Peking. Chang possibly may have suddenly decided to be in Tientsin to meet Sun Yat-sen to see if he could associate himself with Sun. This is not likely. 3. Out of all the welter of rumors and the few facts, straws in the wind, such as Chang Tso-lin's sudden departure, the ex-Emperor's unexpectedly seeking refuge in Diplomatic Quarter, Feng Yu-hsiang's continuing to remain at or near Peking, although having stated he wishes to go abroad, and Sun Yat-sen's imminent arrival, a grave apprehension arises that extreme Kuomintang and Soviet influence may dominate Peking. Except by good fortune and unless the foreign powers are able to devise some defensive action in the circumstances, the chances seem to be that the radical wing of the Kuomintang Party and the Soviets are to have their day in Peking. Tuan Chi-jui's continuance in power seems dependent upon his ability to control allegiance of the various discordant factions. The mere fact, of course, of Chang's withdrawal to Tientsin does not necessarily spell his abandonment of Tuan, since if Chang desires to oppose Sun Yat-sen and the Red element in China he can do so very effectively from Tientsin as a base. However, as I observed, the outlook is far from bright. 4. Feeling, I believe, even more pessimistic than I do in the above regard, the British Minister called upon me yesterday to suggest an informal meeting of the representatives of the Washington Conference powers for the purpose of discussing and exploring into the question of the advisability of recommending to our respective Governments the immediate joint issuance of a statement. This statement would inform the Chinese authorities and people of the continued desire of these powers, as evidenced at Washington Conference, to make [take?] up with China, at the very earliest moment that she puts her house in order, the question of treaty revision, and that these powers to this [end?] would support in every proper way any government in China which would show a capacity for undertaking the task of restoring law and order in the country. At the same time the statement should definitely disclose the decision of the powers concerned not to recognize or have truck with any administration which might be set up in Peking by those Peking leaders in China who in the present as in the past have been and are seeking to incite the Chinese people against the friendly attitude [of the] powers. 5. I readily agreed to attend any such informal conference of representatives of Washington Conference powers which is scheduled for morning of 4th. Some such action as suggested by the British Minister might be effective in opposition to extreme nationalist. and Bolshevik trend of events in China, although a double-edged weapon with both good and bad potentialities. 6. After my conversation with Chang Tso-lin, reported in my 465, December 1, 4 p.m., Chinese secretary had a long conversation with General Wang, chief of the Manchurian military foreign affairs department, who appears very close to Chang and who was present both when Chang called on me and my return visit to him. To Peck's inquiry regarding exactly what assistance Chang considered foreign powers could be to the conservative element in China at the present time to help them oppose the Soviets, Wang stated that Marshal Chang had in mind an announcement by the foreign powers of their sympathetic willingness to discuss treaty revision just as soon as a government was established in China capable of giving effect to any international arrangements which would result from such a discussion. Marshal Chang feared that Sun and his Red adherents prompted by Karakhan would raise louder and louder the rallying cry of "down with the unjust treaties" which being a national issue the conservative leaders in China would not be able to oppose. An announcement by the powers as suggested above by Marshal Chang would [,he] believed, cut under this Bolshevik propaganda and enable him and other conservatives to make common cause with the foreign powers against Soviet influence in China. I venture to invite Department's attention to paragraph 6, my 465, December 1, 4 p.m., expressing the possibility that some such idea as there described was in Chang's mind during his conversation with me on November 29th. Repeated to Tokyo. MAYER 893.00/5804: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Mayer) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, December 3, 1924-4 p.m. 300. Third paragraph of your 465, December 1, 4 p.m. Your observation that the question of dangerous Bolshevist activities in China primarily is one of domestic Chinese administration has my complete approval. I would point out with respect to Marshal Chang's contention that it is world-wide and international, that the American Government cannot concern itself with the matter except in case American interests are directly involved. The serious aspect of propaganda directed from Moscow is, however, fully appreciated by this Government. HUGHES 893.00/5818: Telegram The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State PEKING, December 5, 1924—3 p.m. 473. My number 451, November 20, 4 p.m. The following telegram has been received from consul general at Hankow: "December 4, 5 p.m. Due to the threatened attack by Shensi and Shansi troops on Loyang, Wu fled from there on the evening of the 2nd. Wu's troops refused to support at Chengchow. He conferred with Chang Fu-lai 25 and Li Chi-chen 26 when it was decided that being entirely without troops Wu should continue to Hankow. He is now at Sinyang, Hsiao urges him to retire. Local railway office is informed Yellow River Bridge blown up by the 24th Division to prevent troops under Hu Ching-yi from coming south. General unrest increasing in Honan besides renewed brigandage due to the withdrawal of troops from bandit-infested areas there are reported. Troop disorders at various points on Peking-Hankow and Lund-Hai Railways and popular feeling against Wu will prevent him from recovering control of troops and recruiting new army”. MAYER 893.00/5840: Telegram The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State PEKING, December 13, 1924-noon. [Received December 13-5:19 a.m.] 480. Mandates issued December 11th dismissed from office Chi Hsieh-yuan, Military Governor of Kiangsu, and appointed Civil Governor Han Acting Director General. Military rules same Province and is under Lu Yung-hsiang, Pacification Commissioner Kiangsu [and] Anhui. Whether Chi will vacate post or make armed resistance still uncertain." Credibly reported Chang Tso-lin will give Lu Yunghsiang effective military assistance in removing Chi and securing military control of two Provinces if necessary as Chang is thought to be determined uproot Chihli Party in spite of Tuan's professed policy peaceful unification. 25 Tuchun of Honan. 26 Civil Governor of Honan. MAYER 27 The consul general at Shanghai in despatch no. 2837, Dec. 31, 1924, reported that Chi had retired to private life in the International Settlement of Shanghai (file no. 893.00/5960). Chi resumed military activities, Jan. 1925. 893.00/5871: Telegram The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State PEKING, December 22, 1924-3 p. m. 500. Legation's 463, December 1, noon.28 Following sent commander in chief today: "Legation's November 30, 1 p.m. Referring to our recent conversations I perceive no objection to your withdrawing destroyers from North China waters." SCHURMAN MAINTENANCE OF A UNITED FRONT BY THE POWERS IN OPPOSITION TO THE THREATENED SEIZURE OF CUSTOMS AT CANTON BY SUN YAT-SEN" 893.51/4580 The British Ambassador (Howard) to the Secretary of State No. 280 WASHINGTON, March 26, 1924. SIR: With reference to previous correspondence regarding the joint naval demonstration at Canton in consequence of Sun YatSen's threat to seize the Customs at that port, I have the honour to inform you, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government no longer consider it necessary to maintain the demonstration in question provided that arrangements can be made for its renewal in case of necessity. In acquainting you with my Government's views on this matter, I am instructed to enquire whether the Government of the United States are in agreement therewith, and in that event I should be most grateful if you would inform me at your earliest convenience whether, in case of necessity, the United States Government would be prepared to co-operate in arranging for a renewal of the naval demonstration referred to above. A similar enquiry is being addressed to the Governments to which they are accredited by His Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Rome, Tokio and Lisbon. 29 I have [etc.] Not printed. ESME HOWARD For previous correspondence regarding the threatened seizure of customs at Canton, see Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 551 ff. 893.51/4580 The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Howard) WASHINGTON, March 31, 1924. EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. 280 of March 26, 1924, stating that the British Government no longer considers it necessary to maintain the naval demonstration in force at Canton in consequence of Sun Yat-sen's threat to seize the Customs at that port, provided that arrangements can be made for its renewal in case of necessity, and inquiring whether this Government is in agreement with this view and would be prepared to cooperate in arranging for a renewal of the naval demonstration in case of necessity. Although this Government has received no definite recommendation from its Minister in Peking that the demonstration is no longer necessary, it nevertheless understands that there no longer exists any urgent need for the continuance thereof beyond the usual detail of naval forces which it has been customary to maintain at and in the vicinity of Canton. Without committing itself to any definite engagement such as appears to be suggested in your Note, with respect to any eventual action in regard to the situation at Canton, it is aware of no circumstances which would cause it to alter its previous attitude of cooperation in the event of a similar emergency occurring in the future. Accept [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES 893.51/4580 The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Howard) WASHINGTON, April 12, 1924. EXCELLENCY: With reference to your note No. 280 of March 26, 1924, concerning the naval demonstration at Canton, and supplementing my reply thereto of March 31, 1924, I have the honor to inform you that the American Minister at Peking, in a telegram, dated April 9, 1924,30 reports that, although there is still some uncertainty as to what Sun Yat-sen may do, such uncertainty is not greater now than it would be at a future date, and that there is no other reason for continuing the naval demonstration. The Minister further states that both he and his colleagues are of the opinion that no declaration should be made at the time of the withdrawal of the extra vessels, but that the Consuls should make it known in their private conversation that the ships would return if Sun indicates 20 Not printed. |