mere view of the instrument, to say whether the alteration took place before or after the acceptance. (8 Ad. & E. 215.) Clifford v. Parker, 3 Scott's N. R. 233.

4. (Alteration of bill- Evidence.) In an action on a promissory note by the payee against the maker, it appeared that the note had been altered, the words " or order" having been originally "or other;" there was no direct evidence to show when the alteration took place, but the person who drew the note (who professed to have no recollection as to the alteration) stated that the note as produced represented the intention of the parties, and it further appeared that there had been several payments on account of interest on the note: Held, that this was reasonable evidence whence it might be assumed that the alteration took place with the assent of the defendant. Cariss v. Tattersall, 3 Scott, N. R. 257.

5. (Promissory note payable on demand, negotiability of.) A promissory note, payable on demand, cannot be treated as over-due, so as to affect an indorsee with any equities against the indorser, merely because it is indorsed a number of years after its date, and no interest has been paid on it for several years before such indorsement. Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15.

6. (Proof of identity of defendant as acceptor.) In an action by indorsee against maker of a promissory note, the defendant pleaded, 1. that he did not make the note; 2. that he made it for the accommodation of the plaintiff. There was an attesting witness to the note, who, on being called at the trial, stated that he saw the signature (Hugh Jones) to the note written by a party whose occupation and residence he described, but that he had had no communication with him since, and that this was a common name in the neighborhood where the note was made: Held, that there was no evidence to go to the jury of the identity of the defendant with the maker of the note, and that the second plea could not be called in aid for that purpose. (1 C. & M. 511.) Jones v. Jones, 9 M. & W. 75. 7. (Proof of identity of defendant as acceptor.) In an action by indorsee against acceptor of a bill of exchange, it appeared that

the bill was directed to "Charles Banner Crawford, East India House," and accepted "C. B. Crawford." It was proved that this signature was the handwriting of a gentleman of that name, formerly a clerk in the East India House, who had left it five years ago held, that this was sufficient evidence of the identity of the defendant with the person whose handwriting was proved. Greenshields v. Crawford, 9 M. & W. 314; ID. P. C. (N. S.) 439. 8. (Promissory note, what is.) An instrument in these terms, "six months after date pay without acceptance to the order of J. C. F. 1007., value received," issued from a branch bank of a joint stock banking company, of which J. C. F. was managing director, and signed by T. N. as "for the directors," held to be a promissory note of the company. Miller v. Thompson, 1 D. P. C. (N. S.) 199.

9. (Right of action against drawer on non-acceptance.)

The

holder of a bill of exchange, on non-acceptance, and protest and notice thereon, has an immediate right of action against the drawer, and does not acquire a fresh right of action on the nonpayment of the bill when due. The statute of limitations, therefore, runs against him from the former and not from the latter period. (Doug. 55; 5 M. & Sel. 282; 7 Taunt. 312; 1 Stark. 7; 13 East, 498.) Whitehead v. Walker, 9 M. & W. 506. BURGLARY. Where a servant pretended to concur with two others who had proposed to him to rob his master's house, and having communicated with the police, under their instructions let in the two at night by lifting the latch of the door: held, that this was not a sufficient breaking to constitute a burglary. Reg v. Johnson, 1 Carr. & M. 218.

CHEQUE. (Post-dated cheque not admissible as evidence of money paid.) A post-dated cheque is altogether void, and cannot be received in evidence for any purpose. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot, in an action on such an instrument, resort to the count for money paid, because he cannot prove it without producing the cheque. Serle v. Norton, 9 M. & W. 309. 2. (Time for presentment.) The holder of a cheque is bound to

present it for payment within a reasonable time—that is, in the

course of the day succeeding that on which he receives it from the drawer; and that, whether he presents it himself or through his bankers. The plaintiff received from the defendant a cheque upon Y. & Co. (bankers not using the clearing-house) before 5 o'clock on the 10th of March, and paid it in to his bankers, W. & Co. on the following day; W. & Co. presented it for payment on the 12th, shortly after Y. & Co. had stopped payment: held, that as between the drawer of the cheque and the payee, the presentment was too late. (2 Camph. 537 ; 4 B. & Ad. 572; 4 Bing. N. C. 266; 4 B. & Cr. 330.) Alexander v. Burchfield, 3 Scott, N. R. 555. CONCEALMENT OF BIRTH. The endeavoring to conceal

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the birth of a child by placing its dead body between a bed and a mattress, was held to be a sufficient disposing of the body to constitute an offence within the stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 14; for it is not essential to such offence that the body should be put in some place intended for its final deposit, or be buried or destroyed. [Overruling Reg v. Ash, 2 M. & Rob. 294, and Reg v. Bell, ib. note.] Reg v. Goldthrope, 1 Carr. & M. 335. CONTRACT OF SALE. (Right of possession of purchaserLien of unpaid vendor.) The defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff certain apples, to be taken away and paid by the latter on a given day; in the interim, the apples were deposited in a kiln within a hoast-house, the key of which kiln beingdelivered to the plaintiff, that of the hoast-house being retained by the defendant; the plaintiff made default, the defendant resold the apples held, that the plaintiff had not such possession as to entitle him to maintain trover against the defendant for re-selling before the lapse of a reasonable time. 4 B. & A. 941; 5 Bing. N. C. 541. Milgate v. Kebble, 3 Scott, N. R. 358. 2. (Of goods "to arrive"- Warranty.) The defendant, by a bought and sold note, agreed to sell the plaintiffs "100 tons of nitrate of soda, at 18s. per cwt., to arrive ex Daniel Grant, to be taken from the quay at landing weights," &c.; and below the signature of the brokers there was the following memorandum : "should the vessel be lost, this contract to be void: " held, that

the contract did not amount to a warranty on the part of the seller that the nitrate of soda should arrive if the vessel arrived, but to a contract for the sale of goods at a future period, subject to the double condition, of the arrival of the vessel, with the specified cargo on board. (6 M. & W. 224; 5 M. & W. 644.) Johnson v. Macdonald, 9 M. & W. 600. DISTRESS. (Damage feasant — Personal custody of chattelPleading.) To a plea in trespass justifying the taking of a horse, cart, and other chattels, damage feasant, it is a good replication, that the horse, cart and chattels were, at the time of the distress in the actual possession, and under the personal care of, and then being used by, the plaintiff; and actual danger of breaking the peace need not be alleged.

So, if the declaration complain of an assault, and the plea justify on the ground that plaintiff was interfering to intercept the distress.

Rejoinder, averring that the horse, &c. were, at the time of the taking, in plaintiff's possession, &c. for the purpose of being and were then used in doing the damage: held bad. (Vin. Abr. 121, Distress (A), pl. 4; 6 T. R. 138.) Field v. Adams, 12 Ad. & E. 649; 4 P. & D. 504: and see Bunch v. Kennington, 4 P. & D. 509. ESTATE PUR AUTRE VIE. (Devise of- Special occupant.) Where a lessee of lands demised to him, his heirs and assigns, for lives, devised the premises for the residue of the term to W. J. L. and his assigns, who died intestate : held, that the premises did not go to the heir of W. J. L., but to his personal representative, under the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 12. d. Lewis v. Lewis, 9 M. & W. 661. EVIDENCE. (Secondary evidence, no degrees of.) There are no degrees of secondary evidence; and therefore, semble, that in an action by lessor against lessee, the former may give parol evidence of the contents of the lease, where the lessee declines to produce it, without accounting for the non-production of the counterpart. (6 C. & P. 206; 7 M. & W. 102.) Hall v. Ball, 3 Scott, N. R. 577.

Doe

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. (Right of action of

administrator on contract with intestate.) The defendant ordered a coat of one T. a tailor, the coat was cut out and tacked together, and tried on the defendant by T., but before it was finished T. died; the coat was afterwards finished and delivered by his widow and administratrix: held, that the value of the coat was recoverable upon a count for goods sold and delivered by the administratrix. (1 C. & J. 403.) Werner v. Humphreys, 3 Scott, N. R. 226.

2. (Liability of executor on joint contract made by testator and others.) Where several persons jointly contract for a chattel to be made or procured for the common benefit of all, and the executors of any party dying are by agreement to stand in the place of such party dying, although the legal remedy of the party employed would be solely against the survivors, yet the law will imply a contract on the part of the deceased contractor that his executors shall pay his proportion of the price of the article to be furnished. Prior v. Hembrow, 8 M. & W. 872. FORGERY. (Intent to defraud.) H. employed L. to do work for him. L. had a partner S., who took no active part in the business, which H. knew. L. asked H. for payment, and he gave him a forged bill of exchange, knowing it to be so, which L. indorsed in his own name only, and gave it to S., who also indorsed it with his own name, and negotiated it: held, that H. was properly indicted for uttering the bill with intent to defraud L. alone. Reg v. Hanson, 1 Carr. & M. 335.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. (Acceptance of goods.) Goods of the plaintiff being in defendant's hands, for the purpose of being sold by defendant for plaintiff, defendant told plaintiff that he, defendant, would take them himself at the price she named, Defendant afterwards sold them to a third party, and after that, in a written account current delivered to plaintiff, debited himself with the price of the goods as "sold," not adding to or deducting from them.

Held, that under sect. 17 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, this was evidence upon which a jury might infer, as against