(145 Minn. 344, 177 N. W. 354.) on as barring claimant's right to relief, but also operated as an estoppel against the estate to assert the statute as bar. Brand v. Brand, 63 L.R.A. 206, summary of notes; Bigelow, Estoppel, p. 682. Mr. Daniel F. Foley, for respond ents: No constructive fraud exists. 20 Cyc. 9; 16 Cyc. 87; 1 Bigelow, Fr. 10. An administrator has no principal who can be bound by fraudulent acts. Taylor v. Davis (Taylor v. Mayo) 110 JJ. S. 330, 28 L. ed. 163, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147; Story, Agency, §§ 280-286. The administrator's fraud cannot bind the estate. Roberts v. Spencer, 112 Ind. 85, 13 N. E. 129; 18 Cyc. 471; Woerner, Administration, 2d ed. § 402; Spaulding v. Suss, 4 Mo. App. 541; Kells v. Lewis, 91 Iowa, 128, 58 N. W. 1074. Even if the court had power to extend the time for filing claims, relator has shown no such facts as would justify such an order. State ex rel. Lukes v. Williams, 123 Minn. 57, 142 N. W. 945; State ex rel. Anderson v. Ross, 133 Minn. 172, 157 N. W. 1075. The statutes which provide for filing, claims are mandatory. Gilman v. Maxwell, 79 Minn. 377, 82 N. W. 669; State ex rel. Thompson v. Probate Ct. 66 Minn. 246, 68 N. W. 1063; Berryhill v. Peabody, 77 Minn. 59, 79 N. W. 651; Hantzch v. Massolt, 61 Minn. 361, 63 N. W. 1069; Brown v. Farnham, 55 Minn. 27, 56 N. W. 352; Schurmeier v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 69 C. C. A. 22, 137 Fed. 42. Holt, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The district court of Hennepin county quashed a writ of certiorari granted by it to review an order of the probate court of said county denying relator's petition to extend the time to present a claim against an estate, then in course of administration in that court. The relator appeals. The order of the probate court does not indicate the ground upon wh the petition was denied. However, in the return to the writ of certiorari, the probate judge stated that he considered the petition sufficient to warrant the relief asked, but deemed the court without power to act, because more than eighteen months had expired since the order was made for creditors to present claims. Without stopping to consider or decide whether this recital by the judge in his return to the writ presents an error which a reviewing court may lay hold of, when the record otherwise shows no ground for reversal, we come directly to the questions argued by counsel ir this court, viz: (1) May the presentation of a claim against an estate to the administrator thereof be held a compliance with § 7320, Gen. Stat. 1913? (2) If not, has the probate court the power to extend the time for receiving a claim after the expiration of more than eighteen months from the time the order to present claims was made and published? The record discloses that the administrator herein was appointed February 7, 1917, and on the same day the court made and filed the order for creditors to present claims, which order was, duly published. The petition states that on March 19, 1917, relator verified an itemized claim against the estate, and handed the same to the administrator, believing that by so doing she had complied with the law, and relying also upon the assurance of the administrator that nothing more need be done by her with reference to presenting the same to the court. She made no other attempt to present her claim to the court until this petition was filed on December 23, 1919. Under the common-law practice, and also under statutory regulations in some states, the presentation of claims against the estates of deceased persons is to the executor or administrator; and he passes on the validity thereof. Not so under our Code. The provisions pertinent to the questions here presented are found in §§ 7320 to 7327 inclusive, Gen. Stat. 1913. Section 7320 provides that the probate court, upon granting letters testamentary, shall make an order limiting the time for creditors to present claims against the estate and fixing the time and place when and where proofs will be heard, and such claims examined and adjusted. The time so limited shall not exceed one year. Notice of the order is given by publication (§ 7321). That, under our probate practice, presentation of claims. of claims against an estate must be made to the court, and not to the administrator, is clear from the fact that the administrator may not pay any claim or receive credit therefor in his account, unless the court, within the time limited by the order referred to, acted thereon. The probate court is a court of record, so that, if anything is presented to such a court for action, it is made a matter of record therein. Claims of the sort now in controversy must be itemized and verified; hence are written documents. The time of presentation is ordinarily indorsed on the claims, and they are left in the custody of the court. The order in this case required the creditors to file their claims with the court. That this was a proper order, under the practice that obtains in this state, may not be doubted. That presentation means a filing of the claim in court is indicated by §§ 7324 and 7325; the first of which requires the administrator to file in court a statement, in writing, of any offsets he claims "against any of the claims filed," and the second provides that "no claim or demand, or offset thereto, shall be allowed which was barred by the Statute of Limitations when filed." Executors and administrators -when claims presented. We cannot hold the presentation to the administrator a compliance with the statute. Relator insists that § 7322 confers power to extend the time to present claims, even after the expiration of the eighteen-month period therein mentioned. The section now reads: "For cause shown, and upon notice to the executor or administrator, the court, in its discretion, may receive, hear, and allow a claim when presented before the final settlement of the administrator's or executor's ac count, and within one year and six months after the time when notice of the order was given." The application of the last clause stands out clearer in the language of the statute in force before the Revised Laws of 1905 took effect. Chapter 82, Laws 1899, amended § 102 of the Probate Code (chap. 46, Laws 1889). That section contained provisions now found in §§ 7320 and 7322, Gen. Stat. 1913. The sentence and part of a sentence in the amendment pertinent to the present inquiry, and which the revisers recast into a section by itself (7322), are: "No claim or demand shall be received after the expiration of the time so limited, unless for good cause shown. The court may in its discretion receive, hear and allow such claim upon notice to the executor or administrator, but no claim shall be received or allowed unless presented within one year and six months' from the time when notice of the order is given, as provided in the next section, and before final settlement," etc. The "next section" referred to concerns the publication of the order. Mere change in phraseology and rearrangement of the law in the Revision of 1905 was not intended to work a change in the meaning thereof, unless such a purpose is discernible from the conflict in the language between the provisions in the Revised Laws and the prior statutes. The latter may always be resorted to as an aid to the correct interpretation of the revision. Our conclusion is that the law, while it invests probate courts with wide discretion to accept belated claims up to the expiration of one year and six months after the order for creditors to present claims has been made and published (State ex rel. Musgrave v. Probate Ct. 79 Minn. 257, 82 N. W. 580), withholds the power to receive such claims, if presented after the expiration of said -authority to period. In Gilman permit presentav. Maxwell, 79 Minn. 377, 82 N. W. 669, this court designated the Nonclaim Statute of our tion after time. (145 Minn. 344, 177 N. W. 354.) Probate Code as mandatory. See, also, the view taken of this provision by both the majority and minority opinions, in Schurmeier v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 96 C. C. A. 107, 171 Fed. 1, particularly in the forceful dissenting opinion of Judge Sanborn. When the Nonclaim Statute has run as against claims of decedents, the estate passes free from such claims to the heirs or legatees. In Pullman v. Pullman (C. C.) 10 Fed. 53, the distinction between the ordinary statutes of limitation and the nonclaim statutes relating to claims against decedents is clearly set out. It is there said that an administrator may waive the former, but not the latter, which are rules of property, as well as statutes of limitation. This decision is approvingly referred to in Security Trust Co. v. Black River Nat. Bank, 187 U. S. 211, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52, 47 L. ed. 147, where effect was given to our Nonclaim Statute. Statutes of nonclaim are applied more rigorously than the general statutes of limitation. 2 Woerner, Administration, 2d ed. § 402; Winter v. Winter, 101 Wis. 494, 77 N. W. 883. But appellant suggests that the administrator was guilty of constructive fraud by receiving her claim and assuring her that she had done all that was needful to assert her rights when she handed it to him. Baart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, 116 Am. St. Rep. 394, 108 N. W. 945, is cited to the proposition that a statutory bar does not save even a decree to one who has obtained it by fraud. Overlooking the meager allegations of facts tending to show constructive fraud in the petition, and the absence therein of any excuse for the delay, we do not think the case at bar can be made to parallel the case cited. The administrator has no authority to represent the heirs or crediors in the administration of an estate, except in so far as he is required to conserve the estate for all interested therein. He is not personally affected by the adjudication upon claims. Nor has he any power to waive the Nonclaim Statute (§ 7323), which provides that "all claims against the estate of a decedent, arising upon contract, whether due, not due, or contingent, must be presented to the court for allowance, within the time fixed by the order, or be forever barred." In Nagle v. Ball, 71 Miss. 330, 13 So. 929, it is held: "The administrator cannot waive the absolute bar created by statute for the protection of estates of decedents. He cannot abrogate a positive rule of law requiring probate of claims within the prescribed period by conduct of his own, however misleading or designing." In Gilman v. Maxwell, supra, this court said: "It is not within the power of the administrator of an estate to waive compliance with the statute, and the authorities cited by appellant are not in point, because of this mandatory statute." See also Roberts v. Flatt, 142 Ill. 485, 32 N. E, 484; Miner v. Aylesworth, 18 Fed. 199; 18 Cyc. 500. -effect of nonclaim. If the statute cannot be waived, the means employed in the attempt are of no consequence. The per- fraudulent repsons interested in resentationsrelator's claim are those entitled to participate in the estate after certain preferred claims are paid. It is not pretended that any of these interested persons practised either actual or constructive chargeable with the administrator's fraud upon relator, nor are they deception, if any, towards her. We conclude that the Probate Court was without power to receive the claim, and that it was barred at the time relator presented her petition. The order is affirmed. ANNOTATION. Effect of conduct of personal representative preventing filing of claim against estate within time allowed by the statute of nonclaims. The decided weight of authority upon the question under consideration herein, except where modified by special statutory provision, is in accordance with the general rule that a personal representative cannot waive or suspend the so-called special nonclaim or administration statute of limitations. The following cases, which involve the question of the effect of conduct preventing the filing of a claim against an estate within the statutory period, support this rule: Alabama.-Decatur Branch Bank v. Donelson (1848) 12 Ala. 741; Lowe v. Jones (1849) 15 Ala. 545. sonal representative is sufficient to prevent the bar of the statute as to a claim not filed within the statutory period. See Littlefield v. Eaton (1883) 74 Me. 516; Hinshaw v. Warren (1912) 167 Mo. App. 365, 151 S. W. 497; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Barnes (1868) 48 N. H. 25, cited with approval on subsequent appeal in (1870) 49 N. H. 312; Judge of Probate v. Ellis (1885) 63 N. H. 366; Lewis v. Champion (1885) 40 N. J. Eq. 59; and Seattle Nat. Bank v. Dickinson (1913) 72 Wash. 403, 130 Pac. 372. To illustrate: In Hinshaw v. Warren (1912) 167 Mo. App. 365, 151 S. W. 497, it was held that an agreement by an administrator to waive service of notice of claim did not prevent the running of the Statute of Nonclaim. And in Lewis v. Champion (1885) 40 N. J. Eq. 59, the executor told a creditor that his claim was all right, and that it would be paid, but such statement was held not to excuse the formal filing of the claim. In Powell v. Moore (1919) Vt. 108 Atl. 398, it was held that an "understanding" obtained from a personal representative by a claimant, that a claim filed by a company formed by him was to be regarded as his individual claim, did not excuse a failure formally to file the individual claim as such. And upon the theory that an executor or administrator is the representative of the estate, and cannot New Jersey. - Lewis v. Champion accept employment from, or act as the (1885) 40 N. J. Eq. 59. agent of, a creditor in presenting a claim against the estate, it has been held that a delay in presenting a claim. cannot be excused by proof that the creditor presented his claim to the executor, with a request that the latter should take such action as was necessary to have the claim properly filed, and that the executor agreed to do so, even if it were within the power of an executor to waive the statutory provision. Re Hobson (1907) 40 Colo. 332, 91 Pac. 929. And it has been held that the fact that the executor or administrator removes himself and continues absent from the state, after a Statute of Nonclaim which imposes upon the creditor the necessity of presenting his claim has commenced running, does not prevent the bar of the statute, at least where the statute itself makes no exception for such a case. Decatur Branch Bank v. Donelson (1848) 12 Ala. 741; Lowe v. Jones (1849) 15 Ala. 545. And it is especially true that absence of the personal representative from the state does not suspend the running of the Statute of Nonclaim, where the law permits claims to be filed at his place of business, notwithstanding he be absent at the time. Douglass v. Folsom (1893) 21 Nev. 441, 33 Pac. 660. In New Hampshire, upon the theory that the question is whether or not the absence of a personal representative from the state prevented or defeated the exhibition of a claim, so that by reasonable diligence the claimant could not present it, it has been held that a temporary absence of a personal representative from the state does not suspend or stop the Statute of Limitations, but that, on the other hand, his extended absence from the state, whereby the presentment of claims within the statutory period is prevented, will extend the time limit. Walker v. Cheever (1859) 39 N. H. 420. The reported case (STATE EX REL. SCHERBER V. PROBATE CT. ante, 242) is authority for the proposition that, in the absence of statutory exception, even fraudulent misrepresentations upon the part of the personal representative do not excuse a failure to file a claim within the statutory period. In this case the court assumed constructive fraud, in that the administrator received the claim and assured the claimant that she had done all that was necessary, but ruled broadly that by no act of a personal representative, even though it prevented a claimant filing his claim, can the bar of a Statute of Nonclaim be lifted or waived. And in Nagle v. Ball (1893) 71 Miss. 330, 13 So. 929, it was again held, applying the rule that an administrator cannot waive the absolute bar created by a Statute of Nonclaim, that no conduct of his own, however misleading or designing, could excuse the filing of a claim within the statutory period. In this case the administrator had merely informed the claimant that it would not be necessary to probate the account in question, as he had a right to settle it, but the court assumed for purposes of argument that the administrator had practised fraud which prevented the claimant from probating his claim. And in Cockrell v. Seasongood (1902) Miss., 33 So. 77, where fraud on the part of an administrator was alleged to have prevented the filing of a claim within the short statutory period, it was held that the case was "controlled perfectly" by Nagle v. Ball (Miss.) supra. But in some of the states a more liberal rule obtains. This, however, is generally the result of statutory exceptions. Thus, in Indiana, under a statute providing for the reopening of a final settlement of an estate for illegality, fraud, or mistake in the settlement or prior proceedings, at the suit of one adversely affected, it has been held that where an administrator, by fraudulent promises to pay a claim to a creditor who had no disinterested friends, and who by reason of sickness could not give personal attention to the filing of the claim, thereby throws the creditor off his guard so that he does not file his claim, and the administrator, without notice to the creditor, makes final settlement without including the claim of such creditor, the latter may have the settlement vacated. Chase v. Beeson (1883) 92 Ind. 61. The court said: "It is not the duty of the administrator to assist claimants in the filing and allowance of their claims, nor to keep the estate open for the filing of such claims. As to all unfounded or doubtful claims, it is his duty to make resistance. On the other hand, as to all bona fide creditors, the administrator holds the estate in trust, and it is clearly not his duty, by any kind of unfair dealing, deceit, or fraud, to defeat the filing and allowance of their claims. To practise such fraud or de |