when a proper warrant has issued. State ex rel. Arnold v. Justus, 84 Minn. 237, 55 L.R.A. 325, 87 N. W. 770; State ex rel. Munsey v. Clough, 71 N. H. 594, 67 L.R.A. 946, 53 Atl. 1086; Katyuga v. Cosgrove, 67 N. J. L. 213, 50 Atl. 679. Had the case rested upon the testimony of the relator only, we would be of opinion that the court may probably have been justified in remanding, although the witness Erwin was quite indefinite in his identification. In the face of the positive evidence of relator as to places, times, circumstances, and names of parties by whom he could prove his identity at those places, which would show his absence from Montana, we are of opinion that he was entitled to the absent testimony, and the court should have so ruled. It may be stated that the evidence remanding for extradition should have that de -sufficiencyextradition proceedings. gree of certainty which would justify the magistrate to commit the accused. Ex parte Morgan (D. C.) 20 Fed. 298. This view is somewhat enhanced by a statement in the bill of exceptions to the effect, and verified by the judge as being true, that the evidence is not contradicted that relator was not in Montana at the time. "It is not an open question as to the authority of courts of this state to go behind the executive warrant, in order to examine and review the grounds upon which the governor may have issued his extradition warrant. Ex parte Thornton, 9 Tex. 635; Ex parte Rowland, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 108, 31 S. W. 651; Ex parte Hart, 28 L.R.A. 801, 11 C. C. A. 165, 25 U. S. App. 22, 63 Fed. 260; Bruce v. Rayner, 162 C. C. A. 501, 124 Fed. 481; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; State ex rel. Sundahl v. Richardson, 34 Minn. 115, 24 N. W. 354; People ex rel. Lawrence v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 190." The above is a quotation from Ex parte Cheatham, 50 Tex. Crim. Rep. 53, 95 S. W. 1079. For further elucidation of the question, see that case; also see 2 U. S. Stat. Anno. (Judiciary) pp. 877 et seq. We are therefore of opinion this judgment should be reversed and remanded, that the relator may secure the evidence sought by him. ANNOTATION. Right of one arrested on extradition warrant to delay to enable him to present evidence that he is not subject to extradition. It seems to be well established that a person who has been arrested on an extradition warrant is entitled on a writ of habeas corpus to have tried the issue of fact whether he is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. United States.-Ex parte Smith (1842) 3 McLean, 121, Fed. Cas. No. 12,968; Cook v. Hart (1892) 146 U. S. 183, 36 L. ed. 934, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Hyatt v. New York (1903) 188 U. S. 691, 47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 311; Tennessee v. Jackson (1888; E. D. Tenn.) 1 L.R.A. 370, 36 Fed. 258; Re Cook (1892; E. D. Wis.) 49 Fed. 833; Re White (1893) 5 C. C. A. 29, 14 U. S. App. 87, 55 Fed. 54. Indiana. Hartman V. Aveline (1878) 63 Ind. 344, 30 Am. Rep. 217. Iowa.-Jones v. Leonard (1878) 50 lowa, 106, 32 Am. Rep. 116. New Hampshire. State ex rel. Munsey v. Clough (1902) 71 N. H. 594, 67 L.R.A. 946, 53 Atl. 1086, on subsequent appeal in (1903) 72 N. H. 178, 67 L.R.A. 954, 55 Atl. 554, affirmed in (1905) 196 U. S. 364, 49 L. ed. 515, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282. New York. People ex rel. Ryan v. Conlin (1895) 15 Misc. 303, 36 N. Y. Supp. 888. Ohio.-Wilcox v. Nolze (1878) 34 Ohio St. 520. S. D. 386, 47 L.R.A. 566, 76 Am. St. Rep. 616, 81 N. W. 637, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 303. Texas. Hibler v. State (1875) 43 Tex. 197. And see the reported case (EX PARTE JOWELL, ante, 1407). From that rule it would seem to follow as a matter of course that he is entitled to such reasonable delay of the hearing of the writ as will enable him to produce evidence on the issue which he is thus entitled to have litigated, his situation in that respect differing in no way from that of any other litigant. Such is the conclusion reached in the reported case (Ex PARTE JOWELL), holding that it was error to refuse a continuance to permit a person arrested on an extradition warrant to take depositions to show that he was not in the demanding state at the time of the alleged offense. No other case seems to have passed on a similar situation. The liberality shown by the courts in granting delay for the production of evidence in habeas corpus proceedings is well illustrated by the case of State v. Lyon (1789) 1 N. J. L. 403, which arose on habeas corpus to determine the right of a negro to freedom. In that case, evidence of manumission offered by the negro being rejected as not the best evidence, an adjournment was granted to enable him to procure legal evidence of the fact. So in Hamilton v. Flowers (1879) 57 Miss. 14, a witness, committed for contempt in failing to appear in a criminal case, sought in habeas corpus to show that the accused, by whom he was subpoenaed, had escaped before the time set for the appearance of the witness. The court said: "If the chancellor, on hearing the evidence in relation to the escape, was satisfied that the return was false, he should have punished the appellant for failure to obey the writ, continued the trial to another day, and ordered the production of the relator at the time named. If he was in doubt as to the escape, he should have continued the trial of that issue until satisfactory evidence could be procured." W. A. S. robber. The insufficient lighting by a railroad company of its station yard is not the proximate cause of injury to the station master through an assault by a robber while he is about his duties in the yard, so as to render the railroad company liable, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for such injury. [See note on this question beginning on page 1414.] APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Common Pleas Circuit Court for Orangeburg County (Sease, J.) in favor of defendant in an action brought, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligent failure to keep its station grounds properly lighted. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Raysor & Summers, Wolfe & Berry, and L. K. Sturkie for appellant. Messrs. Moss & Lide and Henry E. Davis, for respondent: In order to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act the plaintiff is required not only to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 57 L. ed. 1179, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 858; Great Northern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444, 60 L. ed. 732, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406; Southern R. Co. v. Gray, 241 U. S. 333, 60 L. ed. 1030, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 58 L. ed. 591, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 159, 9 N. C. C. A. 109; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Padgett, 236 U. S. 668, 59 L. ed. 777, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481; Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 59 L. ed. 1433, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 252, 9 N. C. C. A. 265. Where an injury is caused by the act of a third party over whom the master has no control, it cannot be said to be due to the negligence of the master as a proximate cause, and consequently there is no liability on the part of the master. 26 Cyc. 1090; 29 Cyc. 477; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Slattery, 57 Kan. 499, 46 Pac. 941, 15 Am. Neg. Cas. 104; Marcom v. Raleigh & A. Air Line R. Co. 126 N. C. 200, 35 S. E. 423; Kelly v. Shelby R. Co. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 311, 22 S. W. 445; McDoniel v. Arkansas, L. & G. R. Co. 127 La. 757, 53 So. 981; Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Walker, 97 C. C. A. 44, 172 Fed. 346, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1020; Pierson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 95 C. C. A. 467, 170 Fed. 271; Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256; Cooper v. Richland County, 76 S. C. 202, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799, 121 Am. St. Rep. 946, 56 S. E. 958; Snipes v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 76 S. C. 207, 56 S. E. 959; Kilpatrick v. Spartanburg, 101 S. C. 334, 85 S. E. 775; Hart v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 104 S. C. 476, 89 S. E. 387; Stephenson v. Corder, 71 Kan. 475, 69 L.R.A. 246, 114 Am. St. Rep. 500, 80 Pac. 938, 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 97. The injuries to plaintiff resulted from risks assumed by him in the course of his employment. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 58 L. ed. 1062, L.R.A. 1915C, 1, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475, 8 N. C. C. A. 834; Jacobs v. Southern R. Co. 241 U. S. 229, 60 L. ed. 970, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588; Baugham v. New York, P. & N. R. Co. 241 U. S. 237, 60 L. ed. 977, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592, 13 N. C. C. A. 138; Lorick v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 102 S. C. 276, 86 S. E. 675, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 920. Hydrick, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, as station master, at Orangeburg, South Carolina, was assaulted and injured by a robber at night, Being engaged at the time in interwhile he was attending to his duties. state commerce, he brought this action under the Federal act to recov er damages for his injuries, which, he alleges, were caused by defendant's negligence in failing to keep its station grounds properly lighted. About 3 o'clock in the morning of January 7, 1916, while plaintiff was in his office at the station, a man opened the door, and told him that a loaded box car in the yard was open. Plaintifi' turned on the lights about the station house and yard, which were controlled by a switch in the office, went out and closed the car, and was going back to the office to get a sealing iron to seal it, when the city fire alarm was sounded. In pursuance of his duty, under the rules of the company, he proceeded to ascertain the location of the fire. In doing so, he passed the office door and one of the waiting room doors, in which the man was standing, and in passing plaintiff thanked him for the information given, and walked on some fifteen or twenty steps to the sidewalk on Broughton street, which crosses the railroad at right angles, to look for the fire. After having discovered that it was in a distant part of the city, he turned and was going back to the office, when he was struck from behind by the robber.. The blow crushed his skull, and left him in a seriously and permanently impaired condition. The company had provided for four lights on the outside-one above the office door, one above each of the waiting room doors, and one (109 S. C. 119, 95 S. E. 357.) on a pole in the yard, between the street and the station. This light was about 30 feet from the station house. On the night of the assault, the light above one of the waiting room doors and that on the pole were not burning, and they had not been burning for several nights before. There was an arc light in the street, about 100 feet distant, which afforded some light about the station; but it was darker at the point where plaintiff was struck (which was somewhere between the pole and the corner of the station) than it would have been if all the lights had been burning, and the testimony tends to show that the robber struck under cover of the greater darkness, caused by the absence of those lights. After hearing all the evidence, the circuit court directed a verdict for defendant, on the ground that the alleged negligence of defendant was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Other points of subsidiary importance were discussed by both parties at the hearing in this court, but we shall consider only the ruling of the circuit court, as that is the controlling issue in the case. It is elementary that the law considers the proximate and not the remote cause of injury, which means that, when one party seeks to recover damages of another for a wrongful act or omission, he must allege and prove that the act or omission was the direct and efficient cause of his injury. That does not mean, however, that the cause nearest in sequence must necessarily be held to be the proximate cause; for, ordinarily, the law imposes liability upon him whose wrongful act is the active, efficient, and procuring cause of an injury which is the natural and probable consequence of that act, though the injury may not follow the act in immediate sequence. Cannon v. Lockhart Mills, 101 S. C. 62, 85 S. E. 233. even But, as said by Judge Wardlaw in Harrison v. Berkley, 32 S. C. L. (1 Strobh.) 525, 549, 47 Am. Dec. 578: To the same effect are the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U. S. 7, 53 L. ed. 671, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321. Master and servant Federal Employers' Liability Actinjury by robber. Let the principles announced in the cases cited be applied to the facts of this case, and the conclusion is inevitable that the negligence alleged was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Certainly, the want of light did not directly cause or contribute to the injury. There was no causal connection whatever between the two events. That kind of an injury was neither a natural nor a probable consequence which might reasonably have been expected to result from the failure to keep all the lights burning. The want of light was merely a condition which might or might not have influenced the intervening independent act of the robber, over whom defendant had no control. The authorities are practically unanimous in holding that, when the negligence alleged appears merely to have brought about a condition of affairs, or a situation under which another and entirely independent and efficient agency intervenes to cause the injury, the latter is to be deemed the direct or proximate cause, and the former only the indirect or remote cause. The doctrine is discussed and illustrated by numerous cases in 1 Thomp. Neg. §§ 43 et seq. A late case in point is Chancey v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 174 N. C. 351, L.R.A.1918A, 1070, 93 S. E. 834, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 580, in which the court held that a carrier was not liable for the robbery of a passenger, alleged to have been caused by the insufficient lighting and overcrowding of its cars. As the facts, viewed in the most favorable light for plaintiff, were undisputed and susceptible of but one reasonable inference, the decision of the question was one of law for the court. Judgment affirmed. Gary, Ch. J. and Watts, Fraser, and Gage, JJ., concur. ANNOTATION. Insufficient lighting as proximate cause of assault or robbery. An extended search has disclosed but two reported cases aside from the reported case (CARTER v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. Co. ante, 1411) involving the specific question whether failure to maintain a sufficient light may be regarded as the proximate cause of an assault or robbery, and those cases support the decision in the CARTER CASE. Thus, the negligence of a railroad. company in permitting a passenger coach to be without light and overcrowded, was held in Chancey v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. (1917) 174 N. C. 351, L.R.A.1918A, 1070, 93 S. E. 834, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 580, not to be the proximate cause of an assault upon and robbery of a passenger by a fellow passenger, and the carrier was therefore held not liable for the loss thereby caused. So, too, in Prokop v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (1904) 34 Tex. Civ. App. 520, 79 S. W. 101, an action for personal injuries to a woman alleged to have been sustained by reason of an assault committed by a negro, predicated on the fact that she was left alone in an unlighted station while awaiting her train, in affirming the judgment of the trial court sustaining a general demurrer to the petition, it was held as matter of law that the darkness and the isolation of the passenger were alone insufficient to put the defendant on notice of any danger from third persons, and that the injury was not the proximate result of failure on the part of the company to light the room. The court in the Chancey Case, among other authorities, relied upon Cobb v. Great Western R. Co. [1893] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 459 (an action to re |