state passed for preserving the purity of elections, for it would be in vain to enact laws against bribery, and to authorize at the same time wagers of this kind, which like a torrent of corruption, would carry all before them."

What is the great principle established in all these cases? It is that a contract which gives to the parties a pecuniary interest in the result of an election, is void. Does not this principle, and the reasons given in the foregoing cases, apply in full force to every species of contract, where its performance or non-performance depends upon the result of an election? Have not the parties to the covenant in this case, the same pecuniary interest as if it were in the form of an ordinary wager? Is it not the pecuniary interest of one party to prevent William H. Harrison from being elected, and of the other party to promote his election? Does not this contract hold out the same inducements and color to bribery, and has it not the same corrupting influence that it would have, if the parties simply had agreed to bet or wager five hundred dollars on the election? May not the parties, nay, will they not resort to the same means to effectuate their object? Are not their mutual duties to the community in the same danger of neglect, because they are put in competition with their individual interest? Has not this contract the same tendency to bias their votes, their freedom of choice, to produce clamor, misrepresentation, fraud, corruption, bribery, and the use of improper influences? Has it not the same tendency to debase the character and impair the value of the right 16

VOL. XXVIII. NO. LV.

of suffrage? May it not involve the same inquiry in the courts, as to the validity of the election, and give birth to discussions which may involve the peace and harmony of the community? Will not the parties have the same inducements to corrupt the votes of others, and is it not equally repugnant to sound morality, and the laws for preserving the purity of elections? Surely no man can hesitate for a moment to answer these questions in the affirmative. Why is a wager on an election void? because, say the above cases, it is a mutual promise by two persons to each other, to pay a certain sum, provided A is, or is not elected, which condition is contrary to sound policy and is illegal. Why is the covenant sued on in this action void? because it is a promise by the covenantors to pay a certain sum, provided William H. Harrison is elected president of the United States, which condition is contrary to sound policy and illegal. In the language, therefore, of lord Ellenborough, I say, "whenever the tolerating any species of contract has a tendency to produce public mischief or inconvenience, or pernicious consequences, it is void." This agreement has that tendency, if the reasoning in the foregoing cases of election wagers, is sound. If this contract, and others of a similar nature are sustained, we cannot expect to preserve the elective franchise pure and uncontaminated. Tolerate these contracts, and the anti-republican doctrine that man is incapable of self-government, will soon be demonstrated. Our elections will soon become more impure than they are. The electors will be corrupted, and the baser passions of their nature, instead of their judgment, will influence their votes. The ballot box will become polluted, our public functionaries corrupt, and our institutions be in danger of being subverted. In a word, all contracts which give a pecuniary interest to any amount, on the result of an election, destroys all freedom of choice, paralyzes the judgment, substitutes the interest of the individual for the interest of the community, tends to bribery, corruption, and the agitation and discussion of improper questions, and exercise a pernicious influence in society. Such contracts, must, on principle be void, and the courts would be handmaids to iniquity, were they to enforce them. My judgment therefore is, that the contract set

out in the declaration in this case is void, and judgment must be rendered for the defendants.

I have been thus minute in my investigation, with a view to correct, if possible, the mistaken belief which prevails in the community, that contracts of this kind are merely conditional sales, distinct in their character from ordinary bets or wagers, and are, therefore, not illegal.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — Observations on the late Presidential Veto, together with a Plan for a Change of the Constitution relative to this power. Boston: James Munroe & Co.

1842.

This is an extremely able production, in the form of a pamphlet of seventy-eight pages, in which the conduct of the acting president, Mr. Tyler, is severely arraigned, for his alleged abuse of the veto power. It contains, also, a plan for an amendment of the constitution in this particular, which the writer explains and defends at some length. Of the exercise of the veto power by the president, as it is rather matter of politics than of law, we shall say nothing in this place: although not unwilling, on all proper occasions, to speak freely of the political conduct of men in office. With the subject of the latter portion of the work before us, how, ever, we shall make our readers acquainted, inasmuch as it proposes a great change in a fundamental law. The following is the author's plan, extracted in his own words:

"The amendment I propose is as follows:

"I. Whenever the president shall not approve a bill passed by both houses of congress, he shall return it with his objections as at present.

"II. If the ground of objection be other than the unconstitutionality of the bill, it may still become a law, notwithstanding the objections of the president, if passed by a majority of two votes in the senate, and by a majority in the house of representatives equal to the average number of the representation of one state in that body.

"III. If the ground of objection be the unconstitutionality of the bill, the question of its constitutionality shall be referred to the supreme court of the United States.

"IV. In case of such reference, the president and the two houses of congress shall, within one week from the return of the bill by the president, respectively cause to be prepared, by persons whom they shall appoint for that purpose, an argument in writing on such question of constitutionality, and to be presented to the supreme court.

"V. Such reference shall, as soon as presented with the arguments on both sides, interrupt and exclude all other business before the supreme court until decided.

"VI. In their decision of the question, the supreme court shall be governed by the same principles of interpretation, and of authority or precedent, as if the question arose between individuals.

"VII. The bill objected to, if the only ground of objection by the president be its unconstitutionality, shall at once become a law by the decision of the supreme court in favor of its constitutionality, and without the signature of the president.

"VIII. The arguments presented to the court, with its decision and the grounds thereof, which shall be delivered in writing, shall be immediately made public."

By the plan thus submitted, the whole character of the veto power would be changed; whether for the better or not, we will not presume hastily to decide; though we are not unwilling to say, that we have very little expectation of ever seeing the exercise of any delegated power so hedged about with rules and regulations and limitations, as to render its abuse impossible or even difficult. Though it does not come within our province to discuss this subject politically, we can most heartily recommend this pamphlet to those to whom such discussions properly belong.

2.

Reports of the Cases, THE STATE v. SAMUEL SMALL, and THE STATE V. ANDREW PIERCE, Jr. AND OTHERS, tried in the county of Strafford, January Term, 1842. Concord: Asa McFarland,

1842.

New Hampshire, it seems, as well as Massachusetts, has had her liquor cases; and, in the former, as well as the later, juries. have been asked to disregard a plain provision of statute law, on