intervene in questions between two foreign governments without knowing that it was agreeable to both sides; that it was not sufficient for one party to say that it desired the intervention of the United States and it felt sure that the other side would also; that if this desire existed in Chile it would be very easy for the Chilean Government to inform us thereof or it could be made evident in the correspondence comprising the negotiations between Bolivia and Chile and that until this Government was informed by both parties it could not take the action requested. The Secretary added that in the Tacna-Arica case this Government had taken no action until it had been assured that both parties to the dispute would welcome the assistance of the United States. The Minister stated that in the Tacna-Arica case he had seen, as he was then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, in the interchange of telegrams between Chile and Peru that the negotiations fell through and that the United States had inquired of both Governments whether an invitation to come to Washington to carry on the negotiations would be acceptable and that both parties had agreed. There was evidence he said in the direct exchange of telegrams between the Chilean and Peruvian Foreign Offices that such a meeting would be acceptable to both parties; that what Bolivia now wants is the United States to inquire of Bolivia and Chile whether an invitation from the United States for those Governments to send representatives to Washington to discuss the matter would be agreeable. The Secretary replied that in the Tacna-Arica case the inquiry as to whether an invitation would be acceptable had been sent only after this Government had been informally advised by both parties that such action on the part of the United States would be agreeable to the two parties to the dispute. The Secretary added that even after the Peruvian and Chilean delegates had arrived in Washington the United States took no part in bringing about agreements or arrangements between them except when asked to use its good offices by both parties. The Minister then inquired whether this statement by the Secretary was to be taken as a definite statement of policy of the United States for all time, in other words could he take it that the United States would never enter into a discussion between two Latin American countries or in his country's case between Bolivia and any of its neighbors unless requested to do so by both parties. The Secretary replied that he was not formulating any rules of law nor could he of course prescribe what action his successors in office might adopt nor could he discuss any suppositional or hypothetical questions; 8 Foreign Relations, 1922, vol 1, pp. 447 ff. that this Government dealt with each question as it came up as wisdom and friendship would seem to dictate and that it could not permit the discussion to take the phase of binding the United States to any definite policy in the future in cases which had not arisen. The Minister said that he understood the Secretary's point of view; that in this case if the United States would not take action his Government had misinterpreted the addresses of the Secretary and President Coolidge which had expressed a desire to be helpful to Latin American countries. The Secretary replied that of course this Government as President Coolidge had stated desired to be helpful in any way it properly could but that it could not take action without the request of both parties. Referring back to the question of policy the Minister stated that he was talking purely and simply of the matter connected with his note which dealt with the ardent desire of Bolivia to have an outlet to the sea. Bolivia was now moved with a great feeling in this regard, the question had been taken up in the League of Nations and then directly with Chile and now with the United States and he wanted to know whether the determination of the United States not to take part in this discussion meant that the United States as far as this question was concerned would in its future developments refuse to take any part whatsoever. The Secretary replied that he would not bind this Government's action for the future; that the case before him was the note of the Bolivian Minister dealing with the situation that actually exists; that in the case as it now is the United States has not been requested by Chile to intervene in the matter and he very much regretted that this Government could not at this time intervene as requested by Bolivia. The Secretary could not foresee what the situation might be in the future or what later developments might occur and he therefore would do nothing now which might hamper the action of this Government in dealing in the future with a case which might arise, that in the actual case the United States could not meet the Bolivian Minister's desires. As the Minister was leaving the Secretary expressed his regret to him that he was unable to comply with his wishes in the matter. WHITE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WITH PARAGUAY . (See pages 282 ff.) BRAZIL EXPRESSION OF CONCERN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AT BRAZIL'S NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM 832.20/35: Telegram The Chargé in Brazil (Crosby) to the Secretary of State [Extract-Paraphrase] RIO DE JANEIRO, June 6, 1924—3 p. m. 24. . . . Rear Admiral Vogelgesang, the head of the American Naval Mission in Brazil,1 has just informed me that his recommendations to the Minister of Marine on proposed naval building for the next 10 years, which provide for destroyers 15,000 tons, submarines 6,000 tons, cruisers 60,000 tons, and battleships 70,000 tons, will be submitted immediately to the President. CROSBY 832.34/182: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Brazil (Crosby) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, June 11, 1924-6 p. m. 18. Reference your telegram no. 24, June 6, 3 p. m. The proposed naval building plan submitted by Rear Admiral Vogelgesang is most disturbing to the Department. While from a purely naval technical point of view this program may be justifiable, the outlay appears to be exorbitant and out of all proportion to the necessities of a country like Brazil that is menaced from no quarter. This Government's cardinal policy in Latin America is peace and the promotion among the Latin American countries of the most friendly relations. Severe criticism has been directed against this Government's Naval Mission to Brazil. The motive of the Mission was friendship to Brazil, for if an American mission had not been sent a similar mission from some European country would have been contracted for instead and this Government would in consequence 'For correspondence concerning the agreement providing for an American Naval Mission to Brazil, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. 1, pp. 651 ff. 323 have lost the opportunity to exert its influence for moderation in naval armaments. To carry out a program on the scale proposed would afford ample justification for the criticism which has already been directed against the Mission. Please explain the views of the Secretary of State under these premises to Rear Admiral Vogelgesang and express to him the grave concern with which the Department has received this information; request him to give you a full explanation regarding the matter for transmission to the Department by cable. If possible you will also request him to stop any further steps from being taken in this matter while it is under the Department's consideration. HUGHES 832.34/185: Telegram The Chargé in Brazil (Crosby) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] RIO DE JANEIRO, June 15, 1924-10 a. m. [Received 6:32 p. m.] 27. I have just had an interview with Rear Admiral Vogelgesang who has been confined to his bed with a fever but is better. Neither the chief nor any other member of the Naval Mission is pushing the naval construction program. The Admiral informed me that the President wishes to initiate a program of replacement for old and worn-out units and that at the request of the Minister of Marine a replacement program covering a period of 10 years was submitted. There has been no new construction since 1912; existing submarines are no longer useful and only 5 of the 11 destroyers are now in service; the others are undergoing extensive overhauling and are of little military value. Battleships have not been contemplated or recommended except that battleship tonnage should be utilized for the replacement of the São Paulo and the Minas Geraes, the two existing battleships. Construction will be governed by the financial situation in any event, and there has been no materialization of the rumored loan reported in my despatch no. 2206, May 28.2 This year, in any event, submarines only are likely to be provided for. The Admiral informs me that Ambassador Morgan, now in the United States, has a copy of the recommendations which were made to the Minister of Marine relative to the replacement building program and in which was outlined the Mission's attitude on general naval policy of Brazil in response to a request of the Minister of Marine. Admiral Vogelgesang has stated to me that the attitude of the Mission to new construction is to harmonize as nearly as pos 'Not printed. sible the views of the Secretary of State as known to him and the desires of the Brazilian Government to modernize strong naval defense. CROSBY 832.34/185: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Brazil (Crosby) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, June 26, 1924-4 p. m. 27. Your no. 27, June 15, 10 a. m. Admiral Vogelgesang's recommendations to Minister of Marine relative to Brazilian naval program shown to Department by Ambassador Morgan. The Department fully understands that it is unlikely that any new construction will be undertaken in the immediate future but it desires to point out to Admiral Vogelgesang that the existence of such a program as the one proposed will make it necessary for Argentina and Chile to elaborate likewise their naval programs and thus there may be started a competition in naval construction. The Brazilian building program is spoken of as a program of defense. The Department does not know by what power Brazil is threatened that she should need such a large defensive fleet. 6,000 tons of submarines, of which 5,000 are to be new and 1,000 eventual replacement, are called for by the program; of the 15,000 tons for destroyers 10,000 are new construction and 5,000 replacement; 50,000 of the 60,000 tons for cruisers are new construction; and the Minas Geraes is to be replaced in 1929 and the São Paulo in 1930 by battleships each of 35,000 tons, or a total of 70,000 tons. As the Minas Geraes and the São Paulo and other units in the Brazilian Navy are practically obsolete, it is true that Brazil is now in an inferior position compared with Argentina and Chile, but the new program instead of putting Brazil on a footing of equality with those countries will place her in a very superior position which will necessitate new naval construction by them for the same reason which now moves Brazil to desire new construction; namely, the desire not to be left in a position of inferiority. Any such result as this would be most unfortunate and there would be brought about a condition of rivalry in armaments in this hemisphere which up to the present has happily not existed. The Department's feeling about this matter is so strong that it would rather recall the Naval Mission than assume the responsibility for the naval program that the Mission has proposed. Explain the Department's position to Admiral Vogelgesang and request him to take the first opportunity to revise the naval program on the prin |