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of, and owing immediate allegiance to one of the Indian tribes (an alien, though dependent power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children, born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations. Such Indians, then, not being citizens by birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, by being naturalized in the United States by or under some treaty or statute." 25

§ 144. Disappearance of Indian Tribal Autonomy.

Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Elk v. Wilkins a number of acts of Congress have been passed which have had the effect of destroying, to a very considerable extent, the autonomous tribal governments of the Indians and of subjecting them to the immediate legislative control of Congress instead of to the treatymaking power. The way had been opened to this change in a "rider" attached to an appropriation bill in 1871 which pro vided, as has been earlier stated, that "No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.'

" 26

By an act passed March 3, 1885, the federal courts were for the first time given considerable jurisdiction over crimes committed within the reservations by Indians upon Indians. Section

25 Justices Wood and Harlan dissented.

26 Notwithstanding this act, Congress has continued to deal with the Indians, in many cases, by agreements. That is, their formal consent has been required as a condition precedent to putting into force the legislation proposed. Some question as to the constitutionality of this has been raised, it being alleged that the practice amounts to a delegation by Congress of its legislative power in the premises. It would seem, however, that the objection is not of great weight, as it is conceded that a legislative body may make a statute conditional upon the consent of those to whom it applies, provided such assent affects merely the expediency of the statute (Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., p. 164).

9 of this law provides: "That immediately upon and after the date of the passing of this Act all Indians committing against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following crimes; namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny, within any Territory of the United States, and either within or without the Indian Reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of said territory relating to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same courts and in the same manner, and shall be subject to the same penalties, as are all other persons charged with the commission of said crimes respectively; and said courts are hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such Indians committing any of the above described crimes against the person or property of another Indian or other person, within the boundaries of any State of the United States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall be subject to the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same manner, and subject to the same penalties, as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."

The constitutionality of this act was attacked upon the ground that it was not within the legislative power of Congress thus to interfere with the internal legal affairs of Indians still maintaining tribal governments. The Supreme Court held, however, in United States v. Kagama,27 that whatever political and legal freedom was enjoyed by the Indians was by way of permission or cession from the Federal Government, and was, therefore, subject to curtailment or complete withdrawal by that power. "These Indian tribes," it declared, "are the wards of the Nation. They are communities dependent on the United States, dependent largely for their daily food, dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection."

To this decision the objection was urged, and, it would seem, with considerable force, that since the Indians are no longer permitted to enjoy tribal autonomy, and are no longer treated by the 27 118 U. S. 375; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1109; 30 L. ed. 228.

Federal Government as independent communities which are to be dealt with by treaties instead of statutes, there disappears the constitutional justification for denying to the States the control of such of them as live within their territorial limits. To this the Supreme Court had no better answer to give than that of expediency always a poor, if not an absolutely invalid argument. "The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers," it said, "is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell." Upon this argument the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government over the negroes could, in a degree at least, be justified.

At various times during past years, Congress has declared as to particular Indian tribes, that their lands should be divided and held in severalty by their respective members, and that, thereupon, such Indians should become citizens of the United States, and pass immediately from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government to that of the States in which they reside. By the General Land in Severalty Law, known as the "Dawes Act,” approved February 8, 1887, the President was given the power to apply this process to practically every Indian reservation in the country. The peculiarity of these acts is, it will be observed, that it makes citizens of Indians against their will. The action is taken at the discretion of the President and citizenship is the result.28

28 The following are the provisions of this act upon the points under discussion:

"That in all cases where any tribe or band of Indians has been, or shall hereafter be, located upon any reservation created for their use, either by treaty stipulation or by virtue of an act of Congress or executive order setting apart the same for their use, the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized, whenever in his opinion any reservation or any part thereof of such Indians is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes, to cause said reservation, or any part thereof, to be surveyed, or resurveyed if necessary, and to allot the lands in said reservation in severalty to any Indian located thereon in quantities as follows:

"Sec. 5. That upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be of the legal effect, and

The declaration of 1871, and the acts of 1885 and 1887, and the sustaining of their constitutionality by the Supreme Court, illustrate the legal power of the United States to govern the tribal Indians at will as bodies of individuals completely subject to its legal control, despite the status of quasi-independence that has been accorded them. This absolute power of control has been conspicuously exhibited in more recent legislation which has been enacted in pursuance of a policy decided upon to abolish, as rapidly as possible, the tribal relations and governments, to extinguish the Indian titles to lands, and to incorporate the individual Indians in the general citizen bodies of the States and Territories in which they live.

declare that the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of his heirs, according to the laws of the State or Territory where such land is located, and that at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever: Provided, That the President of the United States may in any case in his discretion extend the period.

"Sec. 6. That upon the completion of said allotments and the patenting of the lands to said allottees, each and every member of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory, in which they may reside; and no Territory shall pass or enforce any law denying any such Indian within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. And every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States to whom allotments shall have been made under the provisions of this act, or under law or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens whether said Indian has been or not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the territorial limits of the United States without in any manner impairing or otherwise affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property..

"Sec. 8. That the provision of this act shall not extend to the territory occupied by the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, and Osage, Miamies and Peorias, and Sacs and Foxes, in the Indian Territory, nor to any of the reservations of the Senaca Nation of New York Indians in the State of New York, nor to that strip of territory in the State of Nebraska

The new policy was based upon the facts found by the so-called "Dawes Commission," which was created by the acts of March 3, 1893, and March 2, 1895.30

29

The constitutionality of thus summarily dealing with the Indians by statute, has been questioned in a number of cases before the Supreme Court, but has always been sustained.

In Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,31 decided in 1899, it was held that because such legislation might be in violation of previous treaties with the Cherokees was no ground for holding it in valid.” As to the general legislative powers of Congress over the Indians, the court said: "We need not review the decisions on the subject, as they are sufficiently referred to by Mr. Justice Harlan in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co. (135 U. S. 641; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 965; 34 L. ed. 295), from whose opinion we quote as follows: The proposition that the Cherokee Nation is sovereign in the sense that the United States is sovereign, or in the sense that the several States are sovereign, and that that

adjoining the Sioux Nation on the south added by executive order." Stat., § 2316.)

nation

(Rev.

The "Dawes" Act of 1887 also provides for allotments of land and citizenship to Indians who may wish to settle upon the public lands of the United States. It also declares that all Indians forsaking their tribal life and adopting the habits of civilized life shall become citizens. Without this express statutory provision, as was decided in Elk v. Wilkins, citizenship could not thus be obtained.

The peculiar status of those Indians who have not become citizens is illustrated in the form of a letter of protection issued in lieu of a passport, to those traveling abroad. The following is a letter issued by our consul at Odessa, the form of which has been approved by the State Department = "To whom it may concern:

"The bearer of this document is a North American Indian whose name is Hampa. This Indian is a ward of the United States, and is entitled to the protection of its consular and other officials. He is not, however, entitled to a passport, as he is not a citizen of the United States. This consul ate has the honor to request the Russian authorities to grant Hampa all necessary protection during his stay in Russia, and to grant him permission to depart when he requires it."

29 27 Stat. at L. c. 209.

30 28 Stat. at L. c. 189.

31 174 U. S. 445; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; 43 L. ed. 1041.

32 Quoting Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; 42 L. ed.

740.

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