in law, but a part of himself, and entitled, with him, to share in the pension. This court should not be astute in discovering a way to relieve the defendant of his obligations, voluntarily assumed, because of any strict construction of the language of an act which was designed to give protection to the faithful servants of the public, and those dependent upon them." In Tully v. Tully (1893) 159 Mass. 91, 34 N. E. 79, the court refused to reverse a decree granting alimony, although the only means of the husband were derived from pension money, stating that pension money is designed in part to enable the pensioner to support his wife and family, and that the Federal statute which provides that pension money shall be exempt from legal process should not be strained to enable him to avoid that duty. In Anderson v. Norvell-Shapleigh Hardware Co. (1908) 134 Mo. App. 188, 113 S. W. 733, where the divorced husband had remarried and claimed exemption as head of the family, it was held that, under a statute which provides that "each head of a family, at his election, may select and hold, exempt from execution, any other property, real, personal, or mixed, or debts and wages, not exceeding in value the amount of $300," exemptions cannot be claimed against execution on judgment for alimony. The court said: "The argument of the hardship that § 4327a imposes upon defendant and others similarly situated might be of some force, if addressed to the legislative department. It is of no persuasive force when addressed to a court called upon to construe the statute of which he complains. The hardship, if any, was not created by the law, but was brought upon defendant by his own voluntary acts and conduct, and the conduct which brought about the decree of divorce and judgment for alimony against him was wrongful; for this reason, he is in no position to complain that the law denies him the exemptions accorded to ordinary debt violation of his marriage vow. His marital pledge to his wife was that he would support and maintain her so long as they both should live. Why should he be relieved of that burden, when his wife has been guilty of no misconduct? His answer is, because he has married another woman, and ought not to be required to support two families. Why assume the burden of supporting two families, if he was not able, or was unwilling, to discharge it? To use a homely phrase, 'He has made his bed and on it he must lie.'" In Menzie v. Anderson (1879) 65 Ind. 239, the husband, the guilty party, who had no property, remarried, became a householder and head of a family, and inherited an interest in real estate, which he claimed to be exempt from execution on judgment for alimony obtained by his former wife; but it was held that no property could be claimed as exempt against such a judgment, as alimony is not a debt growing out of, or founded upon, a contract, express or implied, within the meaning of the statute; since, although the marriage is a civil contract, the cause of divorce arose out of a tort. A distinction has been made in a few cases where the husband had children to support, and claimed the exemption for their benefit, while the wife was free from such encumbrances. Maag v. Williams (1902) 92 Mo. App. 680. In that case the husband had two children, a boy about six years old, the son of a former wife, and a girl about two years old, the child of his marriage with plaintiff. The latter was placed in the custody of the mother and the award was for its support. The father married again and claimed the exemption as head of a family, and the claim was sustained, although he was thereby enabled to defeat his liability for support of his two-year-old daughter. The court relied on the homestead exemption case of Biffle v. Pullam (1893) 114 Mo. 50, 21 S. W. 450, supra, saying of the Spengler Case (1891) 46 Mo. App. 644, that, in that case, "his wife was the only other member of Spengler's family, and there is some apparent justice in the ruling; but suppose Spengler had had minor children dependent upon his wages for their daily bread; the case would present altogether a different aspect and the apparent justice of the decision would be transformed into a palpable injustice. The Spengler decision ingrafts upon the statutes of exemption an exception to the protection they were designed to secure to every head of a family, and is judicial legislation." Following the Maag Case, the court in Jarboe v. Jarboe (1904) 106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S. W. 1162, comes into direct conflict with the Spengler Case, which was decided by a co-ordinate court in another district. In the Jarboe Case, defendant supported his mother and brothers and sister, and was held to be the head of a family. The court said that the statute provided for no such exception to the Exemption Law, and that such construction would be, in effect, in the nature of judicial legislation. In that case the defendant was permitted to repudiate his legal obligation to support his wife, and nullify the decree of the court, by furnishing his money to his mother's family. The legislature had, however, a year before the decision in the Jarboe Case, enacted a statute, which was not referred to in that case, providing expressly that no property shall be exempt in a proceeding by a married. woman for maintenance, nor from execution upon a judgment to enforce a decree for alimony. That statute is construed in Anderson v. NorvellShapleigh Hardware Co. (1908) 134 Mo. App. 188, 113 S. W. 733, supra. The reported case (SCHOOLEY V. SCHOOLEY, ante, 110), however, permits the husband effectually to cast off his first wife, by holding that when he marries again, and thus becomes the head of a family, he is entitled to rely upon his statutory exemption against an execution for alimony in favor of his first wife. H. P. F. GYPSY OIL COMPANY, Plff. in Err., V. CHARLES E. COVER et al. Oklahoma Supreme Court · March 2, 1920. (78 Okla. 158, 189 Pac. 540.) Mines oil and gas separated parcels effect of development of one. 1. Where an oil and gas mining lease covers 160 acres of land, 120 acres thereof are contiguous, and the other 40-acre tract is located mile therefrom, and the lessee assigns the 40-acre tract, and the assigns bring in a producing well producing oil and gas in paying quantities within the one-year period stipulated for in the lease, and pays the royalties reserved to the owner of the land, which are accepted by such owner according to the terms of the lease, and the lease contains the stipulation "that this lease shall remain in full force for the term of five years from this date, and as long thereafter as oil and gas or either of them is produced therefrom by the party of the second part, successors or assigns," these facts do not make the lease a separate lease upon each tract of land, but the same remains a lease upon the entire 160 acres, and the drilling of such well on any portion thereof and the payment of the royalties extend the life of the lease upon the entire 160 acres. [See note on this question beginning on page 138.] Headnotes by JOHNSON, J. 11 A.L.R.-9. 4. From the fact that a trust relation existed between the lessee in an oil and gas mining lease and a third person, as to one of the two tracts of land covered by the lease, at the time the lease was executed by the lessors, and some time thereafter the lessee, upon the payment to it by the person for whose benefit the trust existed, of the bonus agreed upon, and at his request the lessor assigned the lease to such other, covering said tract, which assignment has been treated as valid by the lessee, and the purchasers of the fee in the land covered by the lease, held, that such trust relation is not available to the purchasers of the fee as a ground for a suit for the cancelation of the lease covering the other tract. providing that the completion of such well shall operate as a full liquidation of all rent during the remainder of the term of the lease, which was for five years; and where the assignee of the lessee to a portion of the leased premises completed a well upon such portion within one year, and such well continued to produce oil and gas in paying quantities, and assignees continued to operate said well and pay to the landowners the royalties reserved to them for the full term, and where the lessee neither drilled on the unassigned portion of the lease nor paid delay money during the term, and some time after the term expired the landowners brought suit to quiet the title to the unassigned portion of the premises, and asked that the lease as to such portion be forfeited for failure to drill and operate and develop the same, and where, upon the trial of the cause, the court announced as his findings "that the plaintiffs are the owners of the land and went in possession of the premises at the time of taking their deed, and have retained possession since that date," and entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, quieting their title to the premises and canceling the lease of the defendant, held, that from an examination of the record it clearly appeared that the plaintiffs alleged no facts, nor offered proof of such facts, as would be sufficient to authorize the court to cancel the lease for a breach of the implied covenants to diligently operate and develop the premises, that the demurrer of the defendant to the evidence of the plaintiffs should have been sustained, and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and the cause remanded. ERROR to the District Court for Okmulgee County (Bozarth, J.) to review a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought to quiet title to certain real estate. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The legal relationship between defendant and John J. McCrory appearing from the recitals in the deed of assignments does not change or affect in any way the rights and obligations created by the oil and gas lease. 39 Cyc. 47; Connell v. Cole, 89 Ala. 381, 8 So. 72; Perry, Trusts, 6th ed. § 520; Herlihy v. Coney, 99 Me. 469, 59 Atl. 952; Indian Land & Trust Co. v. Owen, Okla. - 162 Pac. 818; Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Schacht, 75 Okla. 101, 181 Pac. 731. The production of oil on part of the (78 Okla. 158, 189 Pac. 540.) leased premises by Davis and his assigns, in compliance with the terms of the lease, extended the primary term of the lease as long as oil or gas is produced, and vested in the lessee and its assigns the right to produce oil or gas from all of the leased premises. Thornton, Oil & Gas, 3d ed. § 219; Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 405, 119 Pac. 516, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1094; Brennan v. Hunter, Okla. - 172 Pac. 49; Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co. Okla., 179 Pac. 935; Harris v. Michael, 70 W. Va. 356, 73 S. E. 934; South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 848, 76 S. E. 961; Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co. Tex. Civ. App. 178 S. W. 905; Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co. 140 La. 985, L.R.A.1917D, 1115, 74 So. 527; Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494, 22 Mor. Min. Rep. 647; Harness v. Eastern Oil Co. 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S. E. 662; Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W. Va. 374, L.R.A.1918B, 1070, 94 S. E. 739. Messrs. W. W. Calhoun and George James for defendants in error. Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the district court of Okmulgee county. On the 19th day of September, 1918, the defendants in error, Charles Cover and George James, as plaintiffs, commenced an action in the district court of Okmulgee county against the plaintiff in error, the Gypsy Oil Company, a corporation, as defendant, to quiet title to certain real estate situated in said county. For convenience the parties will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiffs and defendant, respectively, as they appeared in the trial court. The essential allegations of the plaintiffs' petition are as follows: "That the plaintiffs are the legal owners in fee simple and in the actual and peaceable possession by their tenant, G. S. P. Washington, of the following described premises, situated in Okmulgee county, state of Oklahoma, to wit: The southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 31 and the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section 32, township 15 north, range 12 east, and the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 5, township 14 north, range 12 east. "That the said defendant claims some right, title, or interest in and to said property adverse to these plaintiffs, the exact nature of which to them is unknown, which constitutes a cloud on the title of plaintiffs." The defendant answered, claiming a valid oil and gas lease upon the premises, and deraigned title thereto from the heirs of Mary Harjo, deceased, the original allottee; the allegations of the defendant being, in effect, that said allottee died intestate, leaving as her sole heirs her five children, three of whom, Benn Harjo, Cinda Harjo, and Salina Harjo, were adults, that Buzzy Harjo and Sarah Harjo were minors, that each inherited an undivided one-fifth interest in said allotment, that, prior lease to the entire allotment of 160 to the execution of the defendant's their interest in said allotment to acres, said adult heirs had conveyed Lewis Adams, Thomas Adams, Jr., and Wash Adams, and that thereafter, on January 28, 1910, the Adams, as guardian of Sarah Harjo Adamses, together with Thomas ministrator of the estate of Mary and Buzzy Harjo, minors, and as adHarjo, deceased, executed to the defendant an oil and gas lease to the entire 160-acre allotment, which was of Okmulgee county on said date, duly approved by the county court and that thereafter defendant executed and delivered to George S. Davis a deed of assignment to the township 14 north, range 12 east, S. E. of the S. E. of section 5, and that thereafter the said George S. Davis assigned a three-fourths interest in said tract to the Producers' Oil Company, who in turn afterward Company, and that prior to the exassigned the same to the Texas piration of one year from the date of said oil and gas lease a producing well was completed upon the said tract by the Producers' Oil Company and G. S. Davis, which had ever since been producing oil and gas in paying quantities, and had been operated for the production of oil and gas, and that the royalty reserved by said lease to the lessors upon the oil and gas produced upon said land had been paid to the plaintiffs and their predecessors according to the terms of the said oil and gas lease, and accepted by them, and that said assignees had paid, kept, and performed all of the conditions, covenants, and agreements provided in said lease, and that the defendant had a valid and subsisting leasehold estate, covering the remaining 120 acres of said allotment, and that the same was in full force and effect. The defendant made copies of said conveyances exhibits to its answer. The plaintiffs replied to said answer, admitting the allegations of the defendant except as to the valid ity of the lease upon the 120 acres sued for herein, alleging that the same was invalid, because: (1) The defendant took title under its lease to the 40-acre tract as trustee only and in trust for one John J. McCrory, and that, when the defendant assigned the same to George S. Davis, the trust and the purpose for which it was created ceased and terminated all the rights and interest held by the defendant, and on account thereof the defendant is estopped to claim any right, title, or interest to said 40-acre tract; and (2) the deeds from the adult heirs to the Adamses had been canceled by the district court of Okmulgee county in a certain action brought by said adult heirs against the Adamses for that purpose, and alleging that no well had been completed on the 120 acres or rentals paid thereon by the defendant. Plaintiffs prayed that their title be quieted, to which reply the defendant interposed a a demurrer, which being overruled, the defendant moved for a judgment upon the pleadings, which was overruled by the court, to each of which rulings the defendant saved objections. Upon the issues thus joined, the cause was tried to the court. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' testimony the defendant interposed a de murrer to the evidence, which demurrer was overruled by the court and excepted to by the defendant, whereupon the court made the following finding: "The court finds that the plaintiffs are the owners of the land in controversy and went into possession of the premises at the time of the taking of said deed, exhibit No. 1, and have retained possession of the land since that date. I will just find for the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and you can prepare your journal entry. Defendant excepts to the findings and the judgment of the court." The defendant filed its motion for a new trial, which was overruled by the court. Thereafter in due time this proceeding in error to reverse the judgment of the trial court was regularly commenced. The trial court was not requested to, nor did it, make and file separate findings of fact. The plaintiff in error assigns numerous errors in its petition in error, but its counsel say in their brief: "The case of the plaintiff in error is grounded upon the settled and established law that the production of oil and gas upon any portion of the leased premises, in compliance with the provisions of the oil and gas lease, vests in the lessee or his as signs the right to continue the production from all of the leased premises. For the sake of clarity in this brief, the case is discussed under two subheads: "(1) The legal relationship between the Gypsy Oil Company and John L. McCrory appearing from the recitals in the deed of assignment does not change or affect in any way the rights and obligations created by the oil and gas lease, and (2) the production of oil on part of the leased premises by Davis and his assigns in compliance with the terms of the lease extended the primary term of the lease as long as oil or gas is produced, and vested in the lessee and its assigns the right to produce oil or gas from all of the leased premises." In answer to the foregoing propositions of the plaintiff in error, coun |