under and in accordance with its requirements. The chancellor finds that the provisions of the law were violated in the following respects: There was a 4-inch standard soil pipe used instead of extra heavy soil pipe; combination lead bands were used instead of lead bands and brass ferrules; branched waste pipes from bathtubs and washstands into lead bands were used instead of connecting the soil pipe with brass ferrules; 11-inch waste pipe from bathtubs was used instead of 13-inch pipe; the bathtubs, washstands, sinks, and laundry trays were not ventilated; and tile sewer pipe was run through the wall into the cellar instead of extra heavy cast-iron soil pipe.

The husband of the defendant is a plumber and did the work. He wilfully and deliberately disregarded and violated the law and refused to comply therewith.

Estoppel-of municipality

statute.

The first of appellant's propositions is that the city, by standing by, and permitting the plumbing to be placed in the building, is estopped from enforcing the act of assembly. This is, to say the least, a somewhat novel contention. In essence, it means that, if a state statute is violated in one of its municipalities and the municipal authorities do not move to prevent this being done, the statute ceases to have force and is as to that transaction repealed. To state such a doctrine is to refute it. violation of Of course, as appellant's counsel contends, municipal corporations, just as other corporations, may be estopped under cer-when munici- tain circumstances by their acts and conduct, but a municipality cannot, by neglecting or refusing to enforce a state law, render it inoperative against him who has violated it and thus give him immunity. "Estoppel may be invoked against the United States, a state, a municipal corporation, or other governmental agency or instrumentality in respect of acts done in its so-called proprietary or private capacity, as distinguished

pality estopped.

from its so-called governmental or public capacity, in the strict scope of which it cannot be estopped." 21 C. J. 1186.

The second proposition advanced by appellant is that the plumbing is not a nuisance per se or injurious to the health and welfare of the public, and therefore equity has no jurisdiction. The act in question is a health measure-to compel the installation of sanitary plumbing. In effect it declares that plumbing installed otherwise than as the act prescribes creates a potential nuisance. "Said changes [in the plumbing] shall be made within the time fixed by the department or board or bureau of health; and, upon refusal or neglect to obey such orders, the department or board or bureau of health shall institute legal proceedings to have such changes made and said nuisance abated, by action before a justice of the peace or court of record." Act May 14, 1909 (P. L. 840, 853), amending original Act June 7, 1901 (P. L. 493; Pa. Stat. 1920, § 2919). The court below found as a fact that the council of the plaintiff city has and exercises the powers of a board of health, and, further, that the plumbing prescribed by the act, and as directed by city council acting in its capacity as a board of health, is less likely to cause a condition prejudicial to health than that put in by defendant, and that, the way the plumbing was installed, there is a possibility of escape of sewer gas into the house, which possibility will be eliminated when the work is done as the law prescribes. We said, speaking of the act in question, in Beltz v. Pittsburg, 211 Pa. 561, 562, 61 Atl. 78: "[It] is an act relating to the public health as affected by the matters of plumbing and drainage and of general sanitation resulting therefrom. In its nature it is a definition and regulation of the police power on a subject which is one of municipal concern."

Under the express terms of the act of June 16, 1836, § 13, subd. 5 (P. L. 784, 790; Pa. Stat. 1920, §

4563), courts of equity have the jurisdiction of a court of chancery so far as relates to "the prevention or restraint of the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals." In Com. v. Kennedy, 240 Pa. 214, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 673, 87 Atl. 605, reversing the court below, it was determined that an injunction should issue to restrain the drainage of sewage into a stream, although it was not a public stream, and although what was done was the violation of a penal statute, on the ground that, "because the public health is endangered by drainage of sewage into any flowing stream, the legislature has denounced it as an offense on the part of any one permitting it. In no more positive way could it be declared a public nuisance."

In that case it was also decided: "The mere fact that there is a remedy at law by indictment or action will not alone prevent the exercise of the power."

The third proposition is that the act is unconstitutional in so far as it enlarges equity jurisdiction to abate and restrain noncompliance with its terms, as this enlargement of power does not appear by the title. The title is: "An act providing for the examination, licensure and registration of persons, firms or corporations engaged or engaging in the business or work of plumbing or house drainage, and prescribing certain rules, regulations and requirements for the construction of plumbing, house drainage and cesspools, in cities of the second class, and imposing fines, penalties and forfeitures for violation thereof."

The act does not enlarge equity jurisdiction (it is conferred by the act of 1836) but if it did, when defendant and her husband decided that they would violate the act, they

saw, if they read the title, that penalties were imposed for its violation. It is inconceivable that their curiosity was not whetted to learn what penalties they would be subjected to and how they would be enforced. The Constitution presupposes a reasonably inquiring state of mind in those who read the title of an act (Reeves v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. 287 Pa. 376, 135 Atl. 362), and thus stimulated to ascertain, they read in the body of the act that one of its penalties is to have the nuisance they would create, failing to comply with it, abated by action before a court of record.

Statutes-suffi

by ciency of title.

The fourth position assumed by appellant, that the city cannot enforce part of the act because it does not enforce other parts, is another quite novel proposition, that the violator of a law in one respect has a standing to challenge its enforcement against him because it is not enforced in all respects and against everybody. Owing to the fact that the city of New Castle has a sewage system differing in construction from other cities of the commonwealth, some of the provisions of the act cannot be applied in plaintiff city; that, however, Health-reguladoes not imply that tions-partial inthose provisions of the law which fit its situation are nugatory.

applicability.

As to the last proposition, that the act is unconstitutional because it attempts an unwarranted exercise of the police power and violates the 14th Federal Amendment, it would seem to be sufficient to point out that the act was upheld in Beltz v. Pittsburg, supra: "A statute enacted for the protection of the public health, safety or morals, can be set aside by the courts only when it plainly has no real or substantial relation to those subjects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law. If 'it does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the court must take judicial cognizance,

may be timely to suggest that there seems to be a growing tendency to lug in the due process clause as a makeweight in aid of arguments on other lines. The effect of this may be to raise a doubt as to the sincerity of the belief of the advocate in his real contentions; particularly is this so when there is no adequate presentation of authority in support of the due process of law proposition. In the pending case, there is no violation of the due process clause as slight reflection will show.

The decree of the court below is affirmed at appellant's cost.

This annotation supplements an earlier annotation on the same subject in 36 A.L.R. 1342.

The following recent cases support the general rule, stated in the earlier annotation, to the effect that statutes requiring the examination and licensing of plumbers, and providing rules and regulations for plumbing and drainage, in the interest of the public health, are within the police power and valid. Evans v. Denver (1926) 79 Colo. 533, 247 Pac. 173; Com. v. Kwiatkowski (1926) 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 272. See also the reported case (NEW CASTLE V. WITHERS, ante, 132).

The objections to a New York statute, made in Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co. (1905) 182 N. Y. 83, 70 L.R.A. 722, 108 Am. St. Rep. 790, 74 N. E. 561 (quoted in the previous annotation), were removed by a later statute. See Fredericks v. Lederer (1925) 126 Misc. 184, 212 N. Y. Supp. 614, wherein it was said: "Any employing or master plumber may now register, though he is only to receive a certificate of such registration if he holds a certificate of the examining board. It is the registration of its members, merely, and not the holding of a certificate, that is made a condition precedent to the conduct of business by a copartnership."

An ordinance has been held to be invalid which forbade any one li

censed and bonded under it to permit any other person to do plumbing work under the former's license, except journeymen plumbers employed by him. Ex parte Davis (1926) 118 Or. 693, 247 Pac. 809.

The decision in that case was based on the ground that the regulation did not have a reasonable relation to the public health, and was therefore not a proper exercise of the police power. The court said: "The essence of the charge against the petitioner is that he, being a master plumber, otherwise a purveyor of labor and material in the plumbing business, allowed someone to work under his license whom he did not directly pay. It is not conceivable how the public health, safety, convenience, or welfare is affected by the payment of the workman. The laborer himself may be concerned about whether or not he receives his pay, but the health, safety, convenience, or welfare of the public, is not influenced in any degree by whether or not the laborer is compensated."

Dawson, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Reno county, wherein the defendant, the Hutchinson Gas Company, was enjoined from putting into effect a schedule of rates for gas for domestic consumption in Hutchinson pending a final determination of litigation over the gas rates prescribed by the Public Service Commission.

It appears that for some years prior to November 14, 1925, the domestic rate for gas in the city of Hutchinson was 60 cents per thousand cubic feet, plus a service charge of 75 cents. On November 14, 1925, the city of Hutchinson filed a complaint before the Public Service Commission alleging that these gas and service charges exacted from the resident consumers of Hutchinson were "exorbitant, unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, arbitrary, capricious, and unnecessary." While that complaint was pending and undetermined, on February 12, 1926, the Hutchinson Gas Company filed with the Public Service Commission a new schedule of gas and service rates for Hutchinson and sought official approval thereof. Pursuant to a hearing on the city's complaint against the existing rates and on the gas company's application for approval of its proposed new schedule of rates, the commission, on April 8, 1926, made an order, to be effective September 1, 1926, prescribing certain graduated rates in Hutchinson and vicinity.

Discontented with this order, the Hutchinson Gas Company instituted an action in the district court of Shawnee county to enjoin its enforcement on the alleged ground that the prescribed rates were noncompensatory and confiscatory. Concurrent therewith were certain other proceedings before the commission concerning the gas rates and service charges in the cities of Newton and Wichita, which likewise culminated in litigation before the district court of Shawnee county. On issues joined involving the

gas rates and service charges in all three of these cities, that court appointed a referee, who heard the evidence adduced by the parties and made comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, which with slight changes were adopted by the district court. The rates prescribed by the Public Service Commission were enjoined as confiscatory, as likewise were the prior rates under which the gas company had been operating since August 17, 1920, under a previous order of the commission.

This judgment of the district court of Shawnee county is the subject-matter of three appeals to this court, Hutchinson Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., No. 27,945, and two companion cases, Nos. 27,944 and 27,946, which were argued and submitted at our January sitting, at which time also the instant case was presented. It has been necessary to a correct understanding of the present case to include in the foregoing statement a brief survey of this collateral litigation.

After the Shawnee county district court rendered its decision holding invalid the rates prescribed by the Public Service Commission, the Hutchinson Gas Company filed with the commission and promulgated a new schedule of rates, viz.:

"Announcement (Effective July 1, 1927).

"Pending final determination of present rate litigation the following domestic rates are announced for Wichita, Hutchinson, and Newton and future deliveries will be based thereon.

"20 cents 100 cubic feet for the first 500 cubic feet per month.

"15 cents per 100 cubic feet for the next 1500 cubic feet per month. "6 cents per 100 cubic feet for the next 5000 cubic feet per month.

"Minimum monthly bill, $1.00. "Penalty of 5 per cent added to all bills not paid within 15 days after date of billing.

"This schedule will continue in effect substantially the present cost of house heating, and our gas supply