landlord accept double rent under the statute (g). And it seems to be a general rule that a reasonable demand of possession, or perhaps even an entry on the premises by the landlord in the absence of the tenant (h), is sufficient to determine the holding of a mere tenant at will, as where a party is let into possession under an agreement for a lease (i); or to expel the minister of a dissenting congregation, who had possession simply in that character, for the purposes of worship only (k). Where a tenant sets his landlord at defiance, and disclaims his title, and denies that he holds of him, or attorns to some other person, no notice to quit need be given (7). But in order to make a verbal or written disclaimer sufficient, it must amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant; or to a distinct claim to hold possession upon a ground wholly inconsistent with the existence of that relation, which by necessary implication is a repudiation of it. An omission to acknowledge the landlord by requiring further information will not be enough (m); nor will a mere refusal to pay rent (n). Thus, the refusal to pay rent to a devisee, under a contested will, accompanied with a declaration, that the tenant was ready to pay the party entitled, is not of itself a sufficient disclaimer for this purpose (o). And it seems that the mere payment of rent to a third person, instead of the lessor, is not a sufficient disclaimer to render a notice to quit unnecessary (p). But where the defendant held premises under a tenant for life, on whose death possession was claimed and rent demanded by the heir-at-law of the devisor, whereupon the defendant wrote to the attorney of the heir-at-law, stating that he held as tenant to J. S. (the husband of the tenant for life), in right of his wife; that he had never (g) Booth v. Macfarlane, 1 B. & Ad. 904. The notice to entitle a landlord to double rent must be a valid notice determining the tenancy; Johnstone v. Huddlestone, 4 B. & C. 922. (h) Lapiere v. M'Intosh, 1 P. & D. 629. (i) Right v. Beard, 13 East, 210; Hegan v. Johnson, 2 Taunt. 148; Doe v. Boulton, 6 M. & Selw. 148. Other instances, Adams, Ej. 3rd ed. 121; ante, 328. Under an agreement to grant a lease to alien artificer, Lapiere v. M'Intosh, 1 P. & Dav. 629. (k) Doe d. Jones v. Jones, 10 B. & C. 718; see also Wilkinson v. Malin, Tyr. 544. As to expelling a pauper from a parish house, Wildbor v. Rainsforth, 8 B. & C. 4. (1) Bul. N. P. 96; Doe d. Williams v. Pasquali, Peake's R. 197; Bower v. Major, 1 B. & B. 4. (m) Doe d. Lewis v. Cawdor, 1 C., M. & R. 398. (n) Per Parke, B., Doe d. Gray v. Stanion, 1 Mee. & W. 703. (0) Williams v. Pasquali, Peake, R. 197. (p) Id.; Doe d. Dillon v. Parker, Gow, R. 180. considered the claimant as the landlord of the house; that he should be ready to pay the arrears to any person who should be proved to be heir-at-law; but that he must decline taking upon himself to decide upon the claim made on him, without more satisfactory proof in a legal manner; it was held that this letter amounted to a disclaimer of the title of the heir-at-law, and that he was not bound to give a notice to quit (q). So where a piece of land was held under a lease for lives, a declaration made by the tenant in possession, that he held the premises as his own, and that he would pay no rent, amounts to a disclaimer (r). It is obvious that a notice to quit is unnecessary, where the tenant holds for a fixed and limited period, or until a certain event occurs (s). 2. By whom given.-The notice to be good, ought to be binding on all the parties concerned at the time it was given, and not to depend for its validity in part upon any subsequent recognition of one of them; because the tenant is to act upon the notice at the time, and therefore it should be such as he may act upon with security (t). Therefore where a notice to quit is given by the agent of a landlord, it seems that the agent ought to have authority to give it at the time it begins to operate, and that a subsequent recognition of the authority of the agent will not render the notice valid; at least a notice to quit given by an agent of the landlord's agent, is invalid, unless given by the landlord's prior authority, or subsequently recognised by him (u). But assuming that a subsequent recognition of the authority of the agent can be sufficient for this purpose (x), the bringing an ejectment is not a sufficient recognition; because the recognition should at all events take place before the day of demise laid in the declaration (y). In Doe d. Aslin v. Summersett (2) it was decided that a notice (9) Doe d. Calvert v. Frowd, 1 M. & P. 480; 4 Bing. 557, S. C.; Doe d. Cheese v. Creed, 2 M. & P. 648; 5 Bing. 327, S. C.; Doe d. Clun v. Clarke, Peake's Addl. C. 239; see Doe d. Grubb v. Grubb, 10 B. & C. 816. (r) Doe d. Phipps v. Gowen, 1 Ju rist, 794. (s) Cobb v. Stokes, 8 East, 358; Messenger v. Armstrong, 1 T. R. 54. (t) Per Lawrence, J., Right d. Fisher v. Cuthell, 5 East, 499; Adams Ej. 3rd ed. 126. (u) Doe d. Rhodes v. Robinson, 4 Scott, 396; 3 Bing. N. C. 677, S. C. (r) See in general, ante, 17, 212,213. (y) Doe d. Mann v. Warlters, 10 B. & C. 626; Doe d. Rhodes v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 677; 4 Scott, 396; 1 Jurist, 356, S. C. (z) 1 B. & Ad. 135. See Goodtitle v. Woodward, 3 B. & Ald. 689. The decision in the latter case seems to be correct; but the reasons for it, as expressed in the report, appear to be to quit, signed by one of several joint tenants, on behalf of himself and others, will determine a tenancy from year to year as to all. Lord Tenterden, in delivering the judgment of the court, observed, "Two grounds were insisted upon by the lessors of the plaintiff: one, that the adoption of this notice by the other lessor of the plaintiff, made it of the same validity as if it had been signed by both of them; the other, that without any such adoption, a notice to quit by one of the joint tenants puts an end to the tenancy as to both: and we are of opinion that the latter ground is right. When joint tenants join in a lease, each demises his own share (a); and each may put an end to that demise as far as it operates upon his own share, whether his companions will join with him in putting an end to the whole lease or not; Doe, Lessee of Whayman v. Chaplin (b); so that upon the notice to quit in this case, no doubt a third might have been recovered, had there been a separate demise. But though upon a joint lease by joint tenants each demises his own share, this is not the only operation of such a lease. Joint tenants are seised, not only of their respective shares per my, but also of the entirety per tout (c). The rent reserved will enure jointly to all the lessors (d); and if any of them die, the lessee shall hold the whole as tenant to the survivors. Upon a joint demise by joint tenants upon a tenancy from year to year, the true character of the tenancy is this-not that the tenant holds of each the share of each, so long as he and each shall please, but that he holds the whole of all, so long as he and all shall please; and as soon as any one of the joint tenants gives a notice to quit, he effectually puts an end to that tenancy; the tenant has a right upon such a notice to give up the whole, and unless he comes to a new arrangement with the other joint tenants as to their shares, he is compellable so to do. The hardship upon the tenant, if he were not entitled to treat a notice from one as putting an end to the tenancy as to the whole, is obvious; for however willing a man might be to be sole tenant of an estate, it is not very likely he should be willing to hold undivided shares of it; and if upon such a notice the tenant is entitled to treat it as putting an unfounded. See Doe v. Summersett, and per Parke, J., in Doe v. Warlters, 10 B. & C. 634; Adams, Ej. 3rd ed. 126, note (b). (a) Co. Lit. 186 a. (d) Co. Lit. 47 a, 192 a, 214 a. end to the tenancy as to the whole, the other joint tenant must have the same right. It cannot be optional on one side, and on one side only. It is certainly true that in Doe v. Chaplin (e), upon a notice to quit from three joint tenants out of four, where there were separate demises from each joint tenant, the court gave it as their opinion, that the lessors of the plaintiff had a right to recover three fourths; but it was not necessary for the court to decide there as to the remaining fourth, for the plaintiff had recovered nothing, the jury had found for the defendant, and the court was only granting a new trial.” It appears, therefore, that if landlords be joint tenants, a notice to quit from one of them only, even though he do not profess to give the notice for the others, will determine the tenancy as to the whole of the premises. At all events where the landlords are partners in trade, a notice in the names of all, signed by one, is sufficient. In such case an authority from the other partners to give the notice, may be (if necessary) presumed, and the tenant has a notice which he can safely act upon (f). Where a lease contained a proviso, that in case either the landlord or tenant, or their respective heirs and executors, wished to determine it at the end of the first fourteen years, and should give six months' notice in writing, "under his or their respective hands," the term should cease; it was held, that a notice to quit, signed by two only of three executors of the original lessor, to whom he had bequeathed the freehold as joint tenants, expressing the notice to be given on behalf of themselves and the third executor, was not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the proviso, and was therefore inoperative, although the latter subsequently recognised such notice (g). And a notice to quit given to a tenant of lands, originally devised to the rector and churchwardens of a parish and their successors, in trust, signed by the rector and churchwardens, requiring him to deliver up the premises" to the rector and churchwardens for the time being,' is ill (h). It is scarcely necessary to observe, that the notice to quit must (e) 3 Taunt. 120. (f) Doe d. Elliot v. Hulme, 2 M. & R. 433. (g) Right d. Fisher v. Cuthell, 5 East, 491; 2 Smith, 83; and 5 Esp. 149, S. C. Observed upon by Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Doe v. Summersett, 1 B. & Ad. 141. (h) Doe d. Brooks v. Fairclough, 6 M. & Sel. 40. be given by the person who is at the time, in legal contemplation, the landlord of the tenant in possession (i). If the tenant took the premises from A., a notice from the latter only is sufficient, although A. subsequently entered into partnership with B., and the receipts for rent were given in their joint names; provided there be no evidence of B. having acquired any legal interest by a transfer from A. (j). The steward of a corporation is a sufficient agent to give a notice to quit corporate lands, although he have no power to that effect under the corporate seal (k). And a receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery with power to let lands may also give notice to quit them (7). But a mere receiver of rents, as such, appears not to have a sufficient authority to give the notice (m), though a prior authority or a subsequent recognition by the landlord might render the notice valid (n). 3. To whom given.-The notice to quit should be served by the landlord upon the party who is his tenant, either personally, upon or off the premises; or by leaving it with the tenant's wife or servant at the usual place of abode of such tenant (o). And it seems that where the wife or servant of the tenant is served upon the premises, the notice is absolutely sufficient; although it be proved that in fact the notice did not reach the tenant (p). Notice to the widow of the late tenant is primâ facie sufficient, if she continue the occupation, and it be not proved that another person is legally the personal representative (g). And where A. had been tenant of the premises, and upon his leaving them B. took possession, it was held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it might be presumed that he came in as assignee of A., although he never paid rent; and that a notice to quit, given to B., was sufficient (r). If there be several tenants, or several landlords, the notice should be addressed to all, but may (i) Brawley v. Wade, M'Clel. 664. (j) Doe v. Baker, 8 Taunt. 241. (k) Roe d. Dean of Rochester v. Pierce, 2 Camp. 96; Doe v. Fillis, 2 Chit. R. 170; ante, 276, 277. (1) Wilkinson v. Calley, Burr. 2694; Doe d. Marsack v. Read, 12 East, 57, 61; ante, 215, note (d). (m) See per Parke, J., Doe d. Mann v. Warlters, 10 B. & C. 693. (n) Doe d. Rhodes v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 677; 4 Scott, 396. (0) Jones d. Griffiths v. Marsh, 4 T. R. 464; Doe v. Lucas, 5 Esp. R. 153; Ad. Ej. 3d ed. 130, 131, 132. (p) Doe d. Neville v. Dunbar, M. & Mal. 10. (9) Rees d. Mears v. Perrot, 4 C. & P. 230; Doe v. Skirrow, 2 Nev. & P. 123; 7 Ad. & E. 157, S. C. (r) Doe d. Morris v. Williams, 9 D. & R. 30; 6 B. & C. 41, S. C.; Roe d. Blair v. Street, 2 Ad. & E. 329. |