confultation to levy war, with intent to kill, depofe, or imprifon the King, had been deemed high treafon long before his time; and that delinquents had been found guilty of hightreafon, within the Act of Parliament, for words which indicated their treasonable intent,

It does not follow, as our Hiftorian afferts, after Mr. Ralph, that the fame inference might have been drawn against the authors and inftruments of the Revolution.' The cafe at the Revolution was widely different. The King had stretched the Prerogative, violated his coronation-oath, and openly invaded the rights of his fubjects. Under thefe circumftances, it was lawful to refift him as a tyrant; but no fuch pretences could be urged in favour of the confpirators against King William. There is undoubtedly a very material difference between a Rebellion and a Civil War. The firft is properly where subjects take up arms against lawful Governors, lawfully governing: but where a Prince violates the established laws of the kingdom, and perfifts in his violation, then refiftance, in vindication of the Liberties of the nation, cannot be called Rebellion: and, as Sydney juftly obferves, there can be no fuch thing in the world as the Rebellion of a Nation against its own Magiftrates.

Had our Hiftorian fhewn himself as forward to praise as ready to cenfure, he might have found a theme for panegyric, in the conduct of Chief-Juftice Holt, in regard to the contefted election for Ailefbury. But though he is fo ready to reflect on the Chief Juftice's opinion in the former inftance, yet he takes no notice of his fpirited declaration in the cafe of Ashby and White,

He gives the following narrative of that memorable election. That an action having been brought by one Matthew Afhby against William White, and the other Conftables of Ailetbury, for having denied the privilege of voting in the laft election, the caufe was tried at the affizes, and the Con* ftables caft with damages. But an Order was given in the Queen's-Bench, to quafh all the proceedings, fince no action had ever been brought on that account.' He afterwards tells us, That actions were brought against the Ailefbury Constables by five other perfons, who were committed to Newgate by the Houfe of Commons, who voted them guilty of a breach of privilege in bringing fuch actions; and that the five perfons committed having moved for a Habeas Corpus in the Court of King's-bench, the court refufed to take cognizance of the af* fair.' But he takes no notice, that the Lord-chief-juftice Holt acted on this occafion as the Patron of Liberty.-That he Was of opinion, that an action did lie at law, and that the profe

ting it, was no breach of privilege-That he opposed the opinion of his three Brethren, who declared, that the House of Commons were the proper Judges of their own privilegesThat, on the contrary, he held the authority of the Houfe to be circumfcribed by law; and that if they exceeded that authority, then to fay that they were judges of their own privileges, was to make their privileges to be what they would have them to be. -He takes no notice, that according to the Chief-Juftice's opinion, the judgment of the other three Judges was reverfed upon a Writ of Error in the House of Lords. These were circumftances as material and interefting as any in the above trial for treafon.

In his account of Sir John Fenwick's cafe, he gives an abftract of all the arguments of the Counfel in behalf of the prifoner, and then contents himself with faying- Their argu6 ments were answered by the King's Counfel.' But he makes no mention whatever, of the purport of thofe arguments. His ftate of the facts likewife is fomewhat imperfect. He has, in particular, omitted the contents of the letter which Sir John Fenwick wrote to his Lady; without which it is difficult to have a clear comprehenfion of the subsequent matter.

It must be observed, likewife, that his reflections, in many inftances, are highly exceptionable. Speaking of the propofals of peace which Lewis the XIVth fent to the Allies, he makes the following observation on their demands.

Their demands were fo infolent, that Lewis would ⚫ not have fuffered them to be mentioned in his hearing had • he not been reduced to the laft degree of diftrefs. One can hardly read them without feeling a fentiment of compaffion for that Monarch, who had once given law to Europe, • and been fo long accustomed to victory and conqueft. Notwithstanding the difcouraging difpatches he had received from the Prefident Rouillé, after his firft conferences with the Deputies, he could not believe that the Dutch would be fo blind to their own intereft, as to reject the advantages in commerce, and the barrier which he had offered. He could not conceive, that they would chufe to bear the burthen of exceffive taxes in profecuting a war, the events of which would always be uncertain, rather than enjoy the bleffings of peace, fecurity, and advantageous commerce: he flattered himself, that the allies would not fo far deviate from their proposed aim of establishing a balance of power, as to throw fuch an ⚫ enormous weight into the scale of the House of Auftria, which cherished all the dangerous ambition and arbitrary principles,

U 4

without

✦ without the liberality and fentiment peculiar to the House of

Bourbon.'

What did Lewis the XIVth deferve compaffion because he had once given law to Europe, and been accustomed to victory and conqueft? Is a tyrant entitled to compaffion, because he is fpoiled of the fruits of fuccefsful tyranny? Did not Lewis XIV. engage in war from the motives of rapacious pride, and the infatiate thirst of arbitrary fway? Had he a right to give law to Europe? and does he deferve pity, because he was humbled to a ftate of incapacity, which prevented him from plundering his neighbours, and extending an illegal defpotifm over the European Powers? A diftreffed Prince, is no more an object of pity than an afflicted Peafant. It is not the perfon who fuffers, but the cause of his fuffering, which justifies our compaffion. What is there in the diftreffes of a King to move pur pity, unless the man deferves it? A King, who becomes a Tyrant, finks in worth beneath the lowest of his fubjects and it would be a weaknefs to commiferate the calamity he merits.Where has this Hiftorian difcovered the liberality and fentiment peculiar to the house of Bourbon? We are not fond of national reflections, but we cannot forbear remarking, that the perfidy and chicanery which the Bourbons have difplayed, in all their political measures, bear no very favourable teftimony of their liberality or sentiment.

His reflections on the Duke of Ormond are not lefs liable to objection. A man of candor,' he fays, cannot, without an emotion of grief and indignation, reflect upon the ruin of the noble family of Ormond, in the perfon of a brave, generous, and humane Nobleman; to whom no crime was imputed, but that of having obeyed the commands of his Sovereign. And he afterwards takes notice, that the Duke and Lord Bolingbroke, who had retired to France, finding themselves condemned unheard, and attainted, engaged in the fervice of the Chevalier, and correfponded with the Tories in England. But the Duke of Ormond's fate was undoubtedly merited. His conduct at the head of the army was certainly bafe and fcandalous; and even the commands of the Sovereign cannot justify a General, in acting to the prejudice or difhonour of his country. Befides, to fay, that no crime was imputed to him, but that of having cbeyed the commands of his Sovereign,' is neither talking like an hiftorian or a politician. It is well known, that he was one of the principal leaders of that faction, which gave fuch pernicious council to their Sovereign, and then fought to fhelter themselves under the fanction of thofe very commands, which they in fact liad dictated themselves. If Sovereign commands were fufficient to authorize the fervants of the Crown in the execution

of

།

哈

of orders, however illegal, then the crown would in fact be ar-
bitrary, and, as the King can do no wrong, no one would remain
anfwerable for the abuse of the executive power. Even Sovereign
orders could not justify the Duke of Ormond in his secret, we
may fay, traiterous correfpondence with the French General. As
to his being condemned unheard, it is a ridiculous observation,
with regard to a delinquent, who betakes himself to flight, and
does not stay to make his Defence. And how it was agreeable
to the character of a brave, generous, and humane Nobleman,
to enter into the fervice of the Chevalier, and foment a horrid
rebellion in his native land, out of perfonal pique to the Mini-
try, we own ourselves at a lofs to determine.

The fame impropriety appears in his remarks on the oppofition to Sir Robert Walpole. It must be acknowleged,' fays he, they were by this time irritated into fuch perfonal animofity against the Minifter, that they refolved to oppofe all his meafures, whether they might or might not be neceffary for the fafety and advantage of the kingdom. Nor, indeed, were they altogether blameable for acting on this maxim, if their fole aim was to remove from the confidence and councils of their Sovereign, a man whofe conduct they thought prejudicial to the intereft and liberty of their country.

Amazing! Were they not blameable for oppofing the Minifter in all his measures, even in fuch as might be neceffary for the fafety of the kingdom? Could any motive, whatever, juftify fuch treafon against their country? Befides, was it a probable method to remove the Minister from the confidence of his Sovereign, to oppofe all his measures, right or wrong? Would not fuch an unjuft oppofition rather increase that confidence which they laboured to deftroy? Was it not the way to convince their Sovereign and the world, that they acted from perfonal animofity; and that their diflike was to the Minifter, and not to his meafures? It would be wafting time to take further notice of fuch inconfiderate reflections.

6

Our Author has taken great pains to place the peace of Utrecht in a favourable light; and has retailed all the exploded arguments ufed in vindication of that treaty; without ftating, as an Hiftorian ought to have done, what was urged in oppofition to it. He makes the very worst apology for the conduct of the Miniftry, when he fays, that they faw no hope of fafety, except in renouncing their principles, and fubmitting to ⚫ their adverfaries, or elle in taking fuch measures as would haften the pacification; and with which view they fet on foot a private negotiation with Lewis.' But whatever glofs partycolouring may put on this treaty, the advantages obtained by it were not only inadequate to what we might reafonably have ex

pected

pected and demanded, and greatly inferior to the terms which Lewis had before humbly offered, nay almoft implored us to accept, but the manner of concluding it was difhonourable to the nation. When a confederacy is formed against a common enemy, no party in it ought to treat privately, or separately. Indeed any one is at liberty to detach himself, if the reft are fo obftinate as to refufe reafonable propofitions; but he should first endeavour to perfuade them to an acceptance of the terms offered, and give them notice, that in cafe of their refufal, he will conclude a feparate peace. This duty is obligatory, even where the confederate powers have not fixed on any particular points to be gained by the war. But this obligation is much ftronger where they have ftipulated not to lay down their arms till they have obtained fuch and fuch particular ends. In this cafe, no one is at liberty to detach himself, till thofe propofed advantages are acquired. If in the courfe of the war, the acquifition of them should be thought impracticable, yet not one, but the whole confederate body muft judge of that impracticability. The allies in the war of 1712, agreed not to fuffer Spain and the Indies to remain in the House of Bourbon. This was the exprefs end of the war; and till that end was accomplished, or given up by the Confederates as impracticable, no one in particular had a right to conclude a separate peace. Befides it was an exprefs article in the treaty, that no party should treat of peace, truce, &c. but jointly with the reft.'

It is in vain for our Hiftorian to adopt the ftale pretence made ufe of by the advocates of this peace- that the liberties of Europe would be expofed to much greater danger from an actual union of the Imperial and Spanish crowns in one head of the House of Auftria, than from a bare poffibility of Spain's being united with France, in one branch of the House of Bourbon.' This might have been a good argument against our entering into any exprefs ftipulations to prevent the crown of Spain's being enjoyed by the Houfe of Bourbon, but could not juftify our withdrawing ourselves from the terms of the alliance, against the confent of the Confederates, after we had engaged. If folemn treaties among nations are to be explained away, and made fubfervent to the particular interefts of a faction, there is an end of all national faith; and we cannot complain, that our allies prove faithlefs in their turns, and defert us when it fuits their convenience. Befides, if there was reafon to think, that the Emperor Charles VI. would become two powerful by the acceffion of Spain, that crown might have been conferred on Bavaria, or fome other power; by which means the inconvenience would have been obviated, without any infraction of the terms of the alliance. But the ill effects of fuffering Spain to remain in the

Houfe