Garnishmentduty to protect rights of garnishees. (- Utah, - circumstances, to protect the rights -right of garnishee to be present when box is opened. owner or owners may be notified to court and make known their rights or interest in or to the articles. To follow such a course in no way impedes or interferes with the expeditious and orderly administration of justice, and can in no way interfere with the plaintiff's rights in the premises. While, in pursuing such a course, all the property belonging to the judgment debtor and in the possession or under the control of the garnishee, which is subject to execution, must be surrendered, yet it also safeguards and protects the rights of the garnishee, as well as those who may have or claim some rights to or interests in the property found in the safety deposit box, without in any way interfering with the rights of the plaintiff in the action. It was not necessary in this case, nor, as we conceive, is it necessary in any case, that notice be given to the judgment debtor or to any person other than the garnishee that the safety deposit box be opened for inspection, as herein suggested. Such an order may be made upon an ex parte application, but when it is made it should comply with the conditions herein suggested, to the end that all interests and rights may be protected. That We are of the opinion, therefore, that the order in this case is too broad and sweeping, and does not sufficiently guard and protect the rights of the garnishee, or of such persons as may have had access to and may have had property in the safety deposit box. Nor is there, in any of the cases to which we have referred, anything which leads to a different conclusion, unless it be found in the case of United States v. Graff, 67 Barb. 305, 4 Hun, 634. In that case it was held to be proper for the sheriff to exclude both parties and their attorneys or agents while he was opening and inspecting the contents of an iron safe. case was decided forty-five years ago, since which time the use of safety deposit boxes by the general public has been greatly increased, and since which time the law govern ing safety deposit boxes has been more fully developed. But even though that case were of recent origin, we should, nevertheless, not feel inclined to follow it in that respect. In all of the other cases cited, there is nothing said in the opinions which in any way militates against the views herein expressed. There is, however, considerable said which is in perfect harmony with the foregoing views. In Tillinghast v. Johnson, 34 R. I. 136, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 764, 82 Atl. 788, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 960, it is said that under the Garnishment Statute "the court may take such action, in accordance with proper legal procedure, as will enable it to determine the liability of the garnishee. This would warrant the court in directing the garnishee to break the seal upon such parcel, or to open such safety deposit box and to inspect the contents thereof, that he may disclose the same to the court, and thus enable it to determine as to whether the garnishee is chargeable, and to what extent." What is there said clearly implies that the garnishee, as well as the sheriff, should have access to the contents of the box, and if it claims some interest in the contents, or has reason to believe, and does believe, that the property, or some of it, does not belong to the judgment debtor, the garnishee may make that fact known to the court, and the court may then determine the ownership of the property; that is, in the language of the opinion just quoted from, the court may then "determine as to whether the garnishee is chargeable, and to what extent." Again, in 12 R. C. L., supra, the language of the text is: "In such cases the court may cause the box to be opened to determine the garnishee's liability." In order to do that, the garnishee, for its own protection, must be given the right to inspect the property deposited in the box, and to direct the court's attention to such as it may claim, or to such as may be the property of someone other than the judgment debtor. The garnishee, under no circumstances, will be chargeable with any property except such as is owned by the judgment debtor, or in which he has a beneficial interest which may be reached by the process of garnishment. Moreover, we think the course herein outlined should be followed for the officer's protection, as well as for the protection of the garnishee. If a full and accurate inventory is made by the garnishee, the officer would also be protected against false or unjust claims by those who may claim an interest in or right to some of the property found in such box. We do not wish to be understood, by anything we have herein before said, that when it is made to appear, as in this case, that the judgment debtor has a safety deposit box which is under the control of the garnishee, and an application is made to the court for an order requiring the garnishee to open such box, it would not be proper practice for the court to issue an order requiring the garnishee to appear before the court or judge forthwith, and show cause why the box should not be opened and the contents thereof exhibited as hereinbefore stated. In most cases such a course would avoid all misunderstandings. If such a course had been followed in this case we are convinced that this controversy would have been avoided. It would then have been made to appear that the box could be opened without the judgment debtor's key, and without force or injury to the box, and no doubt the garnishee would have complied with the court's order to open the box after its objections challenging the jurisdiction of the court had been passed on. As it is, the box still remains unopened, and its contents are still undisclosed. We are of the opinion, therefore, that while the court was authorized to make the order, yet the order is too broad and sweeping, and does not sufficiently protect the rights of the garnishee or of any other person, if there be such, as may have property or some interest in the property deposited in the safety deposit box. For the reasons last stated the cause is remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County, with directions to modify the order so as to require the officer to permit the garnishee, by its attorney or agent, or both, to be present when the box is opened, and to take a full and accurate inventory of the contents of the box, and to make any claim, as herein suggested, to any property or articles found in the box, and, in case any claim is made, to present the same to the court for determination at the earliest possible time consistent wtih orderly procedure. In view of the whole record, we are of the opinion that one half of the costs of this appeal should be paid by the plaintiff, and the other half by the garnishee. Such is the order. Corfman, Ch. J., and Weber, Gideon, and Thurman, JJ., concur. ANNOTATION. Levy upon or garnishment of contents of safety deposit box. The majority of the cases which have passed upon the question whether or not the contents of a safety deposit box are subject to levy, attachment, or garnishment have held in accordance with the rule laid down in the reported case (WEST CACHE SUGAR Co. v. HENDRICKSON, ante, 216) that the contents of such boxes may be reached. Thus, in Washington Loan & T. Co. V. Susquehanna Coal Co. (1905) 26 App. D. C. 149, under a statute liberally providing for reaching a debtor's "goods, chattels, and credits" by garnishment, and permitting interrogatories concerning any such property to be served upon any garnishee, it was held that property in a safe deposit vault was not exempt from execution or attachment. The court said: "Property of a defendant in a safe deposit box of a trust company is either in the possession of the defendant, or in the possession of the trust company. If it is in the possession of the defendant, under the Code, it appears liable to attachment and execution. If it is in the possession of the trust company, such company may be garnished therefor, as in possession of personal property of the defendant capable of being seized and sold on execution. A mere device to guard from intrusion the defendant's property in the vault of the trust company neither devests the defendant of his property, nor releases the company from its charge of defendant's property. There is no magic in two keys,-a master key and a customer's key,-to put property belonging to a defendant in an attachment beyond the reach of creditors and the process of the courts. If there were a doubt respecting the term 'possession,' there can be no doubt that property deposited by a defendant in a safe deposit box of a trust company is the defendant's property in the hands of, and in charge of, the trust company; and, by the terms of the Code, the trust company is liable to be 11 A.L.R.-15. garnished therefor.. We find no good reason for exempting property of a defendant in a safe deposit vault from execution or attachment." The court also pointed out with some emphasis that, in the District of Columbia, a trust company, as garnishee, may be compelled to disclose whether or not it has in its possession, or under its control, a safe deposit box belonging to a defendant in an attachment proceeding, and its knowledge, if any, of the contents of such box. And in Tillinghast v. Johnson (1912) 34 R. I. 136, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 764, 82 Atl. 788, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 960, it was held that the contents of a safety deposit box are not rendered exempt from garnishment in the hands of the company maintaining and renting the right to use it, by the fact that it can be opened without injury only by the use of a key in the possession of the customer, if, under the statutes, the court has power to direct the forcible opening of the box to secure an examination of its contents, which power it has when the statutes authorize examination of the garnishee, and the taking of such action in accordance with proper legal proceedings as will enable the court to determine the liability of the garnishee. This case is also authority for the general proposition that, where the statutes provide a method by which the courts can ascertain the contents of safety deposit boxes, a company maintaining and renting the same can be garnished for the contents thereof. So, in Trowbridge v. Spinning (1900) 23 Wash. 48, 54 L.R.A. 204, 83 Am. St. Rep. 806, 62 Pac. 125, under a statute commanding a garnishee to answer as to the personal property or effects of the defendant in his possession or under his control, it was held that a safe deposit company, having valuables of a debtor in its vaults, was subject to garnishment therefor, although it had no access to the con tents of the box in which the valuables were kept. And in United States v. Graff (1875) 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 304, in holding that a court having jurisdiction of an attachment proceeding may properly direct the sheriff to open a safe in the custody of a trust company, containing the defendant's property, and to take and keep the property and evidences of debt liable to attachment found therein, the court said: "There was nothing improper in that portion of the order made which directed the sheriff to open the safe and tin box containing the defendant's property. The process could be effectually served in no other way. It was the duty of the officer acting under it immediately to attach the real and personal estate of the debtor. And that could only be done by taking it into his custody, where the property was tangible in its character. Neither the safe nor the tin box constituted any portion of the defendant's dwelling, and they were not within the protection which the law affords to that, against an officer acting under civil process. They were simply places of deposit and safe-keeping for the defendant's property, which the sheriff may enter to make the seizure required by law, in the execution of the process in his hands. If that were not so, there would be nothing to prevent a failing or insolvent debtor from turning all his property into valuable securities, or other articles requiring but little space for their custody, and then placing them in the hands of a safe deposit company for preservation, and defying all the efforts of his creditors to satisfy their debts by resorting to them. That would form an expedient for the success of fraudulent devices, which might render the laws of the state for the collection of debts entirely powerless. No such effect could be given to a deposit of that nature, without at once defeating the object plainly designed to be secured by the law, in rendering the debtor's property liable to the process issued in favor of his creditors in actions brought to recover their just debts. Against that, his dwelling alone is secured against the intrusive action of the officer. And that, in no sense, can be so far extended as to include either the safe or tin box in the custody of the Mercantile Trust Company, for the defendant." And the reported case (WEST CACHE SUGAR Co. v. HENDRICKSON, ante, 216) is authority not only for the proposition that, when the statutes confer upon a court having jurisdiction all the means necessary to carry it into effect, a court having jurisdiction of a garnishment proceeding may require the garnishee to open a safety deposit box which the defendant rents of it, but also for the proposition that the court may require a safety deposit box to be opened by drilling, that the garnishee may be required to open the box at its own expense, that neither the garnishee nor the defendant is entitled to notice before the making of an order requiring the opening of the box, and that in ordering the opening of a box the court must safeguard not only the rights of the garnishee, but also those of the defendant and others, if any, interested in the box or its contents, the latter by permitting the garnishee to be present when the box is opened, and to make an inventory of its contents, and to present to the court any claim which may exist to property not belonging to the defendant. However, there is authority to the effect that the contents of a safe deposit box cannot be subjected to attachment. Thus, in Gregg v. Hilson (1871) 8 Phila. (Pa.) 91, where a safe deposit company rented a vault under a contract expressly providing that only in case of refusal to surrender the keys and give up possession at the expiration of the lease was the company authorized to break open the safe, it was held that the rented safe and its contents were not "a debt due to the defendant, or a deposit of money," etc., within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Attachment Statutes, the court saying that the contents of the safe in question were in the actual possession of the renter of the safe, and had not been deposited with the garnishee. G. J. C. (145 Minn. 35, 176 N. W. 173.) Damares - excess submission to operation. 1. The damages are not excessive. Plaintiff was not obliged to submit to an operation in order to reduce his damages. [See note on this question beginning on page 230.] APPEAL by defendant from orders of the District Court for Hennepin County (Leary, J.) denying motions for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff, or for new trial, or for findings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Moore v. St. Paul City R. Co. 136 Minn. 315, 162 N. W. 298; Carlson v. Duluth Street R. Co. 111 Minn. 244, 126 N. W. 825. The damages are so excessive as to have been given by the jury under passion and prejudice. Zuponic v. Val Blatz Brewing Co. 131 Minn. 112, 154 N. W. 790, 11 N. C. C. A. 255; Larson v. Wisconsin R. Light & P. Co. 138 Minn. 158, 164 N. W. 666; Slette v. Great Northern R. Co. 53 Minn. 341, 55 N. W. 137; Gahagan v. Æromotor Co. 67 Minn. 252, 69 N. W. 914, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 92; Johnson v. St. Paul City R. Co. 67 Minn. 260, 36 L.R.A. 586, 69 N. W. 900, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 93; Bennett v. E. W. Backus Lumber Co. 77 Minn. 198, 79 N. W. 682; Torske v. Commonwealth Lumber Co. 86 Minn. 276, 90 N. W. 532; Northrup v. Hayward, 99 Minn. 299, 109 N. W. 241. The court erred in denying the motion of defendant to dismiss plaintiff's action, or to make findings under the Compensation Act allowing or disallowing compensation, and in submitting the question to the jury. Mahowald v. Thompson-Starrett Co. 134 Minn. 113, 158 N. W. 913, 159 N. W. 565; State ex rel. Breckenridge v. District Ct. 136 Minn. 151, A.L.R. -- 161 N. W. 388; Harris v. Hobart Iron Co. 127 Minn. 399, 149 N. W. 662, 7 N. C. C. A. 44; Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620; Hade v. |