Papers in Experimental EconomicsVernon L. Smith is the main creator of the burgeoning discipline of experimental economics. This collection of his papers from 1962 to 1988 surveys major developments in the field from early attempts to simulate economic behavior in now classic double oral auction markets through recent studies of industrial organization and decision making. Topics covered include monopoly and oligopoly supply and demand theory under posted pricing, uniform pricing, double continuous auction, and sealed bid-offer auction; hypothetical valuation and market pricing; asset price bubbles; predatory pricing; market contestability and natural monopoly; and the methodology of experimental economics. Taken together, the papers form a history of the study of economics under controlled conditions. Vernon Smith is Regents Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona, and is the author of over 100 articles and books on capital theory, finance, natural resource economics, and experimental economics. He is president of the Public Choice Society and past founding president of the Economic Science Association. |
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Obsah
Part II Institutions and Market Performance | 159 |
Part III Public Goods | 373 |
Part IV Auctions and Institutional Design | 507 |
Part V Industrial Organization | 703 |
Part VI Perspectives on Economics | 781 |
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Papers in Experimental Economics Vernon L. Smith,Vernon Smith (L.) Náhled není k dispozici. - 1991 |
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